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[Abstract] This study examines the ﬁ nancial behaviour of Russian households from the 
collapse of communism to the ﬁ nancial melt down in August 1998. By transforming savings 
into investment, ﬁ nancial intermediaries are important to economic growth. In post-Soviet 
Russia, ﬁ nancial intermediaries were increasingly unable to attract new household savings, as 
people turned to foreign currency. What determined the allocation of household savings? The 
study considers the three main alternatives households could turn to: The state savings bank; 
commercial ﬁ nancial companies; and foreign currency, mainly dollars.
But how do we go about to explain the behaviour of millions of individuals over time? 
Economists usually assume that people maximise returns on their assets. Financial behaviour 
would then reﬂ ect economic variables such as interest rate, exchange rate and inﬂ ation. Such a 
view ﬁ ts uneasily with observed behaviour in post-Soviet Russia. However, why would people 
not allocate their savings in the most proﬁ table way? This study holds that to understand 
why people do what they do, we should listen carefully - although not uncritically - to what 
they say and how they say it. On this view, we can explain the behaviour of individuals only 
if we can understand them. And - since social phenomena are constituted by the behaviour 
of individuals - such understanding is crucial to the causal explanation of macro level 
phenomena.The historical narrative thus becomes an important vehicle for explanation of the 
contemporary world.
Through analysis of discourses on ﬁ nancial institutions, as they appeared in newspapers of 
the day and as I have been able to gather from interviews conducted in 2004, this study identi-
ﬁ es certain dramatic events that altered the way Russians perceived different ﬁ nancial institu-
tions and their view on trust, risk and proﬁ tability, and ﬁ nds that such changes in perception go 
a long way to explain the changes in observed behaviour in this period.
Nils August Andresen
As safe as the Bank?
Household ﬁ nancial behaviour and economic 
reasoning in post-soviet Russia
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Front-page photo (by the author, May 2004): Main entrance of the office of a 
private pension fund in Nizhny Novogord. The name of the fund is Doverie, 
which means “trust”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Savings constitute the backbone and the most important indication of 
the health of an economy. [...] Household savings should be the most 
important source of investment, as the temporarily superfluous 
resources of citizens should be deposited with banks and other financial 
intermediaries, and through them go into production, trade, services, 
house building. 
 
Boris Fëdorov, former minister of finance, deputy of the Russian State 
Duma, to Izvestija, 24 January 1995 
 
 
 
 
 
 “I’d like to open an account in your bank. Whom should I see?” 
 “A psychiatrist.” 
 
– Russian joke 
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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the financial behaviour of Russian households from the collapse of 
communism to the financial meltdown in August 1998. Because they transform savings into 
investment, financial intermediaries are important to economic growth. In post-Soviet Russia, 
financial intermediaries were increasingly unable to attract new household savings, as people 
turned to foreign currency. What determined the allocation of household savings? The study 
considers the three main alternative allocations: the state savings bank; commercial financial 
companies; and foreign currency, mainly dollars. 
But how do we go about to explain the behaviour of millions of individuals over time? 
Economists usually assume that people maximise returns on their assets. Financial 
behaviour would then reflect economic variables such as interest rate, exchange rate and 
inflation. Such a view fits uneasily with observed behaviour in post-Soviet Russia. However, why 
would people not allocate their savings in the most profitable way? This study holds that to 
understand why people do what they do, we should listen carefully - although not uncritically - to 
what they say and how they say it. On this view, we can explain the behaviour of individuals 
only if we can understand them. And - since social phenomena are constituted by the behaviour of 
individuals - such understanding is crucial to the causal explanation of macro level phenomena. 
The study draws on insight from Russian economic sociology, but insists that a chronological 
understanding be maintained. The historical narrative thus becomes an important vehicle for 
explanation of the contemporary world. 
Through analysis of discourses on financial institutions, as they appeared in newspapers of the 
day and as I have been able to gather from interviews conducted in 2004, this study identifies 
certain dramatic events that altered the way Russians perceived different financial institutions 
and their view on trust, risk and profitability, and finds that such changes in perception go a long 
way to explain the changes in observed behaviour in this period. 
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1. Introduction: Stating the Problem 
On 8 July 2004, the Russian banking system was rocked by a new crisis, as thousands of 
customers gathered outside the offices of Al’fa Bank,1 the fourth largest bank in the 
country, to empty their accounts – even as the bank introduced a 10% commission to 
discourage withdrawal. By all normal measures, the bank was liquid and healthy; and 
both Visa and Master Card attempted to reassure Al’fa Bank’s customers by issuing 
statements that they would accept credit cards issued by the bank. The panic, it 
appeared, was a reaction to a rumour about the bank’s liquidity. That a mere rumour 
can bring about such massive loss of trust in the face of official reassurances is 
incomprehensible unless one knows the history of interaction between banks and 
ordinary Russians in the formative period of the post-Soviet Russian financial market. 
This was a time marred by great financial instability and ensuing crises of trust on the 
part of the population. The expression “as safe as the bank” would probably have been 
interpreted more as a joke than as a proverb. However, although the period as a whole 
witnessed an erosion of trust in financial intermediaries, various saving alternatives did 
enjoy popularity at various points in time. The present study examines the causes of 
household financial behaviour in Russia starting in 1991, when the state savings bank, 
Sberbank, experienced its first major crisis of trust following a monetary reform, and 
ending with the financial crisis in August 1998, a time when cash dollars had come to 
dominate as the most popular savings alternative. But if this is an inquiry into the causes 
of household financial behaviour, the interest in the subject is inspired by the effects of 
household financial behaviour on the Russian economy on the one hand, and, on the 
other, the significance of household financial behaviour as a prism through which light 
can be shed on important questions about social interaction and economic reasoning. 
                                                   
1  Note on transcription: Where there exist well-established English spellings, I have used these. That 
includes names of places and the following well-known people: Leo Tolstoy, Nikita Khrushchev, Leonid 
Brezhnev, Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin, Yegor Gaidar, Viktor Chernomyrdin and Sergei Kirienko, as 
well as chairman of the State Property Committee Anatoly Chubais, and oligarchs Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky and Roman Ambramovich. Otherwise, I have used phonetic transcription. All 
translations from the Russian are the author’s. 
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Why study Russian financial behaviour? 
Savings are fundamental to the functioning of the economy. According to standard 
economic theory, in order to be able to invest, a society has to set aside some part of its 
production which could otherwise have been consumed.2 Investment allows a society to 
expand its productive capacity through the purchase of capital goods – in economic 
terms, gross fixed capital formation – and thereby its output. Total saving in an economy 
is composed of household saving, corporate saving and government saving. It may 
matter less whether it is households, the government or businesses that save, but it does 
matter how savings are allocated. If savings are not put into circulation, they will not 
have the expected beneficial effect on productive activity. (See for instance Munthe 1980: 
89–94.) 
In Western market economies, households rely on financial intermediaries to put 
their savings into circulation – and to their most efficient use. (See Allen & Santomero 
1996.) The most important of these have traditionally been commercial banks, which 
borrow from households and lend to enterprises.3 Several studies have indicated a 
strong correlation between the development of the banking system and economic 
development.4 The rise and fall of commercial banks in Russia, and the ensuing 
dollarisation – in effect, capital flight (Abalkin & Whalley 1999: 5) – is therefore 
significant for overall economic development. 
If the relationship between households and financial intermediaries is important 
because it is an indicator of economic growth, it is interesting also because it is an 
indicator of a fundamental characteristic of a functioning market economy: impersonal 
trust in people and institutions. All market transactions depend on a certain minimum of 
trust, but depositing money with a financial intermediary is a special leap of faith: You 
give away your money, and get no good back immediately; you simply receive a credit 
with the bank. Indeed, the word “credit” derives from Italian credere – “to believe”. In 
his seminal work on civic traditions and democracy, Robert Putnam found the rise of 
                                                   
2  In an open economy, resources for investment can be obtained from abroad. This implies running a trade 
deficit, which is usually unsustainable in the long run. An exception from this rule is the trade deficit in 
the USA, which is possible due to the unique position of the dollar in international financial markets. 
3  A large literature discusses the relative importance of various financial institutions in different countries 
historically, where Great Britain, which traditionally had a dispersed financial system, is counterpoised 
to Germany, which had fewer but larger banks. See for instance Gerschenkron 1962. 
4  See Levine 1998 for an overview. 
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banking in Northern Italy in the 13th century to be an integral part of the development of 
a society where people could trust that their counterpart would honour a contract, or 
that, in the case of disagreement, the contract would be enforced impartially by a third 
party. (Putnam 1993: 128)  
In the Soviet system, households did not compare the terms of different institutions; 
and only to a limited degree did they make decisions regarding the trustworthiness of 
their counterpart, which, at least in theory, was always the state. A third party to enforce 
agreements had no place whatsoever in the system. What, then, happened with financial 
intermediation when the Soviet system was modified and dismantled? 
 
Brief sketch of the Russian financial sector, 1991–1998 
At the beginning of perestroika, the Soviet Union had a ‘monobank’ system, which 
differed fundamentally from what we think of as the banking sector in the West. In 
market economies, banks channel funds into those areas of the economy that offer the 
best returns. But in the centrally planned Soviet economy, the state made all major 
allocation decisions. The economy was quantity-oriented rather than value-oriented, and 
the money plan was simply the counterpart of the quantitative production plan; money 
was needed as an accounting unit. All banks were part of the State Bank – Gosbank. Thus, 
resource allocation depended not on viability criteria, but on five-year plans and 
politically set interest rates. (Prill 1995: 11; Keiding & Pitzner-Jørgensen 1988: 54f ) For 
households, saving alternatives were limited to deposits in Sberbank. Most people had 
an account with Sberbank, which had been a stable and trusted institution ever since the 
1960s (after the Great Patriotic War and until 1957, the state had forced households to 
buy government bonds). (See Spicer & Pyle 2003: 6.) 
When Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985, the Soviet economic system was in 
deep crisis, culminating with a shortage of even basic food products in 1990 and 1991, 
following a poor harvest. Gorbachev set out to speed up the economy by introducing 
market incentives and private initiatives, and the banking system was an integral part of 
this reform programme. In 1988, the monobank system was divided into two tiers – a 
central bank, and specialised banks in various sectors of the economy (ibid.). In 1989, the 
Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (RSFSR) decreed that all banks were to be 
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reorganised into commercial banks, followed by all-Union legislation in 1990 on the 
formation of joint stock companies. Hundreds of branches of the former specialised 
banks split off to become private companies. (Spicer & Pyle 2003: 6ff.) When Yeltsin 
assumed power in the RSFSR in June 1991, there were already some 1200 banks 
registered in Russia, although they did not yet deal with household clients. The hope 
was that the new banks would increase efficiency in mediating savings into productive 
investment. 
That did not happen. Privatisation was expected to lead to greater economic 
efficiency – instead, vouchers were collected by a privileged few. State subsidies to 
industry continued almost unabated, which meant that bank credit was still not 
allocated on the basis of the economic viability of the projects; and corruption reached 
unprecedented levels. The legal framework was underdeveloped in all sectors of the 
economy. Property rights were insecure; honesty and transparency remained 
unsupported by law. Neither the media nor the public had any experience with 
commercials, and fraudulent advertising became widespread. Between 1991 and 1998, 
the Russian economy contracted by some 50% (Khanin & Suslov 1999). The proportion 
of the population living below the official subsistence level skyrocketed from 2% in 1990 
to more than a quarter of the population in 1995, peaking at almost 40% in 1998 
(Tersman 1998). Unemployment soared, as the Soviet system – reflected in the joke 
“They pretend that they pay us, we pretend that we work” – was at least partially 
abandoned as a way of absorbing unemployment, and was only very inadequately 
replaced with social security nets. Life expectancy decreased dramatically, especially 
among the male population, as alcoholism spread at alarming rates. When Western 
advisers in the early 1990s advocated “shock therapy” to create a successful market 
economy, surely these were not the kind of shocks they had in mind. Some of the most 
painful shocks for ordinary Russians concerned the fate of their savings. 
In January 1991, Soviet Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov5 initiated a reform that 
received his name. In effect, the Pavlov reform froze that proportion of household 
savings which was held in cash, in an attempt to undertake partial price liberalisation 
and at the same time curb inflation. The government introduced new rouble bank-notes, 
                                                   
5  Valentin Pavlov later joined the failed coup d’etat in August that year. 
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and citizens were given a three-day deadline to exchange all their old bank-notes in 
Sberbank, but not more than 500 roubles – roughly one month’s wage at the time – per 
individual. Officially, this was done to combat the shadow economy, but it is clear that it 
was hoped that this confiscation of money would reduce the so-called monetary 
overhang, and thereby reduce inflation. These reforms sparked outrage, and became 
associated with Sberbank where the exchange took place. The reform programme linked 
with Yeltsin’s acting Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar moved to a fuller liberalisation of 
prices in January 1992, setting off a period of high inflation and negative real interest 
rates which wiped out much of the population’s life savings. 
At the same time household income dropped, and a greater share had to be devoted 
to everyday needs (Nikolaenko 1998: 503ff). However, in times of uncertainty, many 
people also feel a need to save to prepare for the worst – economists call this 
‘precautionary saving’. Savings as a share of net household income dropped from above 
20% in 1991 to about 10% of disposable household income – or about 5% of GDP in 1995; 
most of the decrease came as the monthly growth of cash rouble holdings was reduced 
as inflation went down (Ivašinenko 2002: 63).6 Saving in cash roubles was 
extraordinarily high during hyperinflation – although rouble holdings devalued quickly, 
households had to have enough cash available to buy food and other necessities at a 
higher price than when they received pay checks, a phenomenon known as consumption 
of money services. According to economic theory, the need to hold cash increases when 
inflation is high. Unfortunately, there is no easy way to distinguish such consumption 
from other saving activity. However, surveys asking about preferred forms of saving 
showed that holding rouble cash was the least popular saving alternative until 1995, 
which suggests that the large increases in rouble cash holdings were not intended as 
saving (Strebkov 2001: 7). From 1995, household savings stabilised at about 10% of 
income until August 1998, when the government defaulted on government bonds. This 
led to a doubling of the exchange rate over night, a burst of inflation and devaluation of 
rouble savings, terms of trade shocks, a 12% fall in GDP, en masse bankruptcies among 
commercial banks, and low saving rates for several years as families tried to cope with 
the shock (Ivašinenko 2002: 63). The political and economic discontinuities associated 
                                                   
6  Goskomstat operates with much higher figures; for a critique of the measures employed by Goskomstat, 
see Gregory, Mokhtary & Schrettl 1999 and Nikolaenko 1998. 
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with the crisis make August 1998 a natural point at which to end this review of the 
formative phase of the Russian financial system. 
At the start of 1992, when the institutional basis for private savings was established, 
Sberbank had 99.7% of the household deposit market. But the institution was no longer 
ubiquitously trusted after the Pavlov reforms. Hundreds of commercial banks were 
ready to offer competition, and when voucher privatisation started in 1992, a multitude 
of investment funds and semi-banks were created to compete for vouchers and money 
from households.7 These companies often offered high returns through aggressive 
marketing, and were able to attract a rising share of household deposits. By the first half 
of 1994, that share amounted to 4.5% of disposable household income – more than 
Sberbank’s 3.3% and far more than the share of foreign currency cash. 
However, in July 1994 one of the largest commercial financial companies, MMM, 
crashed and defaulted on its obligations to depositors. In the end, it was exposed as a 
simple financial pyramid. According to various estimates, somewhere between 5 and 15 
million people suffered from the crash of MMM alone.8 That marked the start of a flight 
from commercial financial companies. The same autumn saw the infamous Black 
Tuesday – 11 October 1994 – when the rouble depreciated 27% against the dollar, in a 
single day (Library of Congress Country Studies 1996). This exchange rate shock caused 
problems for several other financial companies (Ivašinenko 2002: 62). The commercial 
financial companies never recovered. By the second half of 1995, when there was a 
liquidity crisis on the interbank market, they were already attracting less than 1% of 
household savings, a figure that further declined towards the end of the period studied 
here (Spicer & Pyle 2003: 10). 
Sberbank’s share of the market, having dropped to a low of 3.3% in the first half of 
1994, remained stable around 4% until 1996, although Sberbank constantly offered lower 
interest rates than private competitors.9 But starting in late 1996, this changed. In the two 
                                                   
7  In the meantime, Sberbank also reorganised, became a joint stock company and tried to modernise its 
operations. In this study, Sberbank will be treated separately, for three reasons: First, it was still majority 
state-owned, and as the only bank, Sberbank had government guarantees behind its deposits. Second, it 
was a colossus, larger than all its competitors taken together. Third, most people continued to see 
Sberbank and commercial banks as two separate kinds of institutions. 
8  “Pocemu Mavrodi ne sbežal za granicu”, Komsomol’skaja Pravda, 03.02.2003 
9  A March 1995 comparison between Sberbank and eight commercial banks shows that Sberbank offered 
lower interest rates than all other leading banks. For instance, whereas Sberbank offered 50% interest on 
six-month deposits, the other banks varied between 54% and 86%. (Spicer & Pyle 2003: 11) Figures from 
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years preceding the financial crisis of 1998, rouble deposits plummeted from almost 60% 
of total household savings to less than 15%. Instead, people increasingly turned to 
foreign currency. This was not new – the proportion of household savings directed 
towards buying foreign currency had hovered around 20% in 1993 and 1994, before it 
dropped in 1995 (Ivašinenko 2002: 63). 
That people bought currency in 1993 and 1994 is unsurprising, given the extremely 
high inflation and the volatility of the rouble exchange rate,10 as well as negative real 
interest rates on rouble deposits.11 During most of the time from the liberalisation of 
exchange and throughout the period under review, inflation was higher than the 
devaluation of the rouble measured against the US dollar – which meant that the 
purchasing power of dollars decreased over time. However, holding cash roubles was 
infinitely worse; and, until the summer of 1995, the exchange rate fluctuated so sharply 
that currency also served as insurance against sudden terms of trade shocks – such as 
the latter half of 1992, or the above-mentioned Black Tuesday. That the share of foreign 
currency cash in household portfolios dropped in 1995 is also not surprising: The 
government was able to stabilise both the exchange rate and the inflation rate through 
the introduction of a currency corridor, which set goals for the development of the 
exchange rate and established some degree of fiscal responsibility in the state budget. In 
1995, the rouble actually revalued for some time (Brodsky 1997: Figure 1). 
What is more surprising is the trend starting in the second half of 1996, running right 
through the financial crisis in August 1998, when the share of currency in total 
household savings increased significantly, despite positive real interest rates and the fact 
that inflation equalled devaluation in 1996, and substantially outweighed it in 1997 and 
the first months of 1998 (Shorrocks & Khokhlova 1999: Table 16). Still, the proportion of 
                                                                                                                                                       
July 1996 showed a similar situation. (“Kuda vložit’ den’gi, esli oni “lišnie”?”, Argumenty i Fakty, 
23.07.1996) 
10  Inflation reached 2520% in 1992, 840% in 1993 and 224% in 1994. The exchange rate worsened from 144 
roubles per dollar when trade was liberalised in July 1992, to about 5000 roubles per dollar by mid-1995. 
The 1995 budget tried to reimpose fiscal discipline, and in May 1995, the government introduced the so-
called currency corridor, which aimed to keep the exchange rate at between 4,300 and 4,900 roubles per 
dollar. Later, this was changed into a “crawling band”, starting from between 5,000 and 5,600 roubles 
per dollar sliding down to 5,500 and 6,100 roubles per dollar. Together, these measures helped to curb 
both inflation and devaluation of the rouble: In 1996, inflation was down to 21%; in 1997 it reached 10% 
per annum, and stayed at that level until the financial crash in August 1998. The devaluation of the 
rouble was down to 20.0% against the US dollar in 1996, and 7.25% in 1997. (Calculations based on 
figures from Shorrocks & Khokhlova 1999, tables 8, 15 and 16.) 
11  Real interest rates were negative for most of the time until mid-1995, but turned positive thereafter. In 
1996, the average deposit rate was 55.1%, substantially higher than inflation; in 1997, the deposit rate 
averaged 16.8% compared to a 10% price rise. (Calculations based on figures from Shorrocks & 
Khokhlova 1999, tables 8 and 15.). 
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foreign currency cash in total household savings rose to 20% in 1996, reaching 50% in 
1997 (Ivašinenko 2002: 63). From 1996, it also became possible for households to open 
foreign currency accounts, although this was not a significant factor before the August 
crisis.12 Surveys measuring preferred (not actual) saving found a similar trend from the 
second half of 1996 throughout 1998: Whereas 37% of the population preferred currency 
in June 1996, that proportion increased steady over the next two years, reaching 50% by 
December 1998 (Strebkov 2001: 7). By that time, however, actual foreign-currency cash 
savings had turned negative, as households were forced to use their savings to cope 
with the consequences of the August crisis – inflation, the freezing of bank accounts and 
loss of purchasing power. 
 
Main questions 
Starting almost from scratch in 1992, commercial financial companies increased their 
share of the market rapidly until first half of 1994, when they attracted more funds than 
Sberbank, or about a third of total household savings (Spicer & Pyle 2003: 10). Then the 
tide turned. First, the share of income going to private commercial companies sank 
rapidly. Initially, Sberbank compensated for that loss, so that the proportion of 
household savings going through financial intermediaries remained stable until 1996. 
Then Sberbank too started to lose ground. By 1998, both Sberbank and commercial 
financial companies were hard-pressed to attract new savings at all, as Russians 
increasingly made their savings in foreign currency cash, overwhelmingly in dollars. 
These developments prompt three groups of questions, which serve as point of 
departure for this study: 
First, why were commercial financial intermediaries initially so successful compared 
to Sberbank? Why did the trend turn in 1994? And why, from 1996 onwards, did 
Russians hesitate to entrust their money to financial intermediaries of any kind? These 
questions form the basis for the empirical analysis in this study, and structure that 
                                                   
12  The share of foreign currency deposits in household savings apparently increased in 1998 – not because 
people used a larger proportion of their rouble income to buy currency, but because dollars proved to be 
a very good investment: As a result of the rouble crash, the dollar almost doubled its purchasing power 
between July and December. (Shorrocks & Khokhlova 1999: Table 16) 
 9
analysis around these three discontinuities in the financial behaviour of the Russian 
population.  
Second, there are methodological questions which need to be addressed before 
embarking on the empirical study. The substantive questions about household financial 
behaviour in Russia concern the aggregate, observable and measurable results of the 
economic decisions of millions of individual Russians with differing means, norms and 
motivations. How can we explain the behaviour of millions of individuals? In answering 
the substantive questions above, I examine how people reasoned about economic 
phenomena, following the discourses on financial events and institutions among 
ordinary Russians as they appeared in newspapers and in contemporary folklore 
throughout the period, and as I have been able to reconstruct them on the basis of 
interviews. A major objective of the study is to demonstrate why a better understanding 
of economic reasoning in the societies we study is essential to causal explanation of 
economic phenomena in general, and in post-Soviet Russia in particular. 
Finally, an implicit question is what the study of the relationship between households 
and financial institutions can tell us about the relationship between events and discourse 
in general, and in Russian society and polity in particular. And can the study of this 
relationship in the 1990s make the hysteria surrounding Al’fa Bank in June 2004 
comprehensible? 
 
Structure of the study 
Part I deals with the second sub-group of questions: How can we explain aggregate 
behaviour? To examine discourses and to present the explanation as narratives is, to the 
best of my knowledge, a highly uncommon approach to explaining financial behaviour, 
so we need to consider the existing approaches in detail, and see why this study takes a 
different path. Chapter 2 reviews the explanations of the Russian developments in the 
existing academic literature, focusing as much on how the analysis is built up as on what 
it says. Chapter 3 scrutinises the conceptualisations of social phenomena and human 
behaviour underlying much of the work reviewed in Chapter 2. How do different 
academic disciplines conceive of economic behaviour? Has a historical approach 
anything new and meaningful to offer the study of financial behaviour? This study 
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propounds that it does, because in order to explain action we must understand the 
actors – real people who live real lives through time. Much of the existing literature on 
Russian financial behaviour has paid insufficient attention to these people. Chapter 4 
goes on to build a methodological framework on that basis, proposing that individual 
experiences and collective perceptions are an integral part of decision-making, and that 
to study them, we must deal with the medium through which they present themselves 
to humans: language and narratives. 
Part II deals with the first sub-group of questions posed above, applying the 
framework established in Part I to the financial world of Russian households, exploring 
to what extent interviews, newspapers, literature and popular belief can help to explain 
the changes and continuities in Russian financial behaviour. Chapter 5 covers the period 
from 1991 to 1994, and considers the problems which Sberbank experienced in the first 
years of reforms, contrasting it to the initial success of commercial financial companies. 
Chapter 6 deals with the demise of the commercial financial companies from 1994 
through 1996, again contrasting with Sberbank. In Chapter 7, I explore the use of dollars 
as a medium for saving from 1996 to 1998, a period when both Sberbank and commercial 
financial companies were struggling. 
Part III concludes the study. Chapter 8 summarises the discourses presented in Part 
II, offering a more general interpretation of the relationship between events, discourse 
and behaviour in post-Soviet Russia. Finally, Chapter 9 considers what kind of 
explanation this study has provided; what such explanation can tell and what it cannot 
tell; and what this way of writing history has to offer more generally. 
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Part I: Philosophy of Science and Methodology 
 
2. Approaches to Russian Financial Behaviour in the Existing Literature 
In the analysis of post-Soviet Russian financial behaviour, economics and sociology are 
the dominant academic disciplines. The Anglophone literature on Russian financial 
markets usually fits the economist’s rather than the sociologist’s paradigm, whereas in 
the Russian literature, economic sociologists dominate the field. We need to take a closer 
look at the differences between these approaches in general, and the significance of the 
choice of approach for choice of topic, formulation of questions and causal analysis 
regarding financial behaviour in Russia.  
 
Economic approaches 
Economists explain economic decisions that lead to economic outcomes with 
quantifiable economic variables. In order to explain the developments in Russia, 
economists would seek to identify changes in the economic environment corresponding 
to changes in behaviour over time.13 They do not claim that subjective reasons do not 
exist; but they posit that they can be adequately described by standard assumptions. Of 
these, the most prominent assumptions include stable preferences and rational choice 
(Spicer & Pyle 2003: 10). 
In order to allow for rational behaviour, neo-classical economic theory usually also 
posits the existence of full information, zero transaction costs and homogeneous goods. 
Economists dealing with saving behaviour have usually modified these latter 
assumptions. The reason is that in the original Arrow-Debreu model of resource 
                                                   
13  Changes in the distribution of wealth would also be interesting if there were different social norms in 
different groups, as suggested in the sociological literature reviewed below. Such changes could then 
lead to changes in aggregate saving patterns even if every individual stuck to the same strategy 
throughout. However, I have been unable to investigate this in detail: this alternative is hardly 
mentioned in the literature, and I have not found any data on the income development among groups 
with different perceptions of the financial environment over time. Moreover, actual allocation 
corresponds to general surveys about preferred saving forms – which do not measure how much each 
respondent saves, only what alternative they prefer, indicating at the very least that behavioural changes 
were important in their own right. See for instance Ibragimova 2001: 5 and Strebkov 2001: 7 – with the 
exception of the figures for foreign currency cash and deposits in 1998, as explained above. 
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allocation there was no room for financial intermediaries: complete information and 
perfect markets connected saver and investor directly. In the real world, however, 
asymmetric information, transaction costs and risk considerations have promoted 
intermediaries taking deposits from households and making loans to firms for 
investment.14 The time-consuming task of evaluating risk and profitability opportunities 
in innumerable enterprises is then replaced by the relatively simple task of comparing 
interest rates in banks, on state bonds or investment funds. Apart from this modification, 
the central tenets of neoclassical theory are retained. 
Economic literature on post-Soviet Russian saving has not been directed to answering 
the questions posed in this study – that is, they usually lack the diachronic perspective, 
tracking development over time. Instead, the literature seems to have been guided by 
the questions which existing models can generate. We should distinguish between 
models trying to explain how much people save and models dealing with the allocation 
of saving portfolios. Only the latter explicitly relates to this study. However, the former 
family of models also merit attention, because it is often more explicit about how 
economists conceptualise financial behaviour in post-Soviet Russia. Such models include 
life cycle and the precautionary saving hypotheses. The central idea in both is that 
households save in order to stabilise income in the long run. The life cycle hypothesis 
deals with differences in savings between generations. Households, the theory goes, 
allocate more resources to saving during the periods of life when they enjoy relatively 
high incomes – usually when they are middle-aged. Students and pensioners, who 
usually have lower incomes, engage in dissaving (Modigliani and Brumberg 1954). The 
precautionary saving hypothesis deals with different overall saving rates in different 
places or times; on this account, households save more when economic forecasts are 
dire, and less when they are bright (Gregory, Mokhtary & Schrettl 1999).15 
Using the life cycle framework, Gregory, Mokhtary and Schrettl have discovered that 
Russian saving patterns in the 1990s deviated from expected patterns, and displayed a 
U-shaped saving-age relationship, where the very young and the very old saved the 
most, whereas adults in their peak years engaged in dis-saving (Gregory, Mokhtary & 
                                                   
14  For an overview over theories of financial intermediation, see Allen & Santomero 1996 
15  There are theories of this kind that have more elaborate psychological foundations. My point here is to 
show the importance of standard assumptions for the analysis. 
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Schrettl 1999: 695). They offer two possible explanations for this puzzle: First, since life 
expectancy sunk drastically during the transition – reaching a low of 57 years for males 
in 1994 (Shorrocks & Khokhlova 1999: 4) – saving for retirement did not make sense. 
Second, because housing was privatised in the early post-Soviet period, many older 
heads of household owned their own flats. Their disposable income after housing costs 
therefore increased, which in turn enabled them to save more. 
Interestingly, although the Russian case did not yield the expected empirical results, 
the immediate response was not to question the theory embodied in the model – that 
differing saving rates in different age groups reflect an attempt to provide stable income 
over the life course. Rather, attempts were made to save the original theory by positing 
various ad hoc hypotheses, without investigating them empirically. However, Russian 
economic sociologist Olga Kuzina finds it highly unlikely that changes in life expectancy 
could have had this impact on saving rates: First of all, she argues, most people are not 
aware of these statistics. Second, even those who know of them do not believe that they 
apply to their own lives (Kuzina 2003: 3). Although not prepared to abandon the life-
cycle hypothesis altogether, Kuzina points out that “there is a heterogeneity of savings 
motivations and saving practices across cohorts” – for instance, she argues that the 
precautionary motive is more important among older cohorts, especially those who have 
experienced wartime rationing or other crises. 
A recent development in resource allocation theory allows precautionary motives to 
affect not only the formation of savings, but also their allocation: it postulates that, faced 
with uncertainty regarding future income, people will tend to allocate place savings in 
secure, liquid assets. A study from the United States shows that the greater the earning 
uncertainty, the more likely it is that people put their savings in banks, which are 
deemed secure and liquid (Chakraborty & Kazarosian 1999). I know of no similar study 
on the precautionary motive as a factor influencing saving allocation in Russia; however, 
according to the logic of that model, people should save more in dollars under 
conditions of increasing uncertainty about earnings, insofar as dollars were more secure 
and more liquid than Russian banks. However, it does not appear that changes in 
income or job security could have made the precautionary motive increasingly 
important from 1995. 
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Models concerned with the allocation of household saving portfolios assume that 
households want to maximise return, given certain risk considerations. Because 
preferences are taken to be stable – as are, by way of omission in the model, perceptions 
of profitability and risk – changes in resource allocation must be explained by changes in 
the relative profitability or risk between different alternatives – due to changes in 
interest rates, exchange rates, inflation expectations, or the legal framework – or changes 
in the economic situation of households, as this could affect risk considerations. In the 
literature concerned with general macroeconomic problems such as money supply, 
macroeconomic indicators such as the interest rate and exchange rates are often cited as 
explanations for households’ willingness (or lack of it) to make bank deposits. However, 
the treatment of household financial behaviour is often superficial and not empirical in 
nature. An example is found in Jacek Rostowski’s account: 
 
(…) the willingness of households and firms to hold bank deposits [declines] 
as the inflation tax increases, with nominal interest rates falling relative to 
the inflation rate. Thus such a flight from bank deposits will not occur if real 
deposit interest rates do not fall as a result of the increasing inflation. 
Fleeing bank deposits, households and firms shift into foreign currency, 
foreign currency deposits, and in some cases – paradoxically in cash. The 
shift into cash can occur when payment delays through the banking system 
are such that the effective inflation tax on using cash is lower than on bank 
deposits.16 
 
Written in 1995, Rostowski’s article neither anticipated that the shift away from banks to 
dollars would actually accelerate when the real interest rate turned positive following 
the introduction of the currency corridor, nor does it offer any insights regarding the 
shift from commercial banks towards Sberbank between 1994 and 1996. In A Fistful of 
Rubles, Juliet Johnson explains the shift towards Sberbank by the deposit insurance in 
that bank (Johnson 2000: 112). Others point to distrust in the commercial banking 
system, but most stop short of carrying out empirical investigations into the matter.17 
Among Western economists, the most extensive literature on Russian saving is 
probably that on capital flight. However, household savings are only occasionally the 
focus in this literature, and much of what is said on the issue is more relevant to 
                                                   
16  Rostowski 1995: 60ff. Similar examples focusing on negative real interest rates can be found in Åslund 
1995: 100 and Bernstam & Rabushka 1998: 39. 
17  See for instance Bernstam & Rabushka 1998: 96. The most important exception in the Anglophone 
literature, Spicer & Pyle 2003, will be dealt with below in the section on sociological approaches, because 
they reject some of the central assumptions of neo-classical economics. 
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corporate than to household financial behaviour. For example, in a report on capital 
flight from Russia listing five main causes for capital flight, only two relate to 
households: That there were “large perceived political risks associated with maintaining 
wealth in Russia in a regime with frequent and seemingly arbitrary changes in economic 
policy” and “a high level of country credit risk (…) at all levels of the Russian economy.” 
(Abalkin & Whalley 1999: 426ff.) Again, an investigation into the determinants of trust is 
lacking. 
An IMF report by Prakash Loungani and Paolo Mauro lists the following root causes: 
Macroeconomic instability, an arbitrary and confiscatory tax system, lack of confidence, 
weakness of property rights and opportunities for managers of privatised or privatising 
enterprises to take part in asset grabbing, and hide the proceedings abroad (Loungani & 
Mauro 2000: 4ff). These causes are then related to different aspects of economic reforms 
in transition countries. Through cross-country regression analysis, Loungani and Mauro 
find that capital flight correlates with inflation, lack of structural reform and budget 
deficits (ibid.: 9). However, whereas studies of other transition economies, as in 
Lithuania and the Kyrgyzia, have shown a strong correlation between dollarisation and 
real interest rate differentials between foreign and domestic currencies, the results for 
the transition economies in the data set used by Loungani and Mauro are less 
impressive, with an adjusted R-square of only 0.20.18 
Boris Brodsky also finds that the effect of interest rates on dollarisation is weak, and 
hypothesises that the difference between the exchange rate and the inflation rate 
differentials can explain dollarisation – if the exchange rate deteriorates more rapidly 
than prices rise, it becomes rational to buy currency (Brodsky 1997: 55f). Testing a data 
set from May 1994 to June 1996, he finds a correlation between these differentials and 
dollarisation. However, if Brodsky had written his article one year later, he would have 
found that dollarisation accelerated even as devaluation sunk to 7.25% against an 
inflation of 10% in 1997.19 
Alla Friedman and Alexey Verbetsky accept that explanations relying on inflation 
and exchange rates are insufficient to explain the dollarisation – or the lack of de-
dollarisation – between 1995 and 1998 (Friedman & Verbetsky 2001: 12). In fact, lack of 
                                                   
18  Ibid. For Lithuania, see Korhonen 1996; for Kyrgyzia, see Mongardini & Mueller 1999. 
19  Calculation based on Shorrocks & Khokhlova 1999, tables 8, 15 and 16. 
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de-dollarisation has been observed in many countries that have managed to stabilise 
their economies after periods of high inflation and dollarisation, and economists have 
constructed various hypotheses to explain this conundrum. One approach views shifting 
to a new currency and learning to operate with it as a costly investment; once this 
investment has been done, people will continue to use dollars even when inflation falls. 
Friedman and Verbetsky note that such practices in Russia could include double 
bookkeeping and grey schemes in businesses. Another approach suggests that if the 
domestic currency is crowded out by the dollar, it will be difficult for consumers to find 
a counterpart that will accept the domestic currency. However, the rouble remained the 
common means of payment in Russia, so Friedman and Verbetsky judge this hypothesis 
not to have much explanatory power. 
Instead, they apply the theory of money services. This theory explains why people 
hold cash at all, given that they could earn interest on depositing in a bank. The main 
point is that because there are transaction costs (including both use of time and actual 
charges) in converting deposits into cash, people keep a certain amount of cash for their 
everyday needs. In periods with declining exchange rates, it might be rational to hold a 
certain share of one’s cash in dollars for liquidity purposes. Using data from the Russian 
Central Bank, they find that for a specified utility function for consumption of money 
services and the actual levels of currency substitution in Russia, dollars could produce 
between 38% and 57% of money services in the period of the currency corridor from 
mid-1995 until the August financial crisis (Friedman & Verbetsky 2001: 35). However, as 
their concern is more with the effects of dollarisation than with its causes, they provide 
no evidence on whether this was actually the reason why people hoarded dollars. 
Interestingly, they also touch on other elements in their discussion, such as public trust 
in the sustainability of stabilisation programmes, but do not include such factors in their 
model (ibid.: 12). 
Most of what has been written on banking and capital flight has aimed at policy 
prescription; the key variables chosen tend to mirror that interest and are most 
frequently at the macro-level. From this perspective, it is at first glance understandable 
that less is said about household financial behaviour than needed to answer the 
questions posed in this study. However, when economists do comment on actual 
changes in capital flight, many relate those changes to ideographic events, rather than to 
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macroeconomic conditions. For instance, in their summary of peaks and troughs of 
dollarisation, Abalkin and Whalley mention a period of liquidity shortage and 
speculative attacks as factors making people less willing to hold dollars; sharp increases 
in the willingness to keep dollars are attributed among other things to the 1996 
presidential elections and Yeltsin’s illness later that year (Abalkin & Whalley 1999: 428, 
Figure 1). 
Finally, economists have undertaken some case studies at the micro-level. The most 
important for our purposes is a study by Alexis Belianin and Olga Issoupova using 
game theory to explain the rise and fall of financial pyramids in Russia in 1993 and 
1994.20 Their starting point is the following: 
 
Individual behaviour is perhaps the most puzzling problem of modern Ponzi 
games [i.e. financial pyramids], for their behaviour can hardly be treated as 
rational. One possibility would, of course, be to say that individual 
participants of the pyramids were irrational subjects of transitional 
economies, essentially different from the rational subjects in the rest of the 
world. (…) Nevertheless, we are unaware of any convincing evidence which 
might suggest that people with different national, cultural, historical 
backgrounds tend to be systematically more or less rational in their 
behaviour under risk. (…) Therefore, we think that a proper explanation for 
individual involvement in the Ponzi schemes is to be sought elsewhere, and 
in particular, in different perceptions of economic institutions and related 
beliefs. (Belianin & Issoupova 2001: 23) 
 
In their theoretical model, Belianin and Issoupova relax the substantive rationality 
assumption. They divide the population into two groups: naïve players, whose 
behaviour is guided by bounded rationality; and sophisticated players, who are initially 
assumed to be substantively rational. Bounded rationality, a concept pioneered by 
Herbert Simon, allows for some of the known aberrations from rational choice – such as 
satisficing rather than maximisation, incomplete information and weakness of will 
(Simon 1978). In Belianin and Issoupova’s game, the naïve players have incomplete 
information about the pyramid. They do not understand the principle of a pyramid – 
that it is the deposits of newcomers that pay the dividends of the initial participants. The 
only information they have about the pyramid is the observed fact that participants 
                                                   
20  The central idea of game theory is that when the results of our actions depend on the actions of others, a 
rational actor must anticipate those actions, and engage in strategic thinking. Game theory has been 
important in explaining free-rider problems, collective action and problems in resource management 
(Olson 1971). Using the tools of neoclassical economics and rational choice theory, game theory can yield 
complex mathematical models. 
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receive the promised dividends. Sophisticated players, by contrast, know that the 
pyramid will collapse at some point – but they believe they will be able to withdraw 
before then.  
Given certain assumptions, Belianin and Issoupova are able to reconstruct the 
development of a pyramid. This development, however, will depend on the proportion 
of naïve and sophisticated players, and on a psychological component describing the 
utility function of the players. These values are unobservable, according to Belianin and 
Issoupova; furthermore, there are no data available on the development of actual 
financial pyramids, so the results cannot be tested empirically. However, the 
development shows that there exists no equilibrium where it is substantively rational to 
invest in the pyramid, even if one knows that it will collapse. Belianin and Issoupova 
suggest that when the sophisticated players, assumed to be rational, invested anyway, 
this must be due to an erroneous belief that they could find an optimal solution – 
whereas in fact no such solution existed (Belianin & Issoupova 2001: 31). Unwilling to 
give up the rationality assumption, they conclude by asking: 
 
(…) in reality many [still played these games]. This raises the following, 
natural questions: 1) which economic circumstances have created incentives 
for them to do so, paving the way for the pyramids’ growth; and 2) how did 
the market for savings evolve after having experienced Ponzi games, and in 
particular, what did this experience teach them. (2001:56) 
 
One could think that the logical next step from Belianin and Issoupova’s concept of 
bounded rationality would be to generalise the question: Instead of asking which 
economic circumstances made people act as they did, they could simply ask: Why did 
people act as they did? Rationality is an empty concept unless filled with people’s 
perceptions and values. However, perhaps because relaxing the rationality assumption 
in this direction would make mathematical modelling impossible, Belianin & Issoupova 
seem unwilling to explore this option fully. 
Most of the explanations referred above run into problems with empirically 
observable behaviour. Explanations with reference to real interest rate are consistent 
with observed behaviour for certain periods, especially from the introduction of the 
Yeltsin reforms in 1991 until the introduction of the currency corridor in July 1995. 
However, such explanations have less predictive power in the subsequent period. 
Similarly, the lack of legislation protecting deposits in commercial banks is consistent 
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with a preference for Sberbank, but it fails to account for the dynamics of the 
development whereby a growing proportion went to commercial banks until mid-1994; 
and it does not explain the problems Sberbank itself encountered from 1996 onwards. 
Friedman and Verbetsky explore the economic consequences in terms of money services 
holding dollars; but they do not investigate whether this was the cause of individuals or 
companies actually holding dollars. Indeed, economists at the time recommended rouble 
deposits in commercial banks and Sberbank alike.21 If non-economists acted differently, 
they could hardly be calculating along the same algorithms for portfolio allocation. 
That macroeconomic instability, problems with state finances and lack of structural 
reform correlate with capital flight should come as surprise to none, even if the causality 
remains unclear; but that these factors, even when combined, explain so little, and that 
they fail to explain some of the dramatic shifts in capital flight trends – that should 
prompt further questions. The issue of trust could potentially have explanatory power, 
but remains unexplored, and is often used as a black box when other explanations do 
not work.22 A consequence of the economistic approach to decision-making in relation to 
saving behaviour is that the actual allocation of savings at all times is seen as optimal 
given existing conditions. When these explanations seem to fail, it suggests that Russian 
households did not act according to the ideals of homo economicus, either because 
preferences and perceptions differed from those of that ideal, or because decision-
making mechanisms differed from those described by rational choice. 
 
Sociological approaches 
In contrast to the economic approach, Russian economic sociologist Denis Strebkov has 
claimed that household savings in Russia “are used inefficiently, from a private, as well 
                                                   
21  For one of several examples of such advice in the media, see “Kuda vložit’ den’gi, esli oni “lišnie”?”, 
Argumenty i Fakty, 23.07.1996 
22  Perhaps lack of trust is seen as self-evident in the light of rapid socio-economic transformation, high 
inflation and the devaluation of people’s savings. I believe it should not. A comparison with other 
countries experiencing times of crisis can be illuminative in this regard: After the Second World War, the 
Japanese found their country humiliated, their social institutions questioned and their living standards 
depressed. Money printing during the war led to subsequent hyperinflation, the erosion of household 
savings and the freezing of saving deposits by the state in March 1946. (Garon 2000: 8f) However, as 
inflation was brought down, confidence in the countries financial system was restored. By 1949, a state-
led campaign to encourage savings led to a rapid increase in bank deposits, even as most of the 
population struggled in poverty. High household savings channelled through financial intermediaries 
became an important source of investment and growth in the Japanese economy. (Ibid.: 12) If trust is an 
issue, it must be understood in light of the specifics of the Russian case. 
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as from a macro-economic point of view” (2001: 1) In his view, the failure of scholars to 
grasp this can be related to “a lack of systemised information about the specifics of the 
investment behaviour and the financial behaviour of the population.” 
Such a view suggests that behaviour cannot be inferred from the economic 
environment alone – it is necessary to have information on the social world of Russian 
households. Sociologists approaching saving behaviour do not have a unified 
framework like that provided by neoclassical economics. However, they have in 
common an interest in the interaction between groups, between groups and individuals, 
and an interest in both macro- and micro-level analysis; and they usually want to 
explain behaviour with reference to various social variables. 
On the basis of numerous surveys, economic sociologist Nina Ivašinenko (2002) 
divides household economic behaviour in the Russian financial markets into three main 
groups: 1) Economically active (characterised by an attempt to make well-informed 
decisions) 2) Routine-based (characterised by a passive attitude, a lack of interest in 
information about the financial system) and 3) Status-driven behaviour (characterised by 
conspicuous consumption of financial services).23 On the basis of extensive empirical 
evidence from post-Soviet Russia, Ivašinenko analyses how motivations for saving and 
preferred ways of saving varied systematically between these groups. In fact, in some 
respects the attitudes of different groups move in opposite directions in response to new 
challenges.  
For instance, Ivašinenko finds that in the active group, the percentage preferring to 
place their saving in commercial banks decreased from 21% in 1992 to 11% by late 1994, 
before disappearing completely by 1996. The 1994 figures probably disguise a rise in the 
share before the crash of many financial pyramids in the summer of that year. In the 
group featuring conspicuous consumption, on the other hand, the same percentage 
remained stable, between 36% and 39% throughout this period. It is suggested that those 
belonging to the active group took their decisions on the basis of experiences in the 
market place, whereas those belonging to the group of conspicuous consumers to a 
                                                   
23  The latter group was in earlier surveys labelled conformists. The categorisation of groups depends on 
the views of whom people believe they can rely on for their economic security (Ivašinenko 2002: 147). 
According to Ivašinenko’s research, the size of the groups remained relatively unchanged over these 
years – about 10% each belonged to the active group and the group characterised by conspicuous 
consumption. The passive group grew, but mostly at the expense of people earlier not belonging clearly 
to either of the groups. 
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larger extent tried to emulate the financial behaviour of the rich. Another interesting 
example is the changes in the preferences of the passive groups – which again is 
subdivided into two groups, according to the economic situation of the family. The 
“better off”-group shows a 100% readiness to place money in Sberbank in 1992 and 1994, 
sinking to 71% in 1996. This group probably includes those who had a relatively 
favourable view of the Soviet state. Those worse off show an increase in the preference 
for Sberbank from 36% to 72% over the period. Among conformists, too, the share 
preferring Sberbank increased, from 24% to 40%, whereas active individuals constantly 
displayed a very low preference for Sberbank, declining from 12% in 1992 to 6% in 1996. 
The preference for buying dollars increases among all groups from 1992 to 1994, but 
declines from 1994 to 1996 – which is more or less in line with what one should expect 
from an inflation and exchange rate perspective. Unfortunately, these figures do not 
extend to 1997 or 1998, when dollarisation increased despite low inflation, stable 
exchange rates and the positive real interest rate on rouble deposits. 
Ivašinenko’s book provides the perhaps most thorough monograph on the 
relationship between the Russian population and the financial sector. The compilation of 
figures on the macro-level prompts entirely different questions than those asked by 
economists. Why do different groups behave so differently? Why do they react 
diametrically different to changes in the economic situation? 
From surveys on reasons for choosing a specific investment strategy, Denis Strebkov 
has found significant correlations between financial behaviour and factors such as the 
level of trust in the state, individual experience, the general perception of the situation in 
the country, the propensity to risk and knowledge about financial institutions and 
sources of information. These are all concepts that are not easily translatable into 
economic modelling. Strebkov also found that the willingness to engage with the formal 
financial sector – banks, investment funds or the stock market – was higher among 
young people, among students, among the relatively well off, and among those who had 
had positive experiences with the financial sector previously (2001: 10). Others have 
found that important factors when choosing saving strategy were being able to 
withdraw money quickly (in Russian banks, this could be a complicated procedure) 
(Ivašinenko 2001: 41), and the behaviour of other individuals (Kuzina 1999: 2; Ivašinenko 
2001). 
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Neither Ivašinenko nor Strebkov provides an explicit micro-level perspective, 
tracking individuals and their experiences through time. How do changes relate to 
specific events? Other economic sociologists have engaged in empirically based micro-
studies. However, this research is limited to specific episodes or specific financial 
companies. An example is Ol’ga Kuzina’s participant observation in the queues outside 
the branches of the financial pyramid company MMM. Her case study among investors 
shows how an initial belief on the part of investors that they understood the logic of the 
market was subverted when the pyramid crashed. Kuzina notes that 
 
The formation of trust in financial institutions is to a large degree influenced 
by collective perceptions, that, on the one hand, develop in the public 
discourse, such as the mass media, and on the other hand in the private 
sphere, where personal experience and the opinion of friends are important. 
(1999: 11) 
 
Vadim Radaev (2002) has suggested that the logic of decision-making was altered when 
the financial pyramids turned from just another investment alternative into a mass 
movement. The actions of other participants then became much more important than the 
economic calculus which initially triggered the interest of the participants. 
Kuzina’s approach is developed further by Andrew Spicer and William Pyle, who 
argue that the crash of MMM – and other financial scams – in 1994 permanently changed 
the way Russians perceived the financial market, and their trust in information about it, 
in particular with respect to commercials.24 For financial institutions, it therefore became 
rational to engage in fraudulent activities in Russia; since no one trusted anybody, they 
did not expect anyone to trust them, and all long term economic activity, dependent on 
trust, became very risky. This in turn reinforced distrust, because all the players knew 
that the other players had an incentive to shirk on their obligations. Because the 
operation of a firm has “reputational externalities” there is too little incentive to invest in 
trust-producing activities, and too much incentive to shirk (Spicer & Pyle 2003: 4). Spicer 
and Pyle’s approach is interesting because they explain the shift in trust levels among 
the households not through formal models of adaptation of preferences, but rather 
through identification with defrauded customers. However, their empirical research 
focuses on how banks adapted to a situation where customers did not trust them; they 
                                                   
24  Spicer & Pyle constitute an exception to the Western literature discussed above. 
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do not present too much empirical data on how trust to the bank evaporated in the first 
place. 
 
Unanswered questions 
The economic literature reviewed here has not really helped to answer the three 
questions in the first sub-group of questions posed in Chapter 1. Partly, this is because 
this literature has not focused specifically on household behaviour. But even when 
economists have had something to say on that matter, they have not dealt directly with 
those questions, or not answered them satisfactorily. They have pointed out that 
inflation, interest rate and exchange rate matter to a certain extent at some points in time 
– but that should not be a surprise, and does not help to solve the conundrums: If legal 
security and interest rate were the most important factors affecting the choice between 
Sberbank and commercial financial companies, why did the latter grow rapidly between 
1992 and 1994, and why did Sberbank gain compared to commercial financial companies 
between 1994 and 1996, given that the best among the commercial banks offered higher 
interest rates throughout the period, whereas Sberbank enjoyed government backing of 
deposits throughout the period? Why were dollars increasingly popular from 1996 
onwards, the period when rouble was stable and real interest rates positive? 
Furthermore, economists have concluded that, since household economic behaviour 
appears irrational, there must be some other economic incentives, which we are unable 
to detect, but which, had we known them, would have made behaviour rational – and 
thus the question of how we can explain the behaviour of households is circumvented by 
assumption. 
The sociological literature indicates that the questions one can ask on the basis of 
economic models might be the wrong questions altogether. We cannot assume universal 
rationality because there appears to be many different logics of action among the 
population. Specific events seem to merit specific attention, both to understand those 
events in themselves, and because they might have had consequences for financial 
behaviour more generally. The sociological literature thus helps formulate questions for 
this study: Why did different people have different logics of action; how and why did 
these logics change through time; and what was the relationship between specific events 
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and such changes? However, this literature also does not answer my questions as such, 
partly because it does not have a temporal aspect, seeing the developments as part of 
one process. 
A fundamental reason for these holes in the literature is that Western social science 
models have problems dealing with a transition economy with economic and social 
institutions quite different from those which have served as the point of departure for 
Western social theory. Analysis of the contemporary West usually makes more or less 
uncontroversial assumptions about institutions and behaviour, thus allowing the 
researcher to concentrate on specific variables taken to unknown. But in the case of post-
Soviet Russia, I argue that we simply know too little about the financial environment, 
and, more importantly, about how it was perceived; we know too little about norms and 
heuristics regulating financial behaviour; and we cannot take any specific decision-
making procedure for granted. Furthermore, perceptions and procedures might  well 
have changed profoundly over time, and a temporal perspective is therefore essential to 
understanding the development. It is therefore difficult to answer the unanswered 
questions within the most common social scientific paradigms. When dealing with social 
phenomena in societies where we cannot make the expedient assumptions we (rightly or 
wrongly) make in Western societies, we need to take one step back and more explicitly 
conceptualise the fundamental characteristics of the problems we are dealing with. 
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3. How Do We Explain Social Phenomena? 
It is striking that, although essentially grappling with the same questions, the different 
disciplines of the social sciences often provide explanation in terms of very different 
variables. Partly, this difference reflects legitimate differences in interests and aims. 
Economists, for instance, often focus on variables that politicians can influence through 
economic policy. Partly, however, the difference reflects different assumptions about the 
nature of social phenomena and the nature of explanation. These differences should be 
scrutinised when we evaluate different approaches. Before locating explanatory 
variables among all the potentially available data, then, we should have some clear ideas 
of how we conceive of the phenomenon at hand at an ontological level. 
What is a social phenomenon? Most approaches belong to one of three schools of 
thought: individualism, which focuses on individual agency; elisionism (or 
structuration), which conflates individuals and social structures, though retaining the 
importance of agency; and collectivism (or holism), which attributes agency to social 
structures (Gimenez 1999: 19). In my view, history as well as the social sciences studies 
phenomena which are fundamentally constituted by the behaviour of individual human 
beings. Thus, no social structures, no changes in interest rates, exchange rates or bank 
legislation, could have causally affected the development of Russian financial markets 
but through the mechanisms of human decision-making at the individual level.25 This 
appears, perhaps, to be a truism, but here I aim to demonstrate that such an ontological 
understanding of social phenomena is often not reflected in the methodologies used to 
explain economic behaviour.26 
The methodologies employed in this study – which I shall describe in more detail in 
the next chapter – include life stories of individual Russians and analyses of the 
discussions and discourses related to the financial sector. However, as such an approach 
has been more or less absent in the study of financial behaviour, I have found it 
                                                   
25  I should point out that I do not consider the question about whether the physical world actually exists: I 
assume a realist ontology and the existence of the physical world. My interest is in the social phenomena 
created by physical actors. 
26  One could perhaps argue that the goal of the social sciences should not be causal explanation, but rather 
prediction or the discovering of non-causal or not necessarily causal regularities. But this is rarely done – 
indeed, the motto of the London School of Economics and Political Science, for instance, is CAVSAS RERVM 
COGNOSCERE – “to understand the causes of things”. The following discussion assumes that a major goal 
of social inquiry is to demonstrate causality. 
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necessary to consider at some length the approaches I have not chosen. Life stories might 
appear to be individualist in nature; discourse analysis might appear to be collectivist or 
structural. However, in both instances my focus will be on the links between the 
situations an individual is a part of and the actions which that individual takes. In this 
chapter, I consider why especially the economic literature, but also the sociological 
literature has been unwilling or unable to specify these links when examining financial 
behaviour. Through this discussion, I also aim to demonstrate why these links are 
particularly important when we study a social phenomenon – post-Soviet Russian 
financial behaviour – where both the individuals and structures might differ from what 
Western theories have become used to assume. 
The criticism levelled below is not an attack on the usefulness of economics or 
sociology in general. Economists and sociologists alike might further feel that what I say 
is not representative for their approach, and to a certain extent this is indeed an attack on 
straw men. Within sociology, for example, many scholars are in fact quite close to the 
approach of this study, as the intellectual heritage of Max Weber, with its focus on 
methodological individualism and historical context, remains vibrant. Indeed, the 
sociologists reviewed in this study are no crude collectivists at all. These straw men are 
not used to cast judgement on any academic discipline, but to demonstrate why it is 
important to be aware of methodological and ontological assumptions. And, to be sure, 
it is suggested that although useful in many respects, much work within the social 
sciences does have a problematic relationship with causality – so too the literature on 
financial behaviour in Russia reviewed above. Insofar as they make causal claims, this is 
reason for concern. The argument is that by blurring correlation and causality, 
prediction and explanation, social scientists often run the danger of assuming individual 
behaviour, the very phenomenon I argue is what needs to be explained. 
  
Homo Economicus 
Given that economic theory usually assumes individual utility functions and a decision-
making procedure at the individual level, economists appear to adhere to 
methodological individualism. However, by way of the assumptions embodied in homo 
economicus – that the utility function takes the form of maximising consumption of 
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commodities and that the decision-making procedure follows that described by rational 
choice – economists look at economic variables rather than individuals when they give 
causal accounts of social phenomena. Homo economicus has been criticised throughout his 
existence. Economist and philosopher Nobel laureate Amartya Sen (1977: 336) has 
claimed that “The purely economic man is indeed close to being a social moron.” But 
homo economicus has also had many supporters. I shall here consider critically some of 
the best-known justifications for his use. 
 
De gustibus non est disputandum 
One defence of homo economicus is to assert that it is the best approximation of human 
behaviour we can give: Neoclassical economic theory works because people are rational 
maximisers. Nobel laureates George Stigler and Gary Becker have championed this line 
of thought. Critics of neoclassical theory have argued that behaviour varies between 
individuals or over time due to differences or changes in tastes or preferences. 
Explanation of differences and changes must be left to psychologists or anthropologists. 
In their famous article “De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum”, Stigler and Becker 
explicitly turn the Latin proverb on its head – there is no disputing over tastes, not 
because they are too diverse and without any criteria to judge them, but because they 
are universally similar! They explicitly reject that explanation be left to psychologists or 
anthropologists, and argue that economists should never accept non-economic 
explanations of differences in economic behaviour; instead, they should continue “to 
search for differences in prices or incomes to explain any differences or changes in 
behavior”, seeing tastes as both constant and universally similar (Stigler & Becker 1977: 
76). Stigler and Becker assert that this approach is analytically more useful than other 
approaches. In support of this proposition, they cite “all of the existing corpus of 
successful economic theory” (p.77). 
Empirically, however, economic theory fails too often for it to be left unquestioned. 
Philosopher of economics Alexander Rosenberg (1986) has compared economics to other 
sciences and concluded that laws failing as often as those of economics would have been 
abandoned in the hard sciences, where failure is seen as falsification. Indeed, economic 
theory sometimes works. But sometimes it does not – and if we do not know why it does 
not work when it does not, we also do not know why it does when it does, or if it 
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actually works at all. Why, then, is the homo economicus assumption not subject to more 
scrutiny? Quite bizarrely, Stigler and Becker assert: 
 
[differences in tastes] along with the assumptions of unstable tastes, have 
been a convenient crutch to lean on when the analysis has bogged down. 
They give the appearance of considered judgement, yet really have only been 
ad hoc arguments that disguise analytical failures. (1977:89) 
 
In their view, then, searching for a new hypothesis when the original one fails, amounts 
to ad hoc constructions, whereas keeping one’s hypothesis, searching for data that fit 
better, changing the definitions and making additional assumptions, does not. This 
practice leaves the central tenets of economic theory unfalsifiable. This study takes the 
diametrically opposite view: It is Stigler and Becker who encourage economists to 
engage in the production of innumerable ad hoc hypotheses, the aim being to save the 
homo economicus assumption, and the method being to disregard evidence contradicting 
it. Belianin and Issoupova’s conclusion regarding why people engaged in financial 
pyramids as reviewed in Chapter 2 seems inspired by Stigler and Becker: The evidence 
suggested that behaviour was not substantively rational – so Belianin and Issoupova 
suggest that there must be economic factors that have not yet been uncovered. 
Since the publication of Becker’s article in 1977, Nobel laureates in economics ranging 
from Amartya Sen, through Douglass North, representing New Institutionalist 
Economics, to psychologist Daniel Kahneman have challenged the behavioural 
assumptions of neoclassical economics.27 Neil Smelser and Richard Swedberg (1994) 
claim that the unrealistic modelling of social interaction in neoclassical economics gave 
rise to the field of economic sociology, which they spearheaded together with Mark 
Granovetter. Many economists today accept that people do not always deliberate 
alternative actions rationally, and that they to not have stable, transitive preference 
orderings or perfect information in the way described by homo economicus assumptions. 
In the case of Russian financial behaviour, it seems highly questionable that individuals 
conformed to these assumptions, a claim many of the economists reviewed in Chapter 2 
implicitly or explicitly accept. Still, they seem reluctant to modify the models that follow 
from these assumptions. Why is that? 
 
                                                   
27  See for instance Sen 1977, North 1990 and Kahneman 2002. 
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The “as if”-approach 
A tradition dating back to Armen Alchian (1950) and Milton Friedman (1953) argues that 
neoclassical theory should be judged by its ability to yield good empirical predictions, 
and not by the plausibility of its assumptions. Friedman offers the example of the 
behaviour of leaves on a tree: 
 
(…) leaves are positioned as if each leaf deliberately sought to maximize the 
amount of sunlight it receives (…) as if it knew the physical laws 
determining the amount of sunlight that would be received in various 
positions and could move rapidly or instantaneously from any one position 
to any other desired and unoccupied position. (…) Is the hypothesis 
rendered unacceptable or invalid because, so far as we know, leaves do not 
“deliberate” or consciously “seek,” (…) the “optimum” position, and cannot 
move from position to position? Clearly, none of these contradictions of the 
hypothesis is vitally relevant (…) the hypothesis does not assert that leaves 
do these things but only that their density is the same as if they 
did.(1953:20) 
 
Can we therefore use that hypothesis to predict, regardless of the implausibility of its 
assumptions? Economists like to bring forth the body of successful economic theory as 
proof that the theory works. In the case of trees, the answer is probably yes (although the 
predictions would only be approximations). The reason why Friedman’s hypothesis 
“works” as a predictive theory is precisely that leaves do not deliberate or seek, they 
“do” what they are genetically programmed to do. In Jon Elster’s words, it relies 
crucially on “the truth of a certain causal theory, viz. the theory of evolution by natural 
selection”(Elster 1983: 19). It has no explanatory power on its own.28 Economics has not 
traditionally explicitly posited any such theory, and the “as if” approach thus seems 
suspect if people are in fact not rational – but sometimes the market mechanism has 
been used to suggest that rationality is ensured because only those who in fact maximise 
profits will survive. 
Alexander Rosenberg (1992) has forcefully argued against relying on some sort of 
survival of the fittest as a mechanism that would ensure rationality. To say, for example, 
that rational producers survive is an ex post rationalisation of a situation. If rationality 
should be given any substantive content ex ante, which we would need to do to predict, 
looking at survivors is not necessarily relevant at all. In complex decision-making 
                                                   
28  Questions about functional explanation can be raised in biology and zoology too. Pranab Bardhan notes 
that “path dependence is assigned an important role in biological processes,” and that (quoting Gould) 
“organisms have a history that constrains their future in myriad subtle ways.” (Bardhan 1989: 1392) 
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situations, it can be rational to be irrational, as Elster (1992) has pointed out, “if all the 
evidence happens to point in the wrong direction”. To say that only rational firms 
survive (which would be needed to warrant the argument that existing firms are 
efficient) in an ever-changing world is simply not credible. All we can say, then, is that 
existing firms survive. Or, in our case, all that we can say is that those who save, save, 
and they save precisely where they save. 
 
Homo Sociologicus 
The alternative to explanations based on individuals is to say that social facts should not 
be explained with reference to individual behaviour at all; instead both individual 
behaviour and social phenomena should be explained with reference to social facts – an 
approach known as methodological collectivism. This is the approach associated with 
sociologist Emile Durkheim, who asserted that the aim of the social sciences should be to 
establish regularities between social facts and individual behaviour or between social 
facts and other social facts. Only to the extent that such regularities or laws are 
established, he held, can social research claim to be scientific. This methodology relies 
either on an ontological or a practical justification. I shall first address the ontological 
question, and then the practical. 
 
Individualism or collectivism: Does ontology matter? 
To Durkheim, it is the very definition of social phenomena that necessitates a collectivist 
methodology: Since the central characteristic of social phenomena “is their power of 
exerting pressure on individual consciousnesses, it follows that they are not derived 
from the latter” (1965: 100). Durkheim’s statement implies a rejection of ontological 
individualism – the view that the ultimate constituents of the world are individuals. This 
argument has been reformulated and gained credence more recently through Anthony 
Giddens’ structuration theory, presented as a compromise between ontological 
individualism and ontological holism and seeing structures and individuals as mutually 
constitutive of one another.29 Giddens thus admits that structures are constituted by 
individuals, but he argues that the individual does not really exist outside of social 
                                                   
29  Giddens (1984) is specifically concerned with ontological considerations, not epistemological ones. 
 31
relations, and that it is not obvious that one of the two – structures or individuals – 
should enjoy ontological primacy.30 
At first glance, this argument seems convincing, and it appeals to our wish to find a 
compromise between two extremes. However, on closer scrutiny, it appears that the 
conflict between individualists and structuralists continues also within this theory. 
Durkheim could be seen to adhere to the thought that individuals and structures are 
mutually constitutive, but he insists that people have  little autonomy. Unlike Durkheim, 
Giddens finds that individuals have some degree of freedom in relation to social 
structures. Therefore, despite his insistence that structuration theory is not based on 
ontological individualism, it is commonly perceived thus by structuralists. (See, for 
instance, Gimenez 1999.) Furthermore, Giddens’ views seem compatible with the views 
of self-proclaimed individualists, such as Martin van Hees and philosopher of science 
Jon Elster.31 If it is admitted that individuals actually do have some degree of freedom, it 
must by definition be theoretically possible that one individual may change regardless 
of the structures surrounding him. Thus, whereas individuals suffice to explain ongoing 
social structures, structures do not necessarily suffice to explain individuals. Structures 
do not have any freedom with respect to the individuals that constitute them; they 
cannot change unless individuals change.32 
In Chapter 2, it appeared from the sociological literature that one important structure 
in the case of Russian household financial behaviour has to do with different logics of 
action. Strebkov, for instance, pointed to age, education and income as determinants of 
                                                   
30  There are attempts at justifying ontological holism. Philosophers Wright, Levine and Sober introduce a 
distinction between social types and social events (1992: 116ff) They argue that whereas, say, a specific 
strike or class struggle is constituted by the specific individuals who are part of that phenomenon, the 
social types ‘strike’ and ‘class struggle’ are not; it can be realised in many different ways. As social 
science strives to explain the latter and not the former, we must look for explanations at the macro-level, 
they claim. I remain unconvinced by this argument. If the concept of social types should be meaningful, 
it must somehow be related to the social events they represent. If not, it is not clear why we have an 
interest in explaining them. If it is acknowledged that the actual events are constituted by individuals, 
then social types should be constructed by generalising patterns of individual action. Unless this can be 
done, it is misguided to group two social events as one social type. 
31  On this view, a particular social phenomenon follows from particular individual consciousnesses, and 
these are again partly explained by other social phenomena, which in turn could be explained in terms of 
individuals, and so on ad infinitum. Thus, we will never end up with a rock-bottom explanation for a 
social phenomenon. However, this is a problem neither for ontological nor for methodological 
individualism, because, ontologically, these social phenomena are still constituted by individuals, and, 
methodologically, methodological individualists accept reference to social phenomena as a specification 
of the conditions under which individuals act. See van Hees 1997 and Elster 1992 for a discussion. 
32  If there is no autonomy, as implied by Durkheim’s methodological advices, changes in one individual 
imply that social structures have already changed; that it is impossible to tell which change came first; 
that individual action is an epiphenomenon of social structures. But if structures and individuals are 
really one and the same, the one cannot be said to explain the other. Collectivism would then work, but 
it would not explain. However, this view requires a rather dubious conceptualisation of human beings. 
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financial behaviour. However, if our interest is how people came to adhere to these 
logics, how these logics changed through time and how they were related to historical 
events, such variables are not explanatory. Explaining action with reference to, say, 
income fits well within the Durkheimian paradigm. But people with identical incomes 
act differently. Identical twins with identical education and incomes act differently. This 
study maintains that individuals have freedom with respect to structures, and thus that 
our understanding of social phenomena should be based on ontological individualism. 
 
Correlation or causality?  
Many of today’s methodological collectivists seem less insistent when it comes to the 
ontological questions. Could methodological collectivism be justified without a belief in 
ontological collectivism? Methodological collectivism often seems guided by more 
practical considerations: Even if one accepts that social phenomena are constituted at the 
level of the individual, the causal specification, the search for mechanisms at the 
individual level is often simply too complicated or too time-consuming to undertake. 
Even if they might disagree with some of Durkheim’s ontological positions, 
methodological collectivists therefore subscribe to his assertion that 
 
We have only one way to demonstrate that a given phenomenon is the cause 
of another, viz., to compare the cases in which they are simultaneously 
present or absent, to see if the variations they present in these different 
combinations of circumstances indicate that one depends on the 
other.(Durkheim 1965: 125) 
 
This approach has contributed to the development of statistically based research. As 
statistics have become a more advanced tool, and as numerical data have become more 
plentiful, statistical analysis has become more widespread also within economics, 
forming the basis for the field of econometrics. In apparent contradiction with the 
individualist roots of economic methodology, economists also commonly use correlation 
and regression analysis to uncover and explain regularities in the economy. Indeed, this 
was the approach of Loungani and Mauro described in Chapter 2 above. 
Durkheim does not, at least in the above quote, seem bothered by the fact that neither 
statistical correlation nor regression analysis demonstrates causation among tested 
variables. Although students today learn that correlation does not imply causality, many 
seem to forget as soon as they graduate. In the non-laboratory setting of real societies 
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where the researcher cannot control which variables might be at work, it is impossible to 
rule out that a correlation is in fact entirely spurious.33 Correlation equals causality only 
if the model we use can be known to be correct. Statistical correlations should therefore 
not be taken as independent proof that a model has explanatory power unless we have a 
micro-theory connecting the variables in the correlation. Statistics, then, is a descriptive 
tool. It can be accompanied by causal theories; it can be indicative that causality exists; 
and it can alert us to the causal influences of factors taken for granted in ideographic 
studies. But statistics provides no causal mechanism. 
In practice, most collectivists presuppose particular theories linking the macro- and 
the micro-levels – for instance theories of human socialisation and cognition – when they 
undertake causal explanation. But should not social sciences try to explain these links, 
rather than merely presuppose them? Theories about the links between structures and 
individuals should be subjected to empirical scrutiny, because if and when those 
theories fail to hold, methodological collectivism itself will fail.34 
 
A plea for mechanisms 
Jon Elster has introduced the term “mechanism” in relation to causal explanation. In 
different works, he uses the term in two entirely distinct meanings – both of them are 
relevant for my purposes here. The first sense in which Elster (1983) uses the term 
“mechanism” is as an antonym to the black box that separates correlation from 
explanation. Instead of saying “if A, then B”, one would say “if A, then C, D, and B”, 
with the bits in-between providing the story – and including references to the 
individuals involved. For example, instead of saying that an increase in the interest rate 
differential between commercial banks and Sberbank would lead to a larger proportion 
of household savings going to the former, the mechanism approach would require that 
one specified the linkages between these two phenomena. How was information about 
                                                   
33 A well-known example is the relationship between the number of storks and the number of childbirths in 
Copenhagen in the 15 years or so following the Second World War, showing a consistently high, 
statistically significant correlation. Worse yet, statistician Robert Matthews has shown that birth rates 
and the number of nesting white storks correlate across Europe. (Matthews 2000: 36f ) If one did not 
know better, one could easily accept the correlation as proof that babies are delivered by storks. 
34  See Andresen 2004 for a discussion. 
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interest rates spread and perceived? Which goals did households pursue? As I have 
argued above, this kind of specification is crucial to the ontological individualist. 
The second sense in which Elster uses the term is as an alternative to scientific laws. 
Whereas a law states that if a given set of conditions obtain, then a certain effect will also 
always obtain. A mechanism is somewhat less ambitious, claiming simply that if a given 
set of conditions obtains, then sometimes a certain effect will obtain. For our purposes, 
two kinds of mechanisms are of particular importance: Those that affect the formation of 
perceptions and attitudes, and those that have to do with decision-making. Elster gives 
the following example: When people would like a certain proposition to be true, they 
sometimes believe it is true (1998: 47). This is called wishful thinking, and could be seen 
as a psychological mechanism influencing perception. A mechanism is not just a 
probability law; the conditions under which it is at work are what Elster calls “generally 
unknown”. It is difficult to say ex ante that a person will engage in wishful thinking, or 
even the probability of its occurring. But if we observe that it happens, we might 
recognise it.  
 
Looking inside the black box 
These two understandings of the term “mechanism” together seem helpful as a tool that 
can address some of the problems that have been pointed out above in traditional social 
science approaches: It focuses on breaking down the black boxes found in correlation, 
and it allows for a description of how people actually perceive and make decisions, 
without abandoning the aim of providing causal explanation. How do mechanisms 
relate to covering laws? Using mechanisms might sometimes just be a necessity brought 
about by our ignorance of the actual covering laws. The philosopher Nancy Cartwright 
comments: “We may insist that there must be some differentiating factor which brings 
the case under some covering law. (…) On the Day of Judgment, when all laws are 
known, these may suffice to explain all phenomena. But in the meantime we do give 
explanations (…)” (Cited in Elster 1998: 45). A mechanism in this sense is compatible 
with the view that people have some autonomy in relation to laws of different sorts – 
economic, social or psychological. Indeed, one of the elements of the generally unknown 
conditions, one of the differentiating factors, might be some sort of free will. Thus, using 
mechanisms breaks down the distinction between intentional and causal explanation. 
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This study, then, contends that economic variables, social relationships as well as 
economic, political and personal events and perceptions of the financial market, all 
should be analysed as filtered through individuals, and that they should be investigated 
at that level. This insistence on methodological individualism does not imply that social 
norms or other social facts should not be taken seriously – although methodological 
collectivists commonly assume that it does, and although economists like Stigler and 
Becker give them reason to continue believing it.35 It merely implies that the links 
between norms and individual behaviour must be specified. These links will not go 
away if we do not specify them; instead, we will end up assuming them instead of 
explaining them. 
This should not be read as a rejection of work at the macro-level, or of statistics as a 
useful tool in social research. Indeed, the statistically based grouping of types of 
financial behaviour undertaken by sociologists such as Denis Strebkov and Nina 
Ivašinenko referred above in Chapter 2 fulfils such descriptive tasks very well. This form 
of pragmatic methodological collectivism, combined with well-informed suggestions 
with regard to possible mechanisms relating the variables and possible events that 
influence how they develop over time, is and should be an important part of social 
inquiry, and the analysis in Part II in this study is inspired by this work. Indeed, the 
claim that statistics remains descriptive, not explanatory, should not be viewed as a 
criticism at all. Sometimes we are not able to tell the story that would explain the 
correlations we observe – we are then left with a black box, but that might be better than 
nothing. Macro-level research is misguided and misguiding only if researchers claim 
that causality has been demonstrated when no evidence at the micro-level exists – or, 
worse, when micro-level empirical evidence does exist and it flatly contradicts the 
assumptions made or implied by a correlation. 
 
Prediction or explanation? 
One should think that the latter case is rarely observed among researchers. However, 
such an approach has recently been proposed in the ostensibly most individualistic of 
the social sciences – economics. In an attempt at justifying Milton Friedman’s “as if”-
                                                   
35  For an example of collectivists arguing along these lines, see Sejersted 1993. 
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approach, Debrah Satz and John Ferejohn – who admit that people often, and probably 
systematically, do not behave as homo economicus – argue that it does not matter whether 
the behavioural assumptions of economic theory are true, because it is not the 
psychological states of individuals that lend credibility to rational choice theory.36 
Rather, institutional constraints shape actions as if individuals were rational (Satz & 
Ferejohn 1994). This approach, then, explains homo economicus as a result of homo 
sociologicus. Such structures include the organisation of firms and markets, and 
institutionalised procedures for decision-making, with which actors must abide. This 
logic allows economists to explain economic actions with economic variables, without 
direct reference to actual psychological states at all, because a wide range of beliefs and 
preferences would produce the same behaviour. Satz and Ferejohn posit some sort of 
causal feedback ensuring efficiency, akin to functionalist Darwinism explaining why 
existent organisms seem well adapted in evolutionary biology. The most important 
structure ensuring rational behaviour is market competition, which eliminates irrational 
actors. According to Satz and Ferejohn, such structures predominate in the West, 
whereas other societies might have other structures – and in these societies, economic 
theory based on rational choice might fail. 
Satz and Ferejohn would, I presume, agree that rational choice explanations relying 
on structures rest on shaky foundations in Russia, where the structures they postulate as 
being at work in the West cannot be taken for granted. But their methodology is 
problematic in the West as well. As argued above, if we should follow Milton 
Friedman’s criterion for judging rational choice economics on the basis of its ability to 
yield good predictions, we would find a mixed record in the West as well. Indeed, there 
is reason to believe that structures do not always induce rational behaviour, and that 
even if they do, people still have some autonomy in relation to them, so that their 
reasons for acting will matter in their own right. We need to specify both people and 
structures to make a prediction based on such a theory. 
Even more serious for our purposes, however, is that if we seek explanation rather 
than prediction, Satz and Ferejohn’s approach faces an even worse problem, and even if 
                                                   
36  The term “rational choice theory” as used by Satz & Ferejohn, as by most economists, assumes that the 
utility that firms maximise is profits, and is thus the same as what I call the homo economicus approach. 
Rational choice theory is also used by decision-making theorists who do not assume any particular 
utility function. 
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we should agree with their view on the structuration of economic activity in Western 
societies, an explanation of economic phenomena would not follow their logic there 
either. The reason is that even when outcomes happen to fit the predictions of 
neoclassical theory, they cannot be explained by that theory unless its psychological 
assumptions are true. Philosopher of economics Daniel Hausman gives the example of 
people fleeing from a hotel during a fire, having heard the fire alarm. Explaining the 
fleeing with reference to the fire, rather than with reference to the people who are 
running away, is analogous to the reasoning of Satz and Ferejohn. The justification could 
be that many different psychological states would all result in the same action. An 
intentional explanation of the same phenomenon would include that the guests heard 
the alarm; they believed that there was a fire, and that they would die unless they fled; 
and that they did not want to die. Admittedly, this explanation seems a bit pedantic – for 
most purposes, it would suffice to say that people fled because of the fire. However, as 
Hausman points out, that establishing perceptions and values often is trivial, does not 
mean that it is irrelevant: Had the guests not heard the alarm, nor cared if they did, the 
fire would not explain their fleeing. If outcomes conform to neoclassical theory, whereas 
psychological states do not conform to its underlying assumptions, this should “prompt 
a search for the actual [causal] mechanism”( Hausman 1995: 100). A less likely story 
would be that the guests fled the hotel because they thought the alarm was the sound of 
an ice-cream van, and they wanted to be first in the queue. In this case, the alternative 
story is quite implausible. But it is not always easy to tell what is implausible and what 
is not, without examining the case at hand. 
When we deal with history, prediction is of particularly little value. We know what 
happened! That does not stop economists from engaging in the same elaborate exercises 
to show that history can be predicted with different ad hoc hypotheses added to rational 
choice economics. Rosenberg comments this practice thus: 
 
Economists’ satisfaction at the ability of macroeconometrical models to be 
retrodictively curve-fitted to the interwar business cycles is charming in its 
naïve view of what counts as predictive success. (1986:130) 
 
To enhance our understanding of the past, we must go beyond prediction, and seek 
explanation. In our case, this point is pertinent. Economists’ explanations of Russian 
financial behaviour do not hold good for the whole period under review. Furthermore, 
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anecdotal evidence suggests that the perception of financial markets and the motivation 
behind engagement with them in Russia differed from what economic theory assumes. 
We have extra reason, then, not automatically to believe that the theories employed 
actually explain even the outcomes that, in Hausman’s words, “fit the predictions”. 
Examining the actual mechanisms, in both senses of that word, at work might be 
problematic if we want to predict future outcomes – although it is certainly possible to 
draw on that reasoning to imagine different scenarios. But when we are dealing with a 
past that has already happened, there is no reason not to heed Elster’s plea for 
mechanisms. We need to move away from Friedman’s “as if”, and instead try to heed 
Ranke’s call to find out “wie es eigentlich gewesen”. 
Thus far, I have not been very explicit about how these mechanisms can be 
investigated empirically. Economists often argue that reasons, mental states or world 
views cannot be accessed directly. But that is no argument for not trying. The next 
chapter considers to which extent a humanistic approach can deal with social structures, 
economic incentives and decision-making procedures from the viewpoint of individual 
Russians who gave consideration to becoming involved in financial markets between 
1991 and 1998. 
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4. Explanation and Understanding in History 
If explaining social phenomena involves explaining individuals, it involves examining 
people’s reasons for doing what they do and how these reasons are constructed. And if 
explaining social phenomena is about people’s reasons for doing what they do, then it is 
definitely a kind of inquiry where historians should have something to say. I think the 
ultimate test of whether an action can be considered explained on the view presented in 
the previous chapter, is whether, upon having read the explanation, we can say: “Yes, 
that course of action must have made sense to them; I understand why they acted like 
that.” Understanding requires some sort of imagination, some sort of empathy so that 
we can identify with the characters of historical drama. To some, making imagination 
part of scientific explanation seems ludicrous. However, in the previous chapter, I 
argued that we cannot simply assume that the human decision-making process connects 
behaviour with some objective circumstances through a law-like relationship. 
Imagination, then, seems just as valid a tool as the strategy of assumption and 
deduction. 
 
Homo Historicus 
This study is an attempt to fill in some of the gaps between social facts and individual 
behaviour and to specify some of the mechanisms that served to connect social and 
economic events with the financial behaviour of actual people of flesh and blood in post-
Soviet Russia. Although not always too explicit about ontological and epistemological 
considerations, I believe that historians have often de facto been inclined to attempt to 
bridge such gaps. One reason might be their focus on identifying continuity and 
discontinuity. To historians, people are not only located in time and place: they also move 
through time and space, and are shaped by that journey. The question of the relationship 
between people and events therefore has been an integral part of writing history. The 
term homo historicus is sometimes used, because man is the only creature who takes an 
interest in history. But that fact also has significance for how we approach behaviour: If 
an individual’s understanding of a situation depends on how that individual remembers 
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past experiences, an explanation of individual behaviour and thus of social phenomena 
must take into account past experiences and how they are remembered. 
Historians write about ideographic developments. The temporal aspect of an 
explanation is more difficult to conceptualise when the explanandum is a non-temporal 
typical and not a temporal factual situation, as is often the case in economics and 
sociology. To be sure, the temporal aspect is not absent in all sociology, and the 
difference between different disciplines should not be overemphasised: That historical 
sociology and social history are two distinct disciplines has as much to do with 
organisational tradition at universities as with differences in the conceptualisation of 
human behaviour and the nature of explanation and understanding. Economic 
sociologist Mark Granovetter, for instance, warns against “over-socialisation” in 
sociology – which highlights both that currents within sociology do take the temporal 
aspect seriously, and that there is a mainstream that, in his view, does not. He stresses 
that economic decisions take place in a context of ongoing social relations; existing 
relations must take into account the history of interactions. (Granovetter 1985: 485f ) 
According to Raymond Boudon, however, even when approaching temporal, actual 
developments, many sociologists have a preference for explaining change endogenously. 
They prefer, for instance, to explain social change with reference to the social system that 
is changing, and they are reluctant to include exogenous, ideographic events in the 
explanation. (Boudon 1986: 123) One reason, Boudon suggests, is that if they did, their 
disciplinary independence with regard to history would be threatened. There might also 
be other reasons, which have to do with the aim of research. But if the aim is to explain a 
historical development, I think we should go one step further than Granovetter: We 
should take into account not only the history of interactions, but also the wider history 
of those who interact. This view finds resonance in the view expressed by British 
philosopher of history R.G. Collingwood (1946) than understanding and explaining 
history involves the re-enactment of essential experiences. 
 
Do actions really speak louder than words? Discourse and financial behaviour 
When understanding reasons is the aim, the explanation of a social phenomenon must 
refocus from actions as such, and to the meaning they have for those who undertake 
them. This view echoes the epistemological claim that knowledge about the world is 
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available to us only through discourses that give meaning and structure to the physical 
world. Note that this argument does not say that the world is constituted by discursive 
practices, it is an epistemological strategy to reveal how our “understanding of the 
world is created, maintained and reproduced.”37 When the aim is to understand an 
action, then, words seem to speak louder than the action itself. 
The study of the significance of language for social research has been championed by 
discourse analysis. A common definition of discourse is “a system for the production of 
statements and practises, which, by being inscribed in institutions and by appearing as 
more or less normal, is constitutive of reality for its participants and has a degree of 
continuity with respect to a set of social relations.”38 However, discourse analysis in 
general has often not been explicit about the relationship between discourse, decision-
making and action. The genealogical method associated with Foucault39 sometimes 
suggests that discourse is a condition for action, but it is not treated as a variable entering 
into the explanation of an action (Neumann 2001: 154f). 
The genealogical method is interested in how specific representations of the world 
have developed historically, and commonly aims to illuminate power relations within 
society and about the relationship between discourses. I do not approach texts as a 
genealogist. Mine is not a history of concepts, but a history of how concepts influenced 
individual behaviour and produced social phenomena in post-Soviet Russia. The 
question, then, is whether discourse analysis can contribute to the explanation of action. 
Perhaps as a result of the genealogical legacy from Foucault, discourse analysis has not 
been a preferred approach in disciplines traditionally dealing with the explanation of 
action. This study thus departs from the most common discourse analysis framework in 
                                                   
37  Hønneland 2003: 6. Some discourse analysts proceed from the claim that knowledge is constituted by 
discourse to the assertion that all discourses are equally valid. I should emphasise that I am not a 
relativist with relation to discursive practices. Moreover, the idea that the world is merely a discourse is, 
of course, also merely a discourse. I, for one, believe that some aspects of the world are intelligible to us 
in an entirely non-lingual and non-discursive way, such as pain, hunger, anger and other emotions; 
humans are also animals, and to that aspect of our understanding, the concept of discourse is uneasily 
applicable. I also believe that there are criteria, such as logic, observation, and intersubjectivity, on which 
the truth-value of statements could be judged, although the ultimate truth might be out of our reach. 
38  Neumann 2001: 18. Translation from the Norwegian by the author. 
39  An outline of his view is given in Foucault 1979.  
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that the interest in discourse is just one of several possible approaches to decision-making. 
There is therefore not much methodological literature to be guided by.40  
In fact, I have been able to find no literature in the discourse-analysis vein dealing 
with financial behaviour, and no research on financial behaviour using tools from 
discourse analysis – perhaps with one exception: Sociologist Christophe Schinckus  has 
proposed to compare the financial system with a semiotic system – although not 
drawing explicitly on discourse theory – viewing “the market as a particular language 
whose signs, signifiers and the relation between these two abstractions depend directly 
on a cultural code, emerging directly from the lifeworld of the actors”(2004: 18). 
However, Schinckus’ approach is not directly relevant for my purposes. His interest is 
more with professional investors than with households, and his focus is on the frequent 
interaction between individuals; the relationship that arises as a result of that frequent 
interaction; and the way that relationship affects the signified of the signifiers. The 
interaction between Russian household and representatives of the financial sector did 
not conform to this pattern: Personal interaction was infrequent, lasted for a short time; 
and there was usually little room for negotiation.41 However, his idea of the signified 
might be fruitful: In the West, we are accustomed to think of financial intermediaries as 
precisely that – financial intermediaries. But we cannot take for granted that they served 
only or even principally that function for Russian households in the 1990s. 
Discourse entails identities – who we are and who others are, and the delineation of 
self and other; it entails our perception of what a social phenomenon is and how 
different phenomena are interrelated – how the world works; and it expresses and 
constitutes attitudes to specific phenomena, given our definition of them. In the analysis 
of decision-making processes, then, discourse could be understood as a way of framing 
choices. My use of discourse is therefore rather different than that of the genealogist. 
This does not imply that the historical antecedents of discursive practices have no 
relevance at all in my account; sometimes a historical context is necessary to understand 
the meaning of the words that are used, or the way in which the discourse changes. 
                                                   
40  For example, a google search for “discourse analysis” and “financial behaviour”, “financial behavior”, 
“saving behaviour” or “saving behavior” returned a total of only 16 hits – and in none of them are the 
two terms treated together. (Search on www.google.com 24 September 2004.)  
41  There could, of course, be some negotiation over the price of dollars, but this hardly changed 
households’ views (the signified) of dollars (the signifier). 
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Some discourse analysts might find it misleading that I use the term ‘discourse’ with 
relation to the analysis in Part II. Discourse analysis is commonly seen as an analysis of 
the fight about the meaning of discursive events and practices. My focus, on the other 
hand, is on discourse as a factor that shapes action; but I believe that these actions might 
also have non-discursive aspects related to the physical world and to human biology 
and psychology. I do not believe that discourse is the only way in which we can access 
the world; nor do I believe that individuals cannot change or choose between discourses: 
As is the case with other social phenomena, discourses are constituted by the behaviour 
of individuals. 
I share with discourse analysts an interest in how the discursive field structures our 
subjective world. Language is the predominant medium through which I as a researcher 
can access how Russians experienced their financial world between 1991 and 1998, and 
the best way to get an idea about the psychological mechanisms at work and about the 
physical world people lived in. I therefore approach the texts that are the sources of my 
analysis mainly as relics,42 telling something about their author and about the situation 
in which they were produced, rather than as statements that would give evidence about 
events external to its author. The reason for doing so is my wish to understand why 
individuals acted as they did, producing social phenomena external to the text – i.e. 
aggregated household saving. Discourse and behaviour must therefore be treated as 
being analytically independent, linked by the decision-making process. 
 
Psychology and financial behaviour 
Another academic discipline that has taken an interest in the significance of framing for 
economic decision-making is economic psychology.43 However, this has not so far been 
applied to empirical studies of financial behaviour; nor has the significance of discourse 
for framing been explicitly considered. Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman is one of the 
                                                   
42  The term “relics” translates Norwegian “levning”, which is a standard concept in historical methodology 
in Norway, as opposed to “beretning”, which approximately translates as “statement”. A relic is a 
source, or the aspect of a source, which interests us not because of the factual events it describes, but 
because of what it can tell us about its author (or, in the instance of non-textual sources, its creator), and 
the situation in which it was created. Statements, on the other hand, interest us because they can give us 
information about the factual events they speak of. 
43  I distinguish here between discourse and psychology at the epistemological level, because I believe that 
the psychological statements I use are neutral with respect to the alternative discourses presented here – 
including the author’s own. That does not imply that psychology is neutral with respect to any discourse: 
Rom Harré and Grant Gillett, for instance, have proposed viewing emotions as “psychologically 
equivalent to statements.” (Harré & Gillett 1994). 
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psychologists who has been most interested in the psychology of economic decision-
making, and he has demonstrated how the framing of a problem, and the availability 
(rather than the existence) of information is important in shaping decisions. The 
psychology of decision-making often takes the form of mechanisms, as described above 
in the second sense, as something which is not a law of necessity, but which we can 
recognise as a causal pattern when we observe it. Kahneman’s pioneering contribution 
to economic psychology is that he has demonstrated the existence of several such 
patterns not fully recognised before. 
Most of these mechanisms are heuristic devices that we use instead of pure logic – 
such as privileging information that evokes vivid images and strong feelings towards 
information that does not. Other mechanisms include Elster’s concept of wishful 
thinking and “sour grapes” as ways of reducing cognitive dissonance. I shall not discuss 
the specifics of these theories here – they will be brought up at appropriate points in the 
analysis of Russian financial behaviour below in Part II and in the conclusion in Part III. 
It is not self-evident that one should rest content with worldviews, perceptions and 
psychological theories as the building blocks for explaining human behaviour. 
Perceptions could be dubbed macro-constructs covering neurological mechanisms.44 
Similarly, psychological laws are laws established by correlation; they usually do not 
specify any neurological link. However, if we do believe in some degree of free will, 
then reasons seem indeed a reasonable unit to work with. And even if we do not, the 
alternative – neurological explanations – seems futile.45 
 
Narrative and explanation 
If I have given the impression that that this study will be about semiotics and 
psychology rather than historical events, let me hasten to adjust that impression. Once 
the inquiry is about actual people, research into discursive practices, into semiotic 
relationships or into psychological mechanisms takes on an ideographic, historical form. 
Because their research has always been about actual people, historians have always 
written about discursive practices, semiotic relationships and psychological 
                                                   
44  See Dretske for a discussion of reasons, causes and neurology. 
45  However, if anyone does find evidence on that level contradicting the mechanisms I argue to be at work, 
that would be valid criticism which would have to be taken seriously. 
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mechanisms, whether using those terms or not. But perhaps because historians have 
often not cast their accounts in terms of laws, they have traditionally had a problematic 
relationship to causal explanation. The problem originates in the distinction made by 
German philosophers between erklären and verstehen – the former associated with the 
causal processes of natural science, the latter with the hermeneutic reasoning in the 
humanities. What is the relationship between the strategy of re-enactment proposed by 
Collingwood and causal explanation? 
The German-American philosopher of science Carl Gustaf Hempel, insisting on the 
unity of science, argued against this distinction. To him, causal explanation implied 
reference to universal laws, and he claimed that in so far as historians do explain, it is 
through implicit reference to laws, whereas the historical narrative, through its 
painstaking collection of facts, provides explanatory sketches, filling in the conditions for 
the law to apply, but no full explanation.46 Historian William Dray took issue with 
Hempel’s understanding of explanation in history, arguing that historians provide 
rational explanations rather than causal ones– that is, they invoke an individual’s reasons 
for doing what he did, rather than any universal law that anyone would have acted like 
that given the circumstances. It should be noted here that Dray’s concept of rational 
explanation does not entail law-like rationality in the sense described by rational choice 
theory – it only implies that people’s actions can be rendered so that we understand that 
they made sense and were reasonable to them at the time. We could therefore speak of 
reasonable rather than rational explanation. 
There need not be any contradiction between such reasonable explanation and causal 
explanation. As Canadian philosopher of science Maurice Lagueux has pointed out, 
historians  often seem to assume some sort of law-like rationality not so much, perhaps, 
in their explanations as in the very questions they ask (Lagueux 2003: 16). If people had 
done exactly what anyone would expect them to do, there would be no need to explain 
their actions. The expectation that we should be able to see the behaviour of other 
individuals as understandable, and thus in some sense rational, is the reason why we 
pose questions. If we are not able to do so, their behaviour will indeed be inexplicable. 
The belief that we usually can understand other people is a fundamental premise for this 
                                                   
46  Hempel 1942. On this view, a narrative merely relates the factors in the causal model, locating them in 
time and space. See Morgan 2001 for a reformulation of this view of the role of narratives in economics. 
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study.47 The tool historians have used to create that understanding has been the 
historical narrative. The narrative lets us imagine how people’s worldview develops, 
how their psyche develops, and provides an understanding of the mechanisms that 
relate their views and personality to their behaviour. But the narrative then becomes the 
main vehicle for explanation, because discourse, psychology, opportunities and 
limitations, emotions and deliberations – in short, the sort of rationality that the 
Hempelian logic depends on – cannot be understood separately from the context 
described by the narrative.48 We could thus turn around Hempel’s view about narratives 
as providing explanatory sketches: Laws might provide sketches of causal processes, but 
– at least when we deal with human beings – these processes are more fully captured 
through a narrative. 
The historical narrative therefore has much to offer causal explanation of the 
questions posed in this study. At certain points I will refer to psychological theories, 
general mechanisms, or statistics. But I also wish to appeal to the reader’s imagination. 
In the same way as a joke is not funny if it needs to be explained, an explanation of the 
view presented here is not entirely successful if it needs too many comments. Although I 
                                                   
47  This argument has been central to the sociological and anthropological traditions inspired by Max 
Weber’s methodological individualism. See Boudon 1986: 55 for a brief overview. The argument that this 
kind of reasonable explanation can be seen as causal depends on the view that there are causal 
mechanisms at work between reasons and actions. Whether reasons can be said to cause actions has been 
hotly contested within the philosophy of science. (The notion of causation itself was questioned already 
by David Hume, because whereas we can observe correlation, we cannot observe causation. The 
impossibility of observation does not exclude a notion of causality; but that notion remains metaphysical 
in nature. For a discussion, see Hawthorn 1991: 25f) According to philosopher Donald Davidson (1963), 
we can think of reasons as consisting of beliefs and attitudes, preceding and causing our actions. The 
Finnish philosopher Georg von Wright (1969), on the other hand, contends that a reason is not a reason if 
it is not the reason for which an action is done – but then the relationship between reasons and actions is 
better seen as a syllogism. He cites the example of the outbreak of the Great War: had we known the 
relevant facts about the dispositions of the Austrian rulers, we would have known by definition that 
they would have acted as they did following the shots fired in Sarajevo. Had they not done it, they 
would not have had the reasons they had, and citing those reasons is just a re-description of their actions 
in terms that make them intelligible to us. However, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (1989) has shown that even 
if actions and reasons are linked conceptually, they could also be linked causally. But reasons in this 
sense are not something we can observe except through action. However, I do not believe that this is the 
sense in which historians usually use or should use the word “reasons”. People usually perceive reasons 
to be reasons even if it they are not the reasons for which something is done. The causal processes 
linking reasons – or reasoning – thus understood to the reasons that are the reasons for which we do 
things, are difficult to formulate as laws. Perhaps the Elsterian notion of a mechanism that has causal 
efficacy, which we recognise when we encounter it, but which operates under conditions that are 
generally unknown, can be a fruitful way to think about that relationship. And I do believe that humans 
have an intuitive ability to recognise when our reasoning translates into the reasons for which we do 
things. Moreover, if we cannot explain behaviour causally with reference to intentions, we cannot 
explain them causally at all – unless it turns out firstly that humans have no free will at all and secondly 
that we can explain all behaviour with reference to neurological facts. This study has therefore no 
objections to blurring the distinction between causal and intentional explanation. 
48  This view of the narrative as an analytical tool is inspired by Anthony Hopkins’ (1978) discussion of 
analytical narratives. 
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have found it necessary to include some theoretical considerations in the argument, a 
part of the analysis of the analysis will be saved for the conclusion in Part III. 
 
Research design and sources 
Reasons and decision-making reflect the sum of personal experiences, which involves 
socialisation, personal events and human psychology on the one hand; and social 
experiences, which involve common events and the way they are talked about on the 
other.49 Accordingly, I propose two lines of inquiry: The first is to retell stories told by 
ordinary Russians based on oral accounts relating to financial behaviour. The second is 
to follow some of the concepts relating to financial behaviour that emerge from these 
stories and to track their development, and the changes in their content, in the public 
sphere – mostly in newspapers, but with some use of literature and folklore. The former 
is done to show actual mechanisms at work at the individual level – because that is the 
level at which they are at work. The latter is done to show how many of the components 
that constituted an individual’s horizon were common in nature, and that the 
mechanisms described may therefore be relevant to a larger segment of the population. 
For discourse to be used as a variable, there must exist alternative discourses 
describing the same phenomenon. If the explanation should be of interest, we should be 
able to imagine that actors could belong to different discourses and that discourse itself 
could change. To explain action by a discourse viewing trustworthiness and profitability 
as superior to risk and loss might be true, but is hardly very interesting. I have therefore 
been most interested in discursive practices which differ from those known in the West 
and which sometimes were, or came to be, contested in Russia; and which either 
changed or would lead to changing behaviour throughout the period under review.50 
I must here admit that most Russians who lived through this period in their country’s 
history probably know the discourses I examine better than I can hope to do. However, 
                                                   
49  This argument is inspired by Ol’ga Kuzina’s argument on the formation of trust described in Chapter 2. 
50  A possible, and interesting, bias in choosing which discourses to focus on arises from the fact that 
Western researchers are more familiar with “rational” and technical discourses than most people within 
the society which they try to explain. They might therefore end up spending quite a lot of time trying to 
explain discourses that might be self-evident to some of those concerned. However, many within the 
“rational”/technical discourses, which often are privileged among powerful decision makers, are 
unfamiliar with them, and enhancing understanding of them thus seems to me to be a justified priority. 
For a similar view, discussing how the “rational”/technical conceptualisation of medical conditions can 
threaten the dignity of patients unfamiliar with it, and the need for medical personnel to understand 
alternative discourses, see Cameron 2005. 
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being a foreigner might also be an advantage, because the specificity of the Russian 
discourse becomes clearer. To some of the Russians I have spoken with, many of the 
points I find fascinating were simply too self-evident to spur any further interest. If, 
then, the explanations given seem unsurprising and mundane – at least to anyone 
familiar with Russian economic realities and basic human psychology – this is consistent 
with my view that explanation of action should be understandable to the reader, and – 
hopefully – recognisable to the people I write about; but that it still should give both 
groups the opportunity to entertain the thought that people could have acted differently. 
 
Interviews and oral history 
One of the two main bodies of sources underlying this study consists of 27 interviews of 
varying length. The oral accounts are from interviews with the author during a field trip 
to Nizhny Novgorod in April and May 2004 – a few of the respondents, however, are 
from Moscow and Saint Petersburg. All the names applied to the interviews are fictional 
to preserve anonymity. Short biographical information of the respondents I have quoted 
is given in an appendix. Nizhny Novgorod was chosen because I wanted to hear 
experiences from cities that were closer to average Russian indicators than Moscow. For 
example, in July 1993, there were 2294 registered commercial banks in Russia – of these 
787 were in Moscow. In January 1996, the corresponding figures were 2578 and 993. 
(Ivašinenko 2002: 57) Between 30% and 40% of the banks, then, were in Moscow. At the 
same time, the official population of Moscow was 8,875,600 (Blakkisrud 1997: 123). Even 
if one makes allowance for illegal residents, Moscow’s proportion of the Russian 
population does not exceed 10%. Also, the average income in Moscow was more than 
three times higher than the national average – whereas that of Nizhny Novgorod was 
slightly below, as in most other provinces and cities (ibid.). Nizhny Novgorod also had a 
relatively stable social composition throughout the period (Ivašinenko 2002: 178). 
Questions were asked about the respondents’ relationship to financial institutions, 
commercial as well as Sberbank, to the government, to private business, to vouchers, to 
privatisation. Above all, the respondents were asked to tell freely about their experience 
of the financial situation in the country following the economic reforms initiated by 
Yeltsin’s government. Precisely which questions were asked and how they were phrased 
depended on the development of the interview. Care was taken not to ask leading 
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questions; however, it is difficult to be certain that the way in which the questions were 
asked did not influence the answers. The interviews were recorded with the prior 
consent of the respondents, and then transcribed. 
In oral history, an important aim with interviews has often been to establish facts 
about the world that otherwise would have remained unknown, because written sources 
have disappeared or never existed. That has not been the case with my interviews; 
instead, the main purpose was more similar to that of qualitative interviews used by 
sociologists and psychologists, as described by Steinar Kvale: “The purpose of the 
qualitative research interview is to gather descriptions of the Lebenswelt of the interview, 
especially with regard to interpretations of the meaning of the phenomena that are 
described” (Kvale 2004: 39). Thus, I was as a rule not concerned with whether or not 
what an interviewee said about a topic was factually, objectively correct, as long as it 
was subjectively correct. However, because I am interested in the relationship between 
that Lebenswelt and behaviour, I was also interested in actual behaviour. 
An advantage with interviews, as opposed to contemporary written sources, is that 
the researcher can ask to have elicited precisely the relationships that interest him. 
Furthermore, if we see interpreting a text as a hermeneutic circle where we bring our 
own prior understandings to the table, the interview has the advantage that the 
interviewee often reacts when it emerges that the horizons of the interviewer and the 
interviewee differ, and is able to point out the differences. However, there are also 
problems with using interviews as sources for historical writing. I approach the 
interviews as relics, which should say something not so much about economic events as 
about the interviewee’s situation; however, the interviews are actually statements I use 
to make assertions about what I would have been able to obtain as relics, had I been able 
to interview my respondents during the period under review in this study. Possible 
distortions between these statements and the relics must therefore be taken seriously. 
Four such distortions have been considered in particular: 
First, people can forget important events and their own reactions: Researchers in 
Nizhny Novgorod told me that people commonly forgot troublesome aspects of the 
economic reforms, because they were too painful to think about. Thus, their recollection 
both of their own views and of their own financial behaviour could be skewed, even 
when they tried to be honest. Another problem was that some interviewees obviously 
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confused different events, such as the Pavlov reform in 1991 and the liberalisation of 
prices in 1992, or the “Black Thursday” in 1994 and the financial crisis in 1998. The best 
remedy against such distortions in the interviews was to know as much as possible 
about the topics of the interview. 
Second, respondents could have been influenced by their views on different 
institutions today when speaking about how they viewed them then. People commonly 
reinterpret and reconfigure their lives as they live them. Several interviewees 
demonstrated remarkable skill in distinguishing between what they thought now and 
what they thought then – for instance, by asking: “Are you referring to my views now, 
or my views then?” (Interview no. 5). In other cases, I had to make judgements based on 
the totality of what was said. 
Third, interviewees might have had other motivations for not telling the truth. This is 
often a problem in oral history, because people might benefit from a certain 
representation of the past, or simply because they want to present themselves as good 
people. In my context, however, this problem seemed manageable, as the interviewees 
were ordinary people, who could not hope to gain much by not telling the truth, and 
few seemed to mind to reveal facts about themselves that could be seen as unflattering. 
And to extent that my respondents did misrepresent past views and reasoning, the bias 
would probably be towards portraying those views as more “rational” – in the sense of 
conforming to economic theory – than they were. The bias is then against the hypothesis 
in this study, which is that conceptions of the financial market differing from those of 
economic theory were important to financial behaviour in post-Soviet Russia, and is 
therefore acceptable. 
Finally, people might be unaware why they change their views or their decision-
making calculus, or even that they change at all. The causes of such changes are thus 
unlikely to be found in direct statements. When respondents had altered their views on 
different financial institutions over time without knowing why, I have sought to analyse 
those changes in light of other information, partly drawing on psychological theories 
and mechanisms. 
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Written sources 
I have also reviewed several hundreds newspaper articles from Russian newspapers 
from the period under consideration. As newspapers were a source of information, 
analysis of their content is important in order to understand how knowledge was 
established. Surveys have indicated that newspapers were the single most important 
source of information about the financial market (Ivašinenko 2002: 132). For this 
purpose, I have mainly selected articles that reported on events, to see which aspects of 
events were related, and how; and articles aiming at enlightening the readers more 
generally. Second, just as with the interviews, newspapers are used to access arguments 
from different mental universes and their relationship to behaviour; these articles may 
correct possible biases in the interviews and do not have the problem of possible 
confusion of past and present. For this purpose, I have selected articles that relate 
personal experiences: letters to the editor, interviews and other articles where opinions 
and views are expressed. 
The main reason for doubting the reliability of statements – remembering that it is 
their subjective truth-value that is my concern – in these articles is if those who write 
have some personal motive for pretending that they hold different views than they in 
fact do. I have judged this to be so only in extraordinary cases, to which I will return in 
Part II. Where I rely on newspaper sources for factual information on events, I have 
deemed this information to be accurate beyond reasonable doubt. 
The main newspapers used are (circulation in parentheses)51: Argumenty i Fakty 
(2,985,000), Moskovskij Komsomolec (2,245,687), Komsomol’skaja Pravda (819,111), Izvestija: 
(234,500), Kommersant’’ (hereafter transcribed Kommersant, 118,551), Segodnja: (57,000), 
Sel’skaja Žizn’ (92,000). Of these, the most important have been Izvestija and Kommersant. 
My approach has been qualitative, with no attempt to quantify how widespread the 
discourses I discuss were. My main goal is to examine how discourses change and relate 
to behaviour, and thus to illuminate a new aspect of the causal explanation of financial 
behaviour at the micro-level. However, since the questions raised in the beginning of the 
study relate to aggregate behaviour, some considerations are due as to the 
generalisability of any findings. 
                                                   
51  Circulation obviously varied through time – these are figures derived from www.public.ru. 
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There are at least two possible objections to this selection: First, the communist and 
nationalist press is basically absent – papers like Sovetskaja Rossija, Trud or Zavtra. 
Second, although Argumenty i Fakty, Moskovskij Komsomolec and Komsomol’skaja Pravda 
were ranked among the five most trusted newspapers before the 1996 presidential 
elections, Izvestija fared considerably worse; Kommersant was not included in the sample 
(Institut social’no-politiceskich issledovanij 2001: 539). However, I believe this can be 
justified on three grounds: First, all the newspapers contain plenty of examples of people 
from all sides of the political spectrum. Second, if the discourse on financial markets in 
these newspapers differed from that of the communist press, it was usually closer to an 
educated, Western, economistic conception of the situation. If I can still show that these 
discourses conceived of financial markets very differently from what economistic 
reasoning would expect, it seems likely that discourses in the communist press, if they 
differed at all from what I have presented, were at least not closer to an economistic 
reasoning. The clearest examples of such reasoning in my sample usually come from 
Kommersant, which partly serves to demonstrate how discourses could differ. Third, 
these newspapers were the searchable newspapers that contained the most articles on 
financial markets. Their use is thus partly a deed of necessity; it also seems reasonable to 
suspect that precisely because they had more information about financial markets than 
other newspapers, people would turn to them for information on that particular subject. 
Finally, I have to a limited extent used folklore, anecdotes and literature as a source. 
The advantage with such sources is that they have to take as their point of departure 
lingual codes that communicate with an audience in a compressed format. Such 
communication often aims to reveal how we think, what we do and who we are. 
 
New questions: Discourse, psychology and events 
The main function of the epistemological considerations outlined here is not to present a 
theory of interaction of the Russian financial market. Rather I adhere to the view of those 
critical institutionalist economic historians who see the role of theory in history as “a 
device that assists historians to reframe the questions they can ask of their 
material”(Harris, Hunter & Lewis 1995: 8f ). These questions can be outlined as follows: 
How did the worldview, the discourse and the logic of action of those who trusted 
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commercial financial companies differ from the views, discourses and logics of action of 
those who trusted Sberbank, or those who trusted neither? Were different discourses 
instrumental in predisposing for different actions, or, perhaps, an integral part of those 
actions? Could different worldviews, discourses and logics of action lead to the same 
action? How did views change over time? And how should we approach the 
interrelationship between discourse, psychology and events? 
The next part is organised around events that were important in bringing about 
changes in discourses on financial institutions. The three chapters of the analysis each 
feature one major discursive paradigm, reflecting the three shifts in behaviour serving as 
point of departure for the three substantive questions asked in Chapter 1: Why were 
commercial financial companies initially successful? Why did they then lose ground to 
Sberbank? And why did they both subsequently lose ground to dollars? The analysis 
seeks to demonstrate the existence of those paradigms and their relevance for decision-
making – examining changes in paradigms as well as decision-making; but also giving 
space to the many different responses to the situations. In the conclusion, I consider how 
different discourses related to one another, and how they combined to produce 
aggregated, observable results. I then reflect on what kind of explanation has thus been 
provided; what it can tell us and what it cannot tell us about Russian financial behaviour 
in the 1990s; and what it can tell us about the historian’s ability to present causal 
explanations different from those usually presented in the social sciences.  
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Part II: Analysis of Russian Financial Behaviour 
 
5. From Sberbank to MMM, 1991–1994 
Here I address the first of the substantive questions posed in Chapter 1: why did so 
many households came to trust the financial companies that emerged in the first years 
following the break-up of the Soviet Union? Surveys from 1992 have shown that among 
the more financially active, commercial banks – at that point an entirely new 
phenomenon – were preferred to Sberbank as a means of protecting savings from losing 
their value (Ivašinenko 2002: 133). Examining the discursive context of which these 
attitudes were a part might help us to understand why many people readily trusted 
dubious financial companies, even in the face of official warnings that these companies 
were fraudulent. The first section of this chapter investigates how negative attitudes to 
Sberbank developed and spread. I then show that the perception of new commercial 
financial institutions depended directly on attitudes to Sberbank. Finally, I note some 
discourses that did not inspire trust in commercial financial institutions – or at least not 
in financial pyramids – and discuss their relationship to those presented in the preceding 
two sections. 
 
The loss of trust in Sberbank and the state, 1991–1993 
At the time of the break-up of the Soviet Union, the only institution know to accept 
deposits from ordinary citizens was Sberbank. The bank had never defaulted on its 
obligations, and had been a stable presence in the everyday life of most Russians. And 
yet, a sociological survey from November 1992 shows that among economically active 
Russians, and among those characterised by conspicuous consumption of financial 
services, almost twice as many preferred deposits in the new commercial banks to 
deposits in Sberbank.52 To be sure, commercial banks generally offered higher returns. 
But they had no reputation, no experience and did not enjoy the ubiquitous presence of 
                                                   
52 See Chapter 2 for details on this categorisation of the population. 
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Sberbank. If people trusted Sberbank, its lower interest rates could have been 
compensated for by low risk and easy access. Indeed, among wealthy, traditionally 
oriented Russians there was a clear preference for Sberbank. 
In his theory of “satisficing man” Nobel laureate Herbert Simon (1957) suggests that 
rather than constantly looking for the best option, people start to search for alternatives 
only when current behaviour falls short of their aspirations. They satisfice rather than 
maximise. An important question, then, is whether those who preferred commercial 
financial companies did so because they aimed to maximise, or because they had been 
disappointed with Sberbank. How did they view Sberbank, its policies and its 
credibility? How and why did these views change? What did they perceive Sberbank to 
be – a bank or a branch of government? And how did perceptions of the state change in 
this period? 
 
Were Soviet-era savings real? The question of indexation 
A comment by Yegor Gaidar, acting prime minister in 1992, that “money in people’s 
saving accounts [is] not real”53 can serve as a point of departure. That comment was 
made in the context of the devaluation of savings as a result of the Pavlov reforms and 
inflation. From an economic perspective, Gaidar’s comments are understandable 
enough. In late Soviet times, fixed prices and rising wages allowed people to demand far 
more goods than could be supplied, and there were constant shortages. This led to a 
“monetary overhang” – income with no counterpart in real output.54 Whether the 
proportion of household income not spent reflected the proportion of real output made 
available for investment depended on price policy and the government’s commitment to 
budgetary discipline. Furthermore, saving did not necessarily reflect any decision to 
postpone consumption. The household saving rate reached 30% in 1991 (Ivašinenko 
2002: 63), mostly because there was simply nothing to buy in the empty stores of the late 
Soviet period, when even basic foodstuffs were rationed.  
There were thus plenty of reasons for people to understand that the retail price 
system needed to change, even if they did not follow or accept Gaidar’s arguments. One 
                                                   
53  Referred in Satter 2003: 37  
54  In the classical national accounts framework, income equals output by definition. This definition does 
not work when prices and wages are not connected through the market place. 
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respondent told me that food rationing was what had made the single greatest 
impression on him from this time: 
 
We will always remember the rationing system we had, when meat was sold on 
rationing cards, when vodka was sold on rationing cards, when butter was sold on 
rationing cards, when our shops were empty. (Interview No. 17) 
 
However, as we shall see, the experience of shortages did not lead people to accept 
Gaidar’s view on the relationship between the monetary overhang and the devaluation 
of their savings. Indeed, the idea of indexing savings on par with inflation found 
support at the highest level of government. Here we should recall that inflation was an 
entirely new phenomenon in the Soviet Union: many Russians neither understood nor 
accepted the relationship between money supply and prices in a market economy.55 In 
November 1991, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet passed a law, “On the indexation of money 
income and savings of the citizens of the Russian Federation,”56 aimed to regulate 
savings upwards using the interest rate, but at a lower rate than inflation.57 In October 
1992, an organisation defending depositor interests58 demanded that the government 
should not only index current savings, but also that depositors be compensated for the 
devaluation of their savings since the start of the Gaidar reforms in January that year, 
seeing the government as a debtor vis-à-vis those depositors.59 The Supreme Soviet 
Commission on Social Policy often complained that the November 1991 indexation law 
was not implemented adequately. When the Gaidar government and subsequent 
governments would not index savings to inflation, many saw this not only as a violation 
of their material interest, but also as a moral failure on the part of the government. 
 
Were Soviet savings real? Popular perceptions of the devaluation of life savings 
How did the initial perception of a need of reform lose ground to a new perception of 
price liberalisation as theft and fraud? How were these perceptions developed, sustained 
and expressed? Let us look at some concrete reactions to the reforms and their results. 
Four workers from Novgorod complained in Izvestija in February 1993: 
                                                   
55  For an overview over which purposes price setting had served in the Soviet economy, and how Soviet 
economies thought about prices, see Keiding & Pitzner-Jørgensen 1988: 47f 
56  “Ob indeksacii denežnykh dochodov i sbereženij graždan RSFSR” 
57  “Vkladciki potrebovali kompensaciju”, Kommersant, 14.10.1992 
58  Obšcestvennyj Sovet po Zašcite Interesov Vkladcikov 
59  “Vkladciki potrebovali kompensaciju”, Kommersant, 14.10.1992 
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In 1990 we became the owners of bonds from the State Interest-free 
Specified Loan for the purchase of a car. Not many such bonds were given 
out, and they were mainly given to peredoviki.60 
 
As we know, the State Bank did not fulfil its promises; it passed away, 
although the State Bank of Russia declared that it was its heir. 
 
Now, the price of the cars we were given the right to obtain in our bonds 
varies between 1.5 and 4 million roubles. And it continues to rise. From the 
government’s explanations we know that the value of our bonds is increased 
20-fold. But such an indexation does not correspond to today’s prices. 
 
In our region they are now giving out cars to holders of the coupons “Urožaj 
90”, and also to those who worked in Jakutija, at the Bajkal-Amur Railroad 
in Tjumenskaja Oblast’. The difference in value is compensated through the 
local budget. Why this selective justice?61 
 
The Soviet banking system had two main ways in which to attract savings – deposits 
and bonds. During Soviet times, the government could issue bonds that could be used 
only to buy specified objects. Given the chronic shortage of products, these bonds served 
as a right to purchase, at a later date, a product that was not yet produced, and were a 
way of rewarding the best workers – peredoviki – in a situation where the actual products 
did not exist and where the monetary overhang was increasing. When prices rose and 
markets became saturated, these bonds were of little value, especially as the goods they 
were designated for often were among those whose prices soared. In this case, not only 
was the value of the bond reduced, but the privileged position with regard to the 
purchase was lost – whereas others who had such privileges had been able to retain 
them. The relative loss entailed in the changes was therefore subjectively felt as severe. 
However, the consequences of the devaluation of ordinary deposits could be just as 
harsh, as demonstrated by a letter to Izvestija from an elderly man from Sakhalin: 
 
My brother Nikolaj is dead. I need to go [to Moscow] to say goodbye, to bury 
him. But I cannot travel from Sakhalin – the air ticket alone costs 70 000. I 
have worked at Sakhalin for forty years. In this time, I have managed to save 
50 000 for my retirement, but that’s not enough. And why not? Because my 
deposits in Sberbank have melted away. The law on the indexation of 
deposits is nothing but a law on stealing the savings of the working people. 
How can that be just?62 
 
                                                   
60  A Soviet expression for the most hard-working workers. 
61  “Iz redakcionnoj pocty”, Izvestija, 26.02.1993 
62  “Iz redakcionnoj pocty”, Izvestija, 07.04.1993 
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The negative view of Sberbank was not necessarily connected neither to a negative view 
of the reforms in general, nor to general distrust in the state. There were those who saw 
the need for reform of the communist economy, and thus had at least some degree of 
understanding for the Gaidar reforms, but who remained deeply critical of Sberbank 
and the Pavlov reforms. When asked about what he associated with the Pavlov reform, 
Il’ja, a former Soviet mechanic who later went into private business, said: 
 
That was when they screwed63 the whole of Russia, wasn’t it? They screwed 
the whole of Russia. There were some changes… Perhaps the reform was 
necessary; perhaps there was no other way… but so many of our people 
suffered…(Interview No. 20) 
 
The understanding for reform was thus undermined by a perception of its unjust 
implementation. Public reactions to a decision by the Supreme Soviet in December 1991 
to raise deputies’ salaries in line with inflation, are telling: Once the decision became 
known through the mass media, crowds gathered outside the Supreme Soviet building 
to protest that indexation, one of the central concerns of many ordinary workers, was 
bestowed only on the elite.64 The Supreme Soviet had spoken out to promote the 
indexation of the deposits of ordinary citizens – but when it came to implementation, 
indexation was reserved for the political elite. As a result, many found state financial 
institutions to have illegitimate motives, like self-enrichment. A fundamental condition 
for trust was thus lacking. 
It thus seems that even some of those who understood the rationale for reform found 
its consequences and its motives so lamentable and questionable that they associated the 
reform with fraud. At least the discourse allowed seemingly contradictory views – 
support for and rejection of reforms – to be expressed simultaneously. In some cases, it 
seems that personal experiences of hardship were psychologically incompatible with full 
acceptance of reforms, even with an initial acceptance of reform. Interviewee no. 18, 
Julija, who worked as an engineer in Soviet times and later became a successful business 
woman, told me she had never believed in communism, and that the changes that 
occurred were much needed at that time. However, when it came to the Pavlov reforms, 
she took a rather different stand. She and her husband were at the time saving to buy a 
communal flat. 
                                                   
63  Pardon my language. I have tried to be true to the Russian original. 
64  “VS RSFSR spasaetcja ot infljacii”, Kommersant, 9.12.1991 
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We lacked just a little bit to make the first payment. Then they changed 
everything…65 We bought a tape recorder for that money. A tape recorder! 
(…) No, I didn’t trust Sberbank anymore, I started saving in foreign 
currency, we kept the money at home. (…) Why? Because it would be too 
terrible to be left without money again. I was left without a flat, and I lost 
my family because of Sberbank. Because without a flat, without normal 
living conditions, it is impossible to have a family, and my husband and I 
got divorced. That is the reason. (Interview no. 18) 
 
Unlike Gaidar, then, she seems not to have viewed the devaluation of savings as an 
integral part of reform, given her expressed support for reforms in general. The 
mechanism at work here may have something in common with what is known as 
adaptation of preferences (Elster 1992). Julija’s own experiences made her oppose a 
reform that she supported in theory. Furthermore, it seems that her more recent 
experiences suppressed other experiences, such as food rationing or long queues to buy 
bread and milk. It thus seems that her experiences with the Pavlov reform  directly 
influenced her understanding of the state as an actor in the financial system in general, 
and her view of Sberbank in particular. She never again placed her money in Sberbank. 
Asked how she reacted to the Pavlov reform, my respondent Evgenija replied: 
 
How I reacted? I went to Sberbank and asked what was happening. What is 
this? They told me that the money had lost their value. It turned out that 
those who had saved for their children lost everything. To lose one’s own 
money, that’s one thing, but your children’s? You see, my money just 
disappeared. (Interview no. 21) 
 
For many, then, distrust was directly related to highly specific policies and experiences, 
and in particular to the devaluation of savings in 1991 and 1992. That this led many to 
rethink their relationship with state financial institutions might seem surprising, since 
the devaluation was caused by the Pavlov reform and later by hyperinflation, and had 
less to do with decisions made by Sberbank and more to do with government policies. 
However, the stories recounted here suggest that because there was no real distinction 
between the state and the economy in Soviet times, and because the bank was the 
physical place where people were confronted with the devaluation of their savings, 
many associated the devaluation directly with the bank. This is particularly striking in 
Julija’a account. 
                                                   
65  This is a reference to the Pavlov reform. 
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It seems that Gaidar’s assertion that people’s savings were ‘not real’ was difficult for 
people to incorporate into their understanding of the situation. Many, obviously, did not 
understand the economic rationale for such an assertion in the first place. However, 
even those who did understand the rationale for reform were unwilling to accept 
Gaidar’s rhetoric: For them, their life savings were real; they were associated with real 
dreams, hopes and aspirations, and their disappearance had real consequences. 
 
What is the state? 
Thus far, we have explained increasing distrust in state financial institutions and state 
initiatives by the perceived injustice in their implementation and the direct suffering 
from them in the concrete circumstances of the early reform period. But why was the 
notion of injustice so readily available to Russians? Why was there not more 
understanding for the inevitable problems any government would have had in 
transforming the Soviet system – a system that so many realised was crumbling? 
Intuitively, these notions of the state seem to resemble traditional Soviet views. To see 
whether continuities from the Soviet period (and indeed from Tsarist Russia) in the view 
of the state and the bureaucracy were important in the early 1990s, it might be useful to 
consider the notion of the state in Russia more generally. This also corresponds to an 
observation made by discourse analysts that specific discourses, such as that on financial 
markets and savings, usually relate to over-arching discourses, such as that about what 
the state is.66 
The description of Russian perceptions of the state offered will necessarily be 
stereotyped. Although such a stereotype might not provide an accurate description of 
every individual perception of the state, it nevertheless provides a conceptual apparatus 
that would be known to Russians in the 1990s, and which served as a backdrop for ways 
of speaking about other phenomena. The state (gosudarstvo) or the authorities (vlasti) 
occupy a unique position in the Russian polity. To a larger degree than in Western 
countries, the state is seen as, and is expected to be, the driving force for social and 
economic change. On the other side of the dichotomy are the people (narod), who are 
                                                   
66  See for example Hønneland 2003: 14. One example from his book on Russian and Western 
environmental discourses notes how Russians’ views on the West in general have been important in 
shaping their understanding of the scientific support for Norwegian arguments in negotiating quotas for 
cod. 
 61
seen as and expected to be more passive, in politics and in economics. Importantly, the 
state and the people are not one. This corresponds to the dichotomy us vs. them, reflected 
in the Russian “our” (naš) vs. “other”/”alien” (cužoj) or “bottom” (nizy) vs. “top” 
(verchi). Reforms and changes are widely perceived as being initiated by the state 
(Neumann 2004) – and so, many view reforms as a hostile action directed against “the 
people”.67 
The notion of the state as separate from the people is of course not uniquely Russian – 
Abraham Lincoln’s famous phrase “government of the people, by the people, for the 
people” notwithstanding. But when Russians suffered from the economic reforms from 
the late 1980s onwards, views of the state as a separate institution, pushing its own 
agenda at the expense of the people, were reinforced. This tendency was particularly 
manifest among the peasantry, where Yeltsin’s market-oriented policies were frequently 
compared to Khrushchev’s campaign for growing maize in Siberia or even to Stalin’s 
collectivisation efforts (Andresen 2003). But such a discourse was clearly present also 
among urban dwellers in the 1990s. Here, the state was commonly associated with 
corrupt bureaucracy and incompetence. 
The pervasiveness of the dichotomy state/people is seen by the vitality of these 
constructs even among liberals. In an interview with the newspaper Segodnja in April 
1993, Jurij Afanas’ev, a liberal member of the Supreme Soviet and a proponent of 
privatisation, accepts this dichotomy as a premise for political discourse, describing the 
Russian polity thus: 
 
On the one side, you have the mass of people, not structured into any civil 
society; and on the other side, you have power. This is the traditional 
Russian society.68 
 
Discourses on the state were readily connected with discourses on economic reform. 
Answering a question about whether he saw the ruling government in Russia as a break 
or a continuation of what had been, he comments: 
 
In my view, the power of the bureaucratic market has consolidated in 
Russia. Power is now in the hands of a neo-Soviet nomenklatura. It is not 
the nomenklatura which we had under Stalin, Khrushchev or Brezhnev. 
                                                   
67  For a similar discussion on the significance of this dichotomy in the Stalin era, see Davies 1997. 
68  “Jurij Afanas’ev: Revanšu totlitarizma mogut pomešat’ tol’ko nezamedlitel’nye glubinnye reformy”, 
Segodnja, 06.04.1993 
 62
They enjoyed privileges thanks to the leading positions they occupied. Now 
privileges are supported by cash. It is not enough for those in power to have 
a position: they need to create companies, get title to land and so forth. 
Privileges are being capitalised. (Ibid.) 
 
A view of government as incompetent and self-serving was here natural even to a 
person who supported reforms. Afanas’ev’s remarks also demonstrate how the new 
reality was understood in terms of past experiences and concepts. 
 
Voucher privatisation 
The discrediting of Sberbank and of the state happened at a time when new financial 
companies were mushrooming. Many Russians first encountered the financial market in 
connection with voucher privatisation. As there was no real financial market in Soviet 
times, these initial experiences were important in shaping the initial understanding of 
and expectations to financial markets in general. 
Before voucher privatisation was launched, the measure had been debated for about 
half a year following the Yeltsin decree of 21 August 1992. What impression did people 
have before the privatisation auctions started? First of all, it was clear that the voucher 
programme was a central part of the government’s economic policies. The chairman of 
the State Property Committee, Anatoly Chubais, commented on the programme thus:  
 
The might of the economic ideas that are the basis of the construction [of 
the programme] is so great that it will overcome all the doubts people have 
about this process.69 
 
According to the government, the voucher auctions gave people from Kaliningrad to 
Vladivostok the opportunity to become owners of objects across the country. Chubais 
commented that this “unites Russia in the most solid way possible: that based on 
ownership.”70 Furthermore, Chubais portrayed vouchers as an opportunity for everyone 
to share the expected economic gains following the introduction of a market economy. 
At a press conference on 30 July 1992, he addressed concerns about financial firms 
making lists over elderly women prior to the distribution of vouchers, planning to buy 
their vouchers; the elderly women could not be expected to know how best to use their 
                                                   
69  “Brifing Anatolija Cubajsa”, Kommersant, 09.12.1992 
70  ”Vladel’cy vaucerov stali akcionerami, no dividendov im ne obešcajut”, Finansovye Izvestija, 11.02.1993. 
These comments must be understood in the context of a very real fear of disintegration in Russia – the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union was followed by declarations of independence by Tatarstan and 
Chechnya.  
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vouchers, he said, and all parties would gain from such arrangements.71 The logic of the 
argument was that the laws of the market thus would ensure optimal returns to 
everyone, and optimal use of resources available for investment. The government 
rhetoric was thus placed within an economistic discourse that resembled the views 
underlying theories on financial intermediation discussed in Chapter 2. 
Two interesting expressions that later came to be used as points of reference were 
coined in this period. The first – “golden vouchers” – derived from a slogan in 
advertisement campaigns promoting privatisation: “Make your voucher golden.” In a 
letter to Izvestija in November 1993, a reader asks: 
 
They tell us that if we exchange our [vouchers] for shares in investment 
funds, we will become owners of state property, and the voucher will become 
“golden”. Explain how that can be, when a voucher with a nominal value of 
10,000 roubles as a result of the inflation now is worth some 20 dollars?72 
 
But dividends did not materialise, and the real value of the vouchers became 
undermined by inflation. The promises that had been made – by the government, and by 
various private financial companies – boomeranged, as did the expression “golden 
voucher”. The performance of companies was measured against the expectation of 
golden vouchers. 
Five years after voucher privatisation, during the financial crisis in 1998, the 
following message was posted to the website of the liberal party Jabloko: 
 
So, this circle of promises–fraud, promises–fraud – that is the circle of a 
dictatorship. This is no better than Stalin’s regime (as I can imagine it). 
(Mel’nikov 1998) 
 
The message refers specifically to the state bonds, on which the government had just 
defaulted. But the “circle of promises–fraud” evidently refers to the history of the Yeltsin 
government’s involvement in attracting and protecting household savings throughout 
its tenure. This construction of government behaviour suggests that traditional Russian 
concepts of what the state is and how it operates must have been present throughout the 
period under review in this study, shaping perceptions of specific actions on the part of 
the government. 
                                                   
71  “Predprinimateli i babuški budut dovol’ny”, Kommersant, 03.08.1992 
72  “Otcego naš vaucer možet stat‘ zolotym“, Izvestija, 20.11.1993 
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The other expression concerns the elderly women mentioned by Chubais. “Chubais’ 
grandmothers” (‘Cubajsovy babuški’) became a symbol of the ordinary person’s inability 
to take advantage of the voucher programme. The following is a comment in 
Kommersant following a statement issued by AvtoVAZ, a major car producer, changing 
the rules for how the company should be privatised. AvtoVAZ wanted to give more 
shares to its own workers – in particular, to its own managers – and to this end they 
devised new “principles” for privatisation. 
 
Let’s repeat this unique principle: “Applications seeking to buy less shares 
than the average number sought by all applicants should not be granted. 
[…] Let’s imagine that one thousand “Chubais grandmothers” present 
applications to buy shares for two vouchers each. And then, someone 
applies to buy shares for two thousand vouchers. The average number turns 
out to be four – and the women will have brought their vouchers in vain, 
whereas “someone” collects as many shares as he wants. And there will be 
no such trickling down of capital as the Supreme Soviet has talked so much 
about.73 
 
Practices resembling those devised by AvtoVAZ eventually became  widespread 
(Andrésen 1998). However, although the shortcomings of voucher privatisation often 
had to do with malpractice within companies, many people saw the failure of voucher 
privatisation as the government’s responsibility. Nikolaj, a respondent in Nizhny 
Novgorod, recalled: 
 
Nikolaj: As the people always have said: Before going through with 
something like that, the government should have explained to people what 
to do with the vouchers. 
Interviewer: So no one explained what to do? 
Nikolaj: No, they handed them out and said: Do what you want with them. 
Many sold them right away; someone immediately offered to buy them. And 
now these “someone’s” – Abramovich and all the rest – own everything. 
Interviewer: So no one told you that you could find a suitable object to 
invest in? 
Nikolaj: Perhaps they did, but we didn’t understand. After socialism, 
capitalism did not really exist for us. (Interview no. 14) 
 
In this statement, the government is blamed, even though it is not directly accused of 
trying deliberately to fool people. This also fits well within a dichotomised 
understanding of society, where the interest of the people is counterpoised with the 
interest of the state or of an elite. 
                                                   
73  “Priviatizacija Avtovaza”, Kommersant, 29.11.1993 
 65
The perceived centrality of the state was underlined by the way words connected to 
the reform programme were captured and transformed by those opposed to the 
government. Examples include notably the substitution of prichvatizacija – a non-lexical 
word implying grabbing or theft – for privatizacija – privatisation. The word 
prichvatizacija had become a cliché already by early 1993.74 This construct had 
antecedents to the word kukuruzacija – a term used derogatorily to describe 
Khrushchev’s ill-fated maize campaign. This word reflected the Russian word kukuruza – 
maize – but with the added connotations to the sound made by the cuckoo bird, which 
also in Russia denotes something stupid or disorderly. This construct, in turn, was used 
in a fashion resembling Lenin’s famous slogan, “communism was Soviet power plus the 
electrification of the entire country”, a project which also – or so many perceived – came 
to naught. The use of the word prichvatizacija thus allows for an understanding of 
capitalism as “democracy plus the theft of the entire country’s assets by a privileged 
few” – and supports an interpretation of society as a dichotomy consisting of rulers and 
ruled, and an interpretation of the rulers as incompetent and fraudulent. 
Frustrated officials tried to convince people that this was not the case. Commenting 
on why the price of vouchers was falling, Valentina Cernjavskaja said:  
 
That’s because of ignorance. No one trusts anyone. But mark my words: If 
current policies remain in place and if the government is not changed, I’ll 
show people like you what the voucher can do. Anyone who entrusts 
vouchers to me will become rich. And very soon.75 
 
This is a clear attempt to change the discourse on voucher privatisation. It suggests that 
the dominant discourse, or at least an important one, was that voucher privatisation was 
a failure. 
I have so far attempted to demonstrate that a lack of understanding and acceptance of 
the processes of inflation and the devaluation of savings made the question of 
indexation of savings urgent for many Russians. Even those who initially showed some 
understanding of the reforms drifted towards a more negative understanding as events 
unfolded and as the consequences were felt directly. The earlier Russian 
conceptualisation of government as an institution separate from the people, plagued by 
                                                   
74  According to journalist Aleksej Tarasov in the article “Prizrak kommunizma voskresaet v kraju 
stalinskich lagerej”, Izvestija, 25.02.1993 
75  “Kto mne poverit, to razbogateet”, Izvestija, 04.05.1993 
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incompetence and corruption, was thus revitalised through perceived state practice at 
the early stages of reforms; and Sberbank was seen as part and parcel of the corrupt state 
institutions which seemed indifferent to the problems of ordinary men and women.  
I started by asking why, in the light of Herbert Simon’s theories of “the satisficing 
man”, people who through most of their lives had used Sberbank now came to choose 
unknown companies with no reputation. Sberbank was seen as defaulting on its moral 
and financial obligations in this regard; voucher privatisation was generally perceived as 
fraud; and rampant inflation reduced the value of household savings day by day – 
under such conditions institutions that addressed these concerns could attract attention, 
sympathy, and, crucially, money from disappointed depositors. It is therefore likely that 
many would at least consider alternatives to Sberbank, which had proven unable or 
unwilling to protect their interests. 
The question then became: Who could? 
 
The rise of commercial financial companies, 1992–1994 
As we saw in Chapter 1, the proportion of savings directed to buying dollars and to 
investment in commercial banks and investment funds increased rapidly in this 
period.76 Nina Ivašinenko has ascribed the initial success of private financial companies 
to “market euphoria” or “market romanticism” (2001: 101; 2002: 38). David Satter 
describes the companies as taking advantage of “the weakness and gullibility of Russian 
citizens” (2003: 75). But a fascinating aspect of the early success of commercial 
companies is how widespread engagement with private financial companies was even 
among people who did not initially have a positive view of the market. Although such 
behaviour was perhaps naïve, in the sense that it was built on a simplistic understanding 
of the situation, popular views of private financial companies were not automatically 
                                                   
76  The shift to dollars is predicted by economic theory, as seen in Chapters 1 and 2. Dollarisation in such 
circumstances is also well known from other economically instable countries. Interviews and newspaper 
articles confirm that Russian households used dollars to avoid devaluation of rouble holdings, because 
the dollar was seen as stable and safe in this period of rapid inflation and political instability. Thus, 
motivations conform to rational choice, and people’s perceptions of the risks and profits involved in 
dollars and rouble savings respectively conform to those of economists. I shall not, therefore, deal 
extensively with dollars as an alternative to Sberbank before 1995. More surprising is the fact that 
dollarisation continued and accelerated after the 1995 stabilisation programme; this will be dealt with in 
Chapter 7. 
 67
positive. I here offer an alternative explanation of why people still engaged with the 
financial market. 
 
Between a rock and a hard place? 
When private financial companies appeared in the late Soviet state for the first time in 
more than 70 years, they could not draw on a golden past to inspire trust. Russian 
history had not portrayed private banks and bankers favourably. Bankers were 
distrusted in Tsarist Russia, and did not exist in the Soviet understanding of the 
economy. Economic historian Alexander Gerschenkron wrote about banking in the late 
19th and early 20th centuries: 
 
(…) the standards of honesty in business were so disastrously low, the 
general distrust of the public so great, that no bank could have hoped to 
attract even such small funds as were available (…) (Gerschenkron 1962: 19) 
 
That commercial financial companies did not enjoy any automatic, euphoric trust at the 
dawn of the post-communist state seems apparent from an interview with the chairman 
of the financial company Russkij Dom Selenga, Aleksandr Astanin, in the Moscow-based 
newspaper Tribuna: 
 
Russkij Dom Selenga not only has never ever planned to fool anybody – on 
the contrary, in April of last year we indexed the deposits of the population 
by 30%. And spare resources we invest in property and other assets that 
you simply cannot transfer abroad.77 
 
It is interesting to note how two aspects of the company’s activities are highlighted: That 
the company indexes savings; and that it invests in property, and thus cannot transfer 
money abroad and steal it. Such a comment would make sense only in a context where 
the question of indexation was a big concern, and where people feared that financial 
companies would steal their money by transferring it abroad. The question of indexation 
has been raised above; it was a natural concern given rising prises, and its prominence in 
discourse could thus be related to events experienced at the individual level. But why 
did people fear that financial companies would steal their money and transfer it to 
foreign bank accounts? 
                                                   
77  “Intervju Asleksandra Astanina predsedatelja soveta direktorov “Russkogo Doma Selenga””, Tribuna, 
12.04.1994 
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At the time of Astanin’s comments – April 1994 – there had been few bankruptcies 
among banks, and few clients had therefore suffered from possible fraud (Spicer & Pyle 
2003: 14). Such perceptions would thus have had to be shaped not by personal 
experiences on the financial markets but by public and personal discourse.  
Both the question of criminal activity linked to money in foreign bank accounts and 
the question of fraudulent bankers existed even before commercial banks started 
collecting household deposits in earnest in 1992 – although they had not been directly 
linked. In 1991 and 1992, the press wrote a lot about the billions of dollars presumably 
held by the Communist Party abroad. Money abroad was subsequently closely 
associated with criminal activity, and arguments to the effect that ordinary, non-criminal 
citizens or companies held money abroad were in need of explanation: 
 
According to various estimates, Russians hold between 7 and 25 billion 
dollars in foreign bank accounts. But contrary to public opinion, it is not 
first and foremost the mafia that keeps money in foreign banks. Ordinary 
Russian companies, obtaining currency profit from foreign trade, make up 
the majority of the owners of foreign bank accounts.78 
 
It should here be noted that many of the largest newspapers did not always give much 
voice to the crudest popular perceptions of economic actors. It is therefore not surprising 
that there are few statements directly saying or implying that bankers almost by 
definition are criminals. Those newspapers that did reflect these attitudes tended not to 
write much about the banking sector – the rural newspaper Sel’skaja Žizn’, for example, 
provides abundant examples of negative perceptions of all trading activity 
(“posrednicestvo”). One farm worker wrote to the newspaper: 
 
I support those who get rich through honest work. But I’m against those 
who produce little themselves, and earn their money (…) through buying 
and selling. The Russian nation hates such people, and the government 
defends them.79 
 
Similar sentiments were expressed in interviews when I asked respondents how they 
viewed the new commercial structures following Yeltsin’s reforms. Svetlana, a musician 
from Moscow, explained: 
 
                                                   
78  “Ukrytie rossijskimi predprinimateljami i castnymi licami valjutnych sredstv za granicej priobretaet 
massovyj character”, Rossijskie Vesti, 24.12.1992 
79  “Stroki iz pisem”, Sel’skaja Žizn’, 16 October 1992. See also Andresen 2003: 45. 
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People started making money, as we say, out of thin air. And these air-
traders were associated with the new regime. I even remember a friend of 
mine… an acquaintance, who already as a 14-year-old bought himself a car, 
although he lived with his mother, who was a pensioner, it was obvious that 
he didn’t get the money from her. In his spare time he was involved in 
business – bought some sort of boots, and resold them to the girls in school 
under different labels. They had a stamp: Made in Italy, but were probably 
made in some basement somewhere – and not by professionals. People could 
not even trust the goods they bought. (Interview no. 1) 
 
In Svetlana’s understanding, private business placed itself squarely on the wrong side of 
the dichotomy us/them. Bankers were commonly seen as the most prominent among the 
new business elite; the best known of the later oligarchs, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, for 
instance, started his career with the bank Menatep. If people did not trust state financial 
institutions, why should they trust the new commercial structures? 
 
Identifying with ordinary people 
But it seems that the success of financial companies depended on their ability to make 
people identify with them to a certain extent. The government failed in communicating a 
concern for the everyday problems of people. How, then, did some companies succeed 
in building an image that led people to trust that their services would help them solve 
their mundane problems? 
An article about the commercial bank Toribank, one of the first banks to accept 
household deposits, can serve as a point of departure: On 3 November 1992, the 
newspaper Kommersant published an article about an indexation that had taken place the 
previous day.80 The director of Toribank, Andrej Želamskij, commented: 
 
The indexation aims to defend the little that people have managed to save 
up during their lives.81 
 
This echoed very well one of the main concerns for people otherwise sceptical to the 
financial system: The threat that inflation posed to their life savings. Aleksandr Astanin 
in Russkij Dom Selenga followed the same strategy responding to the concerns of the 
population, as we have seen above. 
                                                   
80   ‘Indexation’ in this case meant that the bank added a certain value to deposits, in theory linked to 
inflation, but, as it did not reflect inflation directly, it was distinguished from the normal interest rate 
mostly at the rhetorical level. 
81  “Toribank opjat’ indeksiroval vklady”, Kommersant, 03.11.1992 
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In an interview with Izvestija in March 1994, Sergej Mavrodi, the president of MMM, 
the most successful commercial financial enterprise of the day, took a similarly clear 
stand concerning indexation: 
 
When the rouble exchange rate is falling constantly, talk about dividends 
“paid according to the results of the financial year” is useless for people, 
because the value is eaten by inflation. 
 
That’s why we have decided to index the price of our shares – twice a week 
we gather the board, and on the basis of the results of the company for the 
previous period we establish a new price. And this price is guaranteed (…). I 
want to stress that we are not talking about some abstract “market price of 
the share”, which God knows who is going to pay in the market place, as no 
one usually wants these shares. We’re talking about a completely real price 
that we guarantee and at which we buy without making trouble at any 
time.82  
 
The phrases in inverted commas mimic official rhetoric concerning the voucher 
privatisation scheme. In an interview with Pravda in November 1993, Sergej Mavrodi 
scorned voucher privatisation, claiming that most investment funds were managed by 
amateurs. For this, he faulted not so much business as the government. When choosing 
where to invest, he admonished readers, the important thing was that the leader of the 
company should be competent and honest.83 Interestingly, Toribank was owned partly 
by MMM.84 That these companies evidently succeeded in getting portrayed as being 
concerned with the well-being of ordinary people suggests that they understood the 
discourses of many people better than the government. 
 
Advertisement campaigns 
Mavrodi, Želamskij, Astanin and others tried to appear in interviews as business leaders 
who were truly concerned about the misfortunes of the people. But sporadic 
appearances in newspapers with limited circulation could hardly have resulted in a 
thorough change of the discourse, so the big financial companies had broader marketing 
strategies. The most successful, best-known advertisement campaign was that of MMM.  
Even though it was not actually registered as a bank, for the remainder of this chapter I 
will concentrate on MMM, because it seems to have been central in shaping perceptions 
                                                   
82  “Prezident ob’’edinenija “MMM” Mavrodi S. P.”, Izvestija, 04.03.1994. 
83  “Interv’ju izvestnogo predprinimatelja, prezidenta ob’’edinenija “MMM” S. P. Mavrodi”, Pravda, 
05.11.1993. 
84  “Toribank postavil na castnych lic“, Kommersant 20.01.1992 
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of the banking sector in general – precisely because it was so successful, and so well-
known through its advertising campaigns.  
How and to what extent did MMM succeed in being identified as a trustworthy 
defender of the people and their savings, or otherwise as a profitable and attractive 
savings alternative? Excerpts from an interview with Bachyt Kilibaev, director of the TV 
commercials that formed the backbone of MMM’s advertisement campaign, made just 
before the crash of MMM in late July 1994, can serve as a point of departure for such a 
discussion: 
 
Before [our film people started making commercials], there existed certain 
professional standards, defined by the development of the American 
advertisement tradition. (…) Western television commercials were based on 
certain technologies, which we didn’t have. And everyone then tried to do 
whatever he or she could to achieve the same standards, without the 
necessary technology. (…) But such work is directed towards professionals 
or towards those who ordered the commercial. (…) They say: “This – this is 
first-class material, this is America!” In MMM, we’re doing something 
principally different.85 
 
Interestingly, this notion of other commercials somehow not connecting with, even not 
being directed towards, ordinary people is mirrored, and taken to the extreme, in Viktor 
Pelevin’s novel Generation P from 2001, which has gained status as one of the novels that 
best capturing the generation coming of age during the late 1980s and early 1990s. The 
following dialogue between the boss of an advertising agency and an employee shows 
how the advertising business could be perceived:  
 
– And then, why do people advertise here in Russia?’ 
Tatarskij shrugged his shoulders. 
– Go on, tell me what you think. 
– To sell their goods? 
– To sell their goods – that’s in America. 
– Well, to feel cool, then. 
– That was three years ago. Now, our client wants to show the big guys, who 
follow closely what’s going on both on TV and in real life that he has a 
million dollars to throw away as garbage. The worse the ad, the better. 
(Pelevin 2001: 124) 
 
The most interesting quote here is “to feel cool” – identified by Tatarskij as the dominant 
motivation for advertising among businessmen a few years prior to the events in the 
novel, which is set in the late 1990s. To be sure, this is not evidence of the actual 
                                                   
85  “Ja i Lënja Golubkov – takie, kak vse”, Segodnja, 09.08.1994 
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motivation of business people, but it spells out in a very direct form how the whole 
phenomenon was perceived or could be perceived by some intellectuals of the time. A 
similar perception of how the advertising world related to customers led Kilibaev to 
contemplate the nature of his audience: 
 
I started thinking: ‘Who are these people? How can I communicate with 
them?’ And I understood: No one has ever engaged with them. It is like these 
people don’t even exist for our mass media.86 
 
This is not the place to explore whether Kilibaev’s evaluation of the media’s attitudes 
towards ordinary people in Russian history is correct. The important point here is how 
these commercials were perceived. Were MMM and certain other financial companies 
able to earn themselves a place on the right side of the dichotomy relating to state and 
people? What aspects of their commercials could contribute to such a result? First of all, 
what did the best-known commercials actually contain? 
Kilibaev wanted to create a person people could identify with. The MMM 
commercials featured a man called Lënja Golubkov, his brother Ivan and some friends. 
Svetlana, who was a teenager when the commercials first appeared, recollects: 
 
Then you had this commercial – Lënja Golubkov. He was sitting there, 
perhaps with a friend, saying that the price of MMM shares had gone up by 
this or that much… And on the next clip, perhaps he returned from the 
United States, or he was sitting there with a girlfriend, everything from this 
money. Everyone watched these commercials. (Interview no. 1) 
 
Sergej Mavrodi, president of MMM, offered his evaluation of the extent to which people 
identified with Golubkov and the other characters: 
 
The very well-received characters of the MMM commercials are not actually 
imagined. The thousands crowding at Warsaw Chaussé [the main office of 
MMM] – they are Lënja Golubkov, his brother Ivan, the lonely Marina 
Sergeevna, the students Julija and Serëža or the pensioners. This is not only 
a small segment of the population; it is today the majority. And that is why 
President Yeltsin’s phrase about “this Lënja Golubkov that I’m so sick and 
tired of” is insulting to people, and that is why they react to Prime Minister 
Chernomyrdin’s vow to deal with the same Lënja with anger: Deal with 
whom? With us?87 
 
                                                   
86  “Ja i Lënja Golubkov – takie, kak vse”, Segodnja, 09.08.1994 
87  “Zajavlenie prezidenta “MMM””, Izvestija, 20.04.1994 
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Coming from the president of a company, such a statement might be unsurprising. 
However, the identification with Golubkov and the estrangement from the government 
was mirrored in statements from investors in the company. The following account 
comes from an old woman in a letter to Mavrodi, printed in Izvestija in August 1994.  
 
Highly respected Mr. Mavrodi, Sergej Panteleevic! 
I am an old friend of MMM, I believe in MMM, and MMM has now helped me 
buy a fridge. I was planning to buy a washing machine and a TV – although 
not quite as big as the ones Lënja Golubkov bought. 
 
(…) I’m appalled that starting from our president and ending with those 
journalists, people harass MMM, both orally and in writing. 
 
(…) On the 26th of July, when this new attack on MMM started, I bought 20 
tickets for MMM, costing 24 000 roubles, just in spite!88 
 
The logic that connects a company’s image of relating to the very concrete, very 
mundane concerns of ordinary citizens to the decision-making processes that lead them 
to entrust their savings to commercial institutions, is also suggested by another letter to 
the president of MMM, written by a pensioner from Moscow: 
 
Greetings, MMM! 
My wife and I are pensioners. First of all, we trust MMM 100%, and believe 
that what the company does is necessary, great and just. Especially for us 
pensioners. Judge for yourselves. Until the 1st of January 1992, my wife 
and I had enough money “on the book” [a reference to the Sberbank bank 
book] to pay for decent funerals for both of us (it is necessary to think of this 
in time). And then the so-called reforms took everything. They robbed us. 
 
In March of this year I heard the commercials for MMM. I believed them, 
and bought a few shares. And I wasn’t mistaken. Today, in July, my wife 
and I again, thanks to MMM, have the means required for the purposes 
explained above. We are sincerely grateful to MMM, we believe in you and 
hope for the best. (…)89 
 
This quote comprises both the dichotomy between the state and MMM – interaction 
with the state associated with theft and interaction with MMM associated with the 
restoration of dignity, and of the importance of commercials for associating the 
resolution of the everyday problems of ordinary people, and MMM. This association to 
resolving problems featured in what became the most known slogan for MMM: “MMM 
– no problem” (MMM – net problem, which rhymes in Russian). The slogan was virtually 
                                                   
88  “Pis’ma v “MMM””, Izvestija, 20.08.1994 
89  “Pis’ma v MMM”, Izvestija, 06.08.1994 
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ubiquitous, being played even when people dialled 100 to get the exact time, together 
with the latest prices of the MMM shares (Satter 2003: 77). 
These news articles are so favourably disposed towards MMM and its president that 
one could have suspected the letters of being false – written, perhaps, by MMM officials 
or planted in the newspaper. In fact, there is little reason to suspect anything of the sort. 
Interviewing people in the queues outside MMM’s main office in Moscow in the spring 
of 1994 as part of her sociological fieldwork, Ol’ga Kuzina overheard the following 
comment on 16 June: 
 
The state cheats and has always cheated, we can’t expect anything good 
from the state, but here there are people who want to and who are able to 
help. That’s why I took everything I could here to buy shares in MMM, and I 
don’t regret that for a second. (Kuzina 1999) 
 
A month later, she heard the following comment, which further underlines the differing 
ability on the part of the state and of MMM to communicate trustworthiness to the 
people: 
 
MMM officials explain the situation so we can understand it – the 
government never does that. (Ibid.) 
 
Thus it seems reasonable to believe that the letters posted in Izvestija are authentic 
expressions of how people thought. My respondent Stanislav, who was critical to MMM, 
also accepted that Lënja Golubkov was indeed a symbol that people could identify with: 
 
Lënja Golubkov – that was… a good trick for those who organised it. I 
remember… it was this Mavrodi, wasn’t it. Golubkov, that’s a name I do not 
like, because our people believed in this company, because he was such an 
ordinary guy, ready to invest his money there.(Interview no. 5) 
 
And some members of the government used Lënja Golubkov as an example of ordinary 
men and women. Discussing the lack of a sound legal basis for financial companies such 
as MMM, foreign minister Andrej Kozyrev90 promised: 
 
…the population, Lënja Golubkov, should not suffer from the lack of a legal 
basis, the situation in MMM should not be dramatised or politicised.91 
 
                                                   
90  Why it was the foreign minister who commented on these matters remains outside the scope of this 
study, though I am sure it reveals something about the Russian polity and economy. 
91  “AO “MMM” pogibaet, no ne sdaetsja”, Segodnja, 29.07.1994. However, at the same time, the Deputy 
Prime Minister Sergej Šachraj declared that “easily earned money is always risky, and the government 
cannot take responsibility for shares in unregistered companies.” 
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In the article, the journalist reports that the government has decided to take steps to 
prevent their actions against MMM from having negative consequences for ordinary 
“Lënja Golubkovs and Marina Sergeevnas” – the plural of these two most prominent 
characters of the commercials, “ordinary people” (ibid.). 
Let me provide one slightly more extended example of the circumstances in which 
individuals were motivated to invest in MMM: Pavel (interviewee no. 4) was one of those 
who invested in MMM. In an interview with the author he related how he came to put 
his money there, and how he subsequently viewed commercial banks and information 
about them. By the early 1990s Pavel had amassed considerable savings, especially 
because there had been little to spend his money on as a result of the increasing 
shortages on basic products in the late 1980s. These savings were lost in the Pavlov 
reforms, when the government limited the exchange of old rouble notes to 500 roubles. 
 
Well, what can one say? We were used to that stuff. My parents were in their 
time forced to buy state bonds, this was during Stalin, and I remember from 
my youth different money reforms – not to our advantage, I’ll tell you. 
 
Pavel was 47 years old at the time, and worked as an engineer in a state factory. Facing 
falling real wages and rising job insecurity, Pavel decided to start independently as a 
taxi driver. For this, he had to buy a car, and needed both to save the little money he had 
and to borrow. It was at this time that the financial company MMM appeared, with a 
commercial campaign promising high returns. Pavel explains his attitude to the 
commercial thus: 
 
At that time, just out of inertia, we still believed what they said on radio and 
television. With some doubts, perhaps, but… I still trusted it, a habit from 
Soviet times.”(Interview no. 4) 
 
It might seem surprising that people trusted mass media in Soviet times, given that the 
communist press inspired the “In Pravda (which translates “truth”) there is nothing true, 
in Izvestija (which translates “news”) there is nothing new.” To be sure, some people 
were sceptical. But whereas many would, perhaps, be sceptical to political statements, it 
seems that certain kinds of mundane information were deemed reliable. It should be 
noted that Pavel did not trust or take into consideration all the information that was 
available in the mass media at the time. As suggested in the following, analysts knew 
full well that MMM was not a sound financial company, and the respected newspapers 
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Izvestija and Kommersant both ran pieces to this effect before the crash of MMM.92 Of 
course, Pavel might not have read these pieces. But it is likely that many who were 
aware of this information simply trusted the information in the commercials more, 
perhaps because the language of MMM more closely resembled their own views than 
government or expert information, which to many was discredited by what they saw as 
the cynical approach of Gaidar’s team. 
These successful commercial campaigns aimed at creating identification and 
appealed more to emotions than to rationality. MMM became by far the largest of the 
commercial financial companies of the day, although it is difficult to estimate exactly 
how big. But there were also advertisement campaigns focusing less on identity and 
more directly on profits. AKB Mosimportbank, for example, ran ads in the newspaper 
Nezavisimaja Gazeta on a semi-daily basis in the spring of 1994, promising 30,000% 
annual interest rate on deposits.93 The content of the ad was simply: 
 
AKB “Mosimportbank”: Licence No. 2165. Deposits on demand – the most 
profitable allocation of capital today: 30,000% annual interest rate – for your 
children and grandchildren on the threshold of the 21st century.94 
 
Such “rational” ads were by no means more reliable than their more emotional 
counterparts. The ad does not reveal, for example, that the figure 30,000% is not the 
interest rate a depositor would receive in one year; it is the compound interest rate paid 
on ten-year deposits without adding interest every year, and the ad is thus highly 
misleading. Moreover, the bank itself was not much more reliable than the financial 
companies described above: It had its licence revoked on 3 November 1995, which 
marked the beginning of a long bankruptcy procedure.95 This was the kind of ad that 
would appeal to naïve individuals suffering from market euphoria. But I hope to have 
shown above that many of the successful financial companies succeeded by connecting 
to people not by exploiting their naïve belief in the new market economy, but rather by 
presenting themselves as guardians that people could trust and identify themselves with 
in a time when the state was failing to deliver on its perceived obligations. 
 
                                                   
92  “Sverchdochodnye vloženija”, Kommersant, 29.03.1994, “P’janyj gost’ na vašej krovati”, Izvestija, 
18.03.1994 
93  Nezavisimaja Gazeta, 06.04.1994–24.06.1994. 
94  For example Nezavisimaja Gazeta, 05.05.1994, p. 7. 
95  “Mosimportbank i “Industria – Servis” – bankroty”, Segodnja, 15.09.1997 
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Voices of caution 
On the other hand, no everyone believed in these advertising campaigns. Examining 
discourses that were critical of the dubious financial companies provides a contrast and 
a better understanding of those that were not. Some commentators have argued that 
there were few warnings in the newspapers regarding the incredible promises made in 
commercials. Especially for the spring of 1994, I believe to have found enough articles 
critical of these commercials to remain unconvinced that such information was 
unknown to those who nevertheless chose to disregard it. An investment expert 
commented to Izvestija during the advertising campaign for AKB Mosimportbank 
described above: 
 
Don’t rush to invest your money, especially if they promise you 30,000 
percent interest rate. People call in to our desk almost every day to ask: 
Where should we invest our hard-earned money?96 
 
In January 1994 the financial newspaper Finansovye Izvestija published an article by 
Michail Charšan, chairman of the board of the financial company First Voucher Fund. 
Charšan wrote: 
 
In 1994, after mass bankruptcy among smaller funds, and scandals 
because of the expectations of shareholders in the companies who have 
promised their clients the earth, we should expect major structural changes 
in the operation of investment funds, a more civilised behaviour and 
openness among those who are in the market for the long run.97 
 
Charšan was candid about which companies he thought risked bankruptcy or scandals: 
 
The unheard marketing expenses have made “Moskovskaja Nedvižimost’” 
(“Moscow Real Estate”), “MMM” or “Neft’almazinvest” more famous than, 
say, IBM or Macintosh, which is quite ridiculous. 
[These investment funds] often use marketing tricks that are completely 
inadmissible in the civilised world, and that amount to fraud, promising 
their shareholders 750% or 1,000% annual interest rates. These tricks have 
remained within the law, but they are morally completely unacceptable. 
 
                                                   
96  “Cudes v bankach ne byvaet”, Izvestija, 09.04.1994 
97  ”Bor’ba za castnogo vkladcika v minuvšem godu osnovyvalas’ na mošennicestve“, Finansovye Izvestija, 
13.01.1994 
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The views expressed by Charšan were not exceptional. In an interview in Izvestija in 
March 1994, Mark Masarskij, president of the Council of Entrepreneurs under the Mayor 
of Moscow,98 warned people against getting involved with MMM: 
 
– If friends or family ask me where to invest their voucher (…) I answer 
them: Put the question more simply: Don’t trust someone who promises you 
50% interest rate in three days! Do you remember the following commercial: 
A woman who doesn’t trust anyone, bought shares in MMM, returned three 
days later and got one and a half time her money back. In three days! 
– So you say this is plain fraud? 
– It’s insane fraud!99 
 
Financial analysts understood well that MMM was a pyramid – however, they did not 
necessarily warn against participating. In an overview of investment opportunities 
Kommersant commented on the promises MMM gave in their commercial thus: 
 
As soon as a large chunk of the shares are sold – that is, when the original 
source of the pyramid is gone – the price of the shares will, in the best case, 
stabilise, or go into steep decline. (…) But then you have the reserves in the 
periphery. It is still early to expect the end of the game, and it should be 
possible to make money on the advertising-driven rise in the price.100 
 
This reasoning is reminiscent of what Belianin and Issoupova dubbed “sophisticated 
players” in the financial pyramids – those who realised that MMM and other companies 
were pyramids eventually doomed to crash, but believed they could beat the system.101 
What made people willing to participate in pyramids even if they realised the 
companies actually were fraudulent, and their commercials were inaccurate or plain 
lies? An example is perhaps provided by one respondent, Alla, a young mother in the 
early years of reforms. Alla’s husband had lost large sums in MMM. She was herself 
“categorically against it, knowing that money is not made of thin air” (interview no. 9), 
but her husband, a mathematician by training, tried to find the right moments for entry 
and exit – just like the “sophisticated players” described by Belianin and Issoupova. 
Alla said that she and her husband saw commercials as objects of art rather than 
sources of information. That Alla did not, as Pavel quoted above, “out of inertia” believe 
the commercials, is not explained by her profound knowledge about the financial 
                                                   
98  Russian: Sovet predprinimatelej pri Mere Moskvy 
99  “P’janyj gost’ na vašej krovati”, Izvestija, 18.03.1994 
100   “Sverchdochodnye vloženija”, Kommersant, 29.03.1994 
101   Cfr. Chapter 2. People knowing they were participating in a pyramid are also described by Kuzina 
1999. 
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market – before this she had worked as a florist, and had been at home with two 
children – but by the fact that she had never believed what was said on television, 
especially not in Soviet times. Alla had long dreamt about a new regime, because she 
saw the old one as corrupt, oppressive and manipulative: “I spent my youth in the 
Soviet regime, and it seemed then that this would last for ever, that it would never end; 
and suddenly it was ending, it was so exciting, so joyous”. Still, asked what hopes she 
nurtured for the future during perestroika, this “exciting and joyous time”, Alla 
answered calmly that she “nurtured no such hopes, we were adults, we understood that 
this was going to be very difficult.” 
Embracing the new opportunities, she took courses in the fashion industry, but found 
out that the market for this outside Moscow was limited, and she was jobless for a while. 
Still, her story was not one of broken promises, as is so widespread in Russia, because 
she did not have any high hopes that could be dashed. Similarly, she did not see her 
husband’s loss in MMM as fraud; he was a mathematician, he gambled and lost – “he 
was a grown man, and should decide for himself.” 
Alla’s husband thus was the prototype of the “sophisticated player”. It seems clear 
that the motivation for those who participated in MMM, knowing it was a pyramid, was 
consistent with that postulated by neoclassical economics: To maximise returns on 
investment. The article in Kommersant above explicitly aims at locating investment 
opportunities that balance risk and profit. However, it is not equally clear that their 
decisions were made according to rational choice. Belianin and Issoupova find that, at 
least in the “game” constructed in their model, they are unable to demonstrate that the 
behaviour of the “players” is substantively rational, because there are no circumstances 
under which participation is optimal. “Those who succeeded in playing this strategy”, 
they note, “did so only by luck.” (Belianin & Issoupova 2001: 27) Their research proposal 
for dealing with this paradox was, as we have noted, to look for further economic 
incentives that would render participation rational. 
However, a less dogmatic attitude to rational choice theory opens for an alternative 
representation of decision-making. When does one stop looking for or calculating 
information? A possible interpretation is that rather than making a conscious decision in 
that regard, attention was simply focused on variables that seemed important, because 
they intuitively seemed relevant, and because they were present in the public space. One 
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such variable could have been total participation throughout the country, or as the 
article in Kommersant put it: “But then there are the reserves in the periphery.” The 
“sophisticated” discourse was thus completely different from the discourse focusing on 
identification described in the previous sections. 
However, even people who neither believed in MMM nor had high thoughts about 
their own chances to “beat the system” placed their money there. Boris, a former 
engineer who had turned to private business in the early 1990s, had lost large sums in 
the Pavlov reforms, as a consequence of which he according to himself lost faith in the 
financial system. He similarly took a negative view on the prospects of MMM: 
 
It was clear right away that this was not going to last.(Interview no. 24) 
 
Nevertheless, Boris bought shares in MMM for his voucher money. But when I asked 
him if he bought the shares in an attempt to beat the system, he replied:  
 
No, absolutely not… But there were no other options out there – and we had 
learnt the lesson from the Pavlov reforms… You had to put your money 
somewhere.  
 
One final aspect of Boris’ statements deserves mentioning: When saying that the Pavlov 
reforms had taught him that he needed to put his money somewhere, he evidently did not 
consider Sberbank. Such disastrously low levels of trust in Sberbank led Boris to invest 
in a company he did not trust, perceiving it at least comparatively safer. 
A widespread myth about Russian economic behaviour is that it is risk-averse. 
According to the theoretical foundation for this analysis, it is not meaningful per se to say 
that Russians are risk-averse; risk aversion cannot be distinguished from concrete 
experiences and circumstances, and it might be that circumstances rather than culture 
have made Russians cautious. At any rate, the behaviour described in the previous 
paragraph seems paradoxical if Russians are assumed to be risk-averse: Putting your 
money somewhere you know there is a good chance you will lose everything does not 
fit with that paradigm. Economic psychologist Daniel Kahneman (2002) has suggested a 
psychological mechanism that could explain this paradox: People are much more prone 
to take risk when the default option – the result of doing nothing – is lower than what 
they already have. If the default option brings some gain or leaves you with what you 
have, your willingness to take risk decreases significantly. This can explain why people 
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were willing to take greater risk when inflation was high, viewing MMM as an attempt 
to “win back” the inevitable losses that ensued from inflation. 
6. From MMM to Sberbank, 1994–1996 
The pessimists were right. On 29 July 1994, MMM crashed. Russkij Dom Selenga reneged 
on payments in August, and others followed suit during the summer and autumn. 
Estimates vary, but tens of millions of Russians were directly affected, losing virtually all 
the savings they had deposited with these companies.102 Simultaneously, there was a 
significant negative shift in the proportion of household savings going to commercial 
financial companies. 
 
The collapse of the financial pyramids and its consequences 
The directly affected by the collapse of obscure financial structures amounted only to a 
relatively small proportion of the population. Ivašinenko finds that some 5% of the 
population of Nizhny Novgorod, for example, were directly affected, a figure that could 
perhaps be multiplied by three to take account of the families of those affected 
(Ivašinenko 2001: 41). Two questions arise: What were the effects of these crashes on the 
rest of the financial sector? And how did they affect people who did not suffer directly 
from them? 
 
Commercial banks? You mean MMM and that stuff? 
The scandal around MMM seems to have tainted the entire banking sector. Furthermore, 
the fall of the financial pyramids – MMM in particular – changed the whole discourse on 
banks and the financial sector. Furthermore, as we shall see below, it changed the 
perception of commercial ads as well. Why did the fall of a company that was not even 
formally registered as a bank have such a wide-ranging effect? For one thing, this 
distinction was unknown to many Russians, as indicated by the following excerpt from 
an interview with a young woman from Moscow: 
 
Svetlana: People stopped trusting banks. 
                                                   
102  It could seem nonchalant not to scrutinise the figures more at this point. However, the “facts” in 
this sense are not the concern of my argument in this chapter. 
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Interviewer: When? 
Svetlana: After MMM, I think. 
Interviewer: Why? MMM was not a registered bank? 
Svetlana: (Uncertain) I don’t know, are you sure it wasn’t a bank? 
 
There were probably many who did not know the difference between various kinds of 
banks. This information could be found in the newspapers, but to many the legal 
distinctions were unclear. Furthermore, the voices of caution reviewed above were often 
not heeded in any case. But even if MMM were considered to be a bank, could there not 
be other more honest players in the market? The following excerpt from an interview 
with Vladimir suggests that this question was often not considered seriously at all: 
 
Interviewer: Do you remember the appearance of the first commercial banks 
in Russia? 
Vladimir: Not very well… You’re talking about MMM and companies like 
that, right? 
Interviewer: Well, yes. 
Vladimir: Financial pyramids… I have never trusted banks, ever. And when 
this robbery of the people started… It is better to keep your money in 
Sberbank, that is, in state structures rather than in commercial structures. 
(Interview no. 8) 
 
MMM could not only be seen as a commercial bank; it became the very symbol of 
commercial banks. MMM received the most attention both in media and in public 
discourse. When thinking about whether or not to deposit money in a commercial bank, 
the image that came to mind would, in this reasoning, be that of enraged defrauded 
depositors massing outside MMM’s main office at Warsaw Chaussé 26. 
Of course, there were also those who knew the difference between financial pyramids 
and real commercial banks. Aleksandr was one of them; he explains why he still did not 
trust banks: 
 
How can I explain? The thing wasn’t that I distrusted them: But the only 
thing we heard was this bank crashed, another went down, a third one was 
a pyramid. (…) Even if I wasn’t defrauded, there was not trust either. 
(Interview no. 17) 
 
Aleksandr found that in the chaotic information situation, it was difficult to know for 
sure which bank was real and which was a pyramid. But since he had not suffered 
directly himself, his impression of banks seems to come from public discourse – or, as he 
puts it, such information was “the only thing we heard”. In other words, his view of 
 83
banks was in this respect stereotypical: He substituted stereotypes for the specific 
information he did not have. 
In this context, jokes and anecdotes constitute possible sources, because they often 
use stereotypes which do not work unless people recognise them. Let me therefore refer 
to jokes that were told by Pëtr, a retired police officer from Nizhny Novgorod, as a 
response to a question about how the crash of financial pyramids affected trust: 
 
– I would like to open an account in your bank. Whom should I see? 
– A psychiatrist.  
 
Another anecdote highlights the Russian love of punning: 
 
– Where do you have your money? 
– In a bank, of course. 
– Which bank? 
– In a piggy bank in my bedroom.103 
 
These jokes seem to reflect a mental world where putting money in a commercial bank is 
simply ruled out as an alternative. But some people kept on using commercial banks. I 
distinguish between those who continued to use commercials banks even though they 
belonged to the discursive paradigm just described; and those who had an entirely 
different conceptualisation of commercials banks. 
Pëtr serves as a good example of the first category. Having said twice that he did not 
have contact with commercial banks, it emerged that he had used a commercial bank, 
NBD Bank, precisely at this time – 1994–1996 – for making currency deposits in 
Deutsche Mark. 
 
I put aside money in a bank, in Deutsche Mark, because that would help me obtain a 
visa to Germany. It was in NBD Bank. The bank went in some years later, during the 
August crisis in 1998. I lost some money, but there wasn’t much left at that time. (…) 
I chose NBD Bank because their headquarters are right next to me at work, and a lot 
of our guys, policemen, have started working there as guards. It’s just the most 
convenient. But in general, I try not to have anything to do with banks. (Interview 
no.11) 
 
That this justification for involvement with commercial banks could have been quite 
widespread is suggested by a survey from Nizhny Novgorod, albeit from 2001, where 
                                                   
103  Ibid. The Russian orginial here is slightly different: In Russian, the word ’bank’ means ”bank”, 
whereas the word ’banka’ means jar. In the grammatical form in which they are used in the anecdote – 
the prepositional – they are identical. 
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32% of those who had bank accounts said that they were forced to have one in order to 
receive their pension, salary or other transfers. Only 11% said they had bank accounts 
because it was profitable. (Ivašinenko 2002: 162) Thus, a sceptical discourse on 
commercial banks did not automatically preclude any cooperation with such banks; 
other concerns could override that scepticism. However, it also seems clear that even to 
many among the sharply diminishing proportion of the population who deposited their 
savings with commercials banks, trust in these institutions remained low or non-
existent. 
 
Here in Russia, they only advertise the worst products 
Let me return to Pavel from Chapter 5, who had invested in MMM. How did the crash 
affect his views on the financial sector? Pavel was lucky. It so happened that he cashed 
in his shares to buy a care before the pyramid crashed – and got three times as much out 
as he had put in. However, he had many friends who lost large sums. 
 
Well, a lot of financial structures went down around that time, and we 
started to be a bit more critical towards commercials. Life has taught us this 
much: They always advertise – here in Russia, at least – the worst products. 
It’s because it wouldn’t sell otherwise. (Interview no. 4) 
 
As discussed above in Chapter 2, Andrew Spicer and William Pyle have proposed that 
the MMM crash led to the erosion of trust not only in the banking system, but also in the 
use of commercial ads as a source of reliable information. Which processes can have 
made for such an outcome? In Chapter 2, I also referred to the finding of Russian 
economic sociologist Denis Strebkov, that previous experience in the financial market 
could predicate current views. However, Pavel’s case offers us an opportunity to 
reconsider the causal mechanisms relating past experience and current views, because 
his views, as expressed in my interview with him, in many respects are the opposite of 
what one should expect if one considered only Pavel’s own experiences in the financial 
market: He lost his savings in the Pavlov reform, and he benefited from his interaction 
with MMM, a commercial financial company. Still, when asked what he associated with 
the word “commercial bank”, he answered without hesitation: “An unreliable bank”. 
Similarly, Pavel’s view of commercials as promoting the worst products is not readily 
understandable in terms of his own experiences, as he personally got what was 
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promised from MMM; and, he said in the interview, he could not remember any other 
commercials for bad financial products. 
It should immediately be pointed out that Pavel’s views are more complex. He saw 
private business as the prime mover in society, and commercials in general as “the 
prime moving force in the economy”. But he found that commercial ads were 
advertising the wrong products: 
 
Well, commercial ads are the engine of trade. But I think that, here in 
Russia at least, they only advertise the worst products. Because people don’t 
buy them otherwise.104 
 
Still, the question remains how Pavel came to feel such distrust in institutions from 
which he had not suffered any loss, whereas he actually had regained some trust in 
institutions where he believed he had suffered. How did the fraudulent commercials, or 
bank malpractices, translate into distrust on the part of the population? There was, of 
course, considerable fraud, bankruptcy and other economic shocks. However, 
confidence in these institutions could also be disastrously low both among those who 
had never had contact with them, and among those who had, but had not suffered, such 
as Pavel. The hypothesis that an individual’s experiences from interaction with the 
system suffice to explain his relationship to it therefore seems suspect. 
Ol´ga Kuzina has argued that trust is developed as a result of personal experiences 
and of communication and language in the public sphere. In this context, a Russian joke 
which I heard from a 44-year-old journalist, Vjaceslav, in the aftermath of the MMM 
crash, can perhaps be informative:  
 
So, Lënja Golubkov dies, and meets Saint Peter at the gates of heaven. Saint 
Peter asks: "Where do you want to go, hell or heaven?" Golubkov answers "I 
don't know, can I have a look at the two places before I decide?" Saint Peter 
nods, and takes Golubkov to heaven, where he sees choirs of angels praising 
the Lord. "Hmm, I don't know" – Golubkov watches the praising sceptically; 
“What is hell like?" The two men walk off, and Saint Peter shows Golubkov 
hell: Dancing women, barely dressed, wine and food as much as you please, 
relaxation under palm trees. "I choose hell," Golubkov finally decides. "As 
you wish," replies Saint Peter. 
  
Suddenly Golubkov finds himself in burning sulphur, with forks sticking his 
aching body, while the screams of tortured men and women penetrate his 
ears. "What is this?" he shouts to Saint Peter, "this is not what I was 
                                                   
104  Interview No. 4. Russian: ‘U nas reklamirujut samyj plochoj tovar’ which translates: “It is the worst 
products that they advertise here.” 
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shown!" "What you were shown?" replies Saint Peter scornfully. "That was 
just the commercial, stupid." (Interview no. 10) 
 
The idea that commercial ads mostly advertised bad products which could not 
otherwise hope to be sold – a view reflected in the above anecdote – was found among 
several of my respondents. The following statement is an excerpt from the interview 
with Julija, a business woman described above in Chapter 5. Her understanding of 
commercials is strikingly similar to that offered by Pavel: 
 
I know that commercial ads are the engine of trade – but that’s the trade of goods 
that are too old, that don’t sell, goods of low quality, or goods that have been taken 
in store in too large quantities. (Interview no. 18) 
 
Vladimir, asked how he viewed commercials, commented: 
 
To me, it seems that they only advertise products that don’t enjoy any demand in the 
market place. (Interview no. 8) 
 
It thus seems that Pavel did not base his view on commercials from his own experience 
alone. The point is not that he could not have adopted a negative view based on these 
experiences; but rather that the specific negative view he adopted was the one common 
in the public sphere and was reflected in folk culture through anecdotes. Interestingly, 
both Pavel and Julija take more or less ironically as a point of departure that commercial 
ads are the engine of trade, which seems to reflect some sort of a slogan, which they then 
criticise. Both Pavel and Julija had experience from private business, and had many 
positive attitudes towards business phenomena and the market economy in general; but 
they were highly critical of the operations of big business in Russia, and of phenomena 
associated with these operations. 
The loss of trust in commercials should not be explained solely in terms of the 
advertising for MMM. Commercials for other products, insofar as they proved, or were 
perceived to be, inaccurate, also contributed to the erosion of trust. The ability of 
financial companies to build trust through commercials, then, can be influenced by 
events in other markets. Svetlana explains: 
 
Those who have money, who want to sell their products, they’ll say in the ad 
that it’s a good product even if it’s lousy… but no one will believe that. But 
in the beginning… I remember a brand of toothpaste, Blend-a-med, in the 
commercial they talked about what white teeth you get from using it. 
Everyone was afraid of dentists, and we, of course, thought that if they say 
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in TV ads that this is the best remedy against cavities, then that’s the way it 
is. In virtually every home I saw the toothpaste Blend-a-med. I bought it too, 
thinking that our scientists probably hadn’t invented such toothpastes yet, 
and that you had to pay more to get it, because it was more expensive than 
our Russian toothpastes. (Interview no. 1) 
 
Svetlana thus displayed the same inclination to believe in certain kinds of information as 
Pavel, quoted in Chapter 5 as believing the commercials for MMM “out of inertia”. In 
the West, we have come to expect less from advertised products. When Svetlana 
associates Blend-a-med with dubious commercials, that indicates how easily the public 
can be disappointed if expectations are too high: According to odontological research, 
Blend-a-med was a better remedy against caries than most Russian brands.105 Moreover, 
during late Soviet times there was simply not enough good toothpaste on the market, to 
the extent that this fact featured in anecdotes of the time (Zadornov 2004: 154). The 
mechanism relating the use of Blend-a-med to a negative view of commercials seems to 
be that people who used Blend-a-med thought they were immune to dental problems; if 
they still got cavities, they were disappointed, and lost confidence not only in the brand, 
but also in the channels through which it was promoted. It should be noted that Blend-a-
med came on the Russian market at a time when almost all adults had problems with 
their teeth, and most Russian-made toothpastes did not contain fluoride.106 Dental 
problems therefore constituted a serious concern for many, which might explain why 
the commercial clips for Blend-a-med became so well known and remembered; and why 
disappointment with that one particular brand could have contributed to the erosion of 
trust in commercials more generally.107 
 
                                                   
105  “Po dannym mnogocislennym issledovanij, pocti 100% naselenija Rossii posle 30 let stradajut ot 
zabolevanij zubov”, Moskovskaja Pravda, 22.09.1994 
106  “Po dannym mnogocislennym issledovanij, pocti 100% naselenija Rossii posle 30 let stradajut ot 
zabolevanij zubov”, Moskovskaja Pravda, 22.09.1994. 
107  Another question, which I can only touch upon, is how the disappointment with commercial ads 
affected the medium through which ads were communicated – the mass media. As Pavel suggested in 
my interview with him, people had been used to believing what they read, and they were not used to 
distinguishing between different forms of information – articles, editorials, commentaries or commercial 
ads. It would therefore not be surprising if people came to view the whole media sector more critically. 
Surveys conducted by the Institute of Socio-Political Research under the Russian Academy of Science 
support this hypothesis: The proportion expressing distrust in mass media increased from 41% in May 
1994 – before the MMM crash – to 57% in May 1995. (Institut social’no-politiceskich issledovanij 2001: 
431) Of course, many other processes might have made for this development, such as the general news 
coverage (including the coverage of financial companies). But it seems at least plausible that the crash of 
financial pyramids could have contributed to the erosion of trust in a wide range of social institutions. 
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A brief respite for Sberbank 
We have looked at how the perception of – and the money flow to – commercial 
financial companies changed when promises were broken or remained unfulfilled, and 
have argued that commercial companies found themselves unable to inspire trust either 
through promising high returns or through commercial campaigns. But how did the loss 
of trusts in commercial banks affect trust in Sberbank? As described in Chapter 1, the 
proportion of household income going to Sberbank remained relatively constant in the 
two years following the MMM crash in August 1994; and the proportion of household 
savings allocated with Sberbank increased.108 A survey from early 1995 showed that 
whereas only 17% of the population trusted commercial banks, the figure for Sberbank 
was an impressive 53%.109 How was Sberbank different from the commercial banks? 
 
What is a commercial bank? 
Firstly and most importantly, this difference suggests that Sberbank was perceived as 
something separate from the commercial banks. This was not a given: By 1994, 
Sberbank’s operations had become more similar to those of other banks. To many 
financial analysts, there were differences in degree concerning profitability and 
reliability between Sberbank and the other banks; but fundamentally, they constituted 
the same kind of saving allocation, an alternative distinct from financial pyramids, but 
not from each other. Some two weeks the MMM crash, Izvestija had an article evaluating 
alternatives to the financial pyramids, dealing only with banks considered to be reliable: 
 
Those who want to earn interest rate even in a month or in three months 
have a broad range of options. This service is provided now by 
Promstrojbank, Sberbank, Inkombank, Vozroždenie, Al’fa-bank, Orgbank, 
Unikombank and others. The majority of these banks not only offer a 
monthly interest rate, but if the client does not withdraw his money, they 
add them to the initial deposit, and interest rates for the next period is 
calculated from this new, larger sum.110 
 
This discourse encouraged involvement with all these banks; both Sberbank and other 
banks should be judged on the services they provide and on their reliability (the article 
cites bank ratings) – not on images of defrauded depositors on Warsaw Chaussé. 
                                                   
108  Spicer & Pyle 2003: 10 (based on Bulletin of Banking Statistics issued by the Central Bank of Russia). 
109  “Naselenie vsë men’še doverjajut Sberbanku i vkladyvajut den’gi v valjutu i zoloto”, Finansovye Izvestija, 
28.03.1995 
110   “Kommerceskie banki obostrajut bor’bu za den’gi melkich vkladcikov”, Izvestija, 16.08.1994 
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But to many who lacked in-depth information about interest rates and bank ratings, a 
better heuristic for evaluating different banks could have been whether a given bank 
was associated with the state or with private business. A survey from Nizhny Novgorod 
showed that the proportion who preferred financial companies backed by the state to 
private financial companies rose from 53% in 1994 to 69% in 1996 (Ivašinenko 2002: 113). 
Let us repeat the following excerpt from the interview with Vladimir: 
 
I have never trusted banks, ever. And when this robbery of the people 
started… It is better to keep your money in Sberbank, that is, in state 
structures rather than in commercial structures. (Interview no. 8) 
 
In this discourse, commercial banks and Sberbank are two entirely separate phenomena; 
there is no contradiction between distrusting the former and trusting the latter. It is 
difficult to be certain that this distinction between commercial banks and Sberbank 
depicts the respondent’s view in 1994–95, and is not of later origin, as the interview was 
made in 2004. But assuming that it does reflect his views at the time, it seems clear that 
there were at least two alternative ways of categorising financial companies after the 
collapse of the financial pyramids: distinguishing between Sberbank and other 
commercial banks on the one hand and financial pyramids and other dubious schemes 
on the other; or distinguishing between Sberbank on the one hand, and commercial 
banks and financial pyramids on the other. This difference in categorisation would 
naturally have impact on saving decisions. 
Even Pavel, who had suffered economic loss in the Pavlov reform and who had 
gained from participating in MMM, preferred Sberbank after 1994. Whereas his first 
association to the word “commercial bank” was “an unreliable bank”, his association to 
the word “Sberbank” was that it was “more or less trustworthy”. Asked to explain that 
in terms of his own experiences with the bank, he said: 
 
You see, holding back our money – that could happen in any bank in this 
country. I still think Sberbank is safer than the others. (Interview no. 4) 
 
Again, the case of Pavel questions Strebkov’s findings that personal experiences explain 
attitudes, as people who had turned to commercial financial companies when Sberbank 
had seemed unable to protect their savings, now seemed to have forgotten their distrust. 
It is tempting to invoke a psychological mechanism called “the availability heuristic” 
concerning how phenomena that evoke easily accessible images make us overestimate 
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the likelihood of their occurrence (Kahneman 2002). It was easier to invoke images 
relating to the crash of MMM than images relating to the Pavlov reform several years 
before; consequently, the likelihood of commercial banks crashing appeared greater than 
the likelihood of problems in Sberbank. 
 
Why was Sberbank more reliable? 
Whereas neither Vladimir nor Pavel cited any hard facts to explain their preference for 
Sberbank, facts were available – but they required more knowledge about the operation 
of the financial system. For instance, a newspaper article from March 1995 explained 
Sberbank’s prominent position with reference to the state guarantees for deposits: 
 
The prominent position held today by Sberbank is based on the old deposits 
of the whole population of the Soviet Union, when Sberbank was a 
monopolist. Today, only the poorer segments of the population (pensioners 
and the working class) use Sberbank. Rich people and young people prefer 
commercial banks. They only reason why anyone would continue to deposit 
their money with Sberbank is that the deposits are guaranteed by the state 
– in other words its reliability. Surveys show that Sberbank scores three 
times as high as commercial banks when it comes to reliability.111 
 
Although the picture of Sberbank painted here was not wholly flattering, it is admitted 
that Sberbank was safer. These state guarantees are also cited by Juliet Johnson, as seen 
in Chapter 2. However, many of those I interviewed seemed unaware of the existence of 
such guarantees. One of my respondents used a different measurement to evaluate 
reliability: Since MMM appeared to have crashed because it had promised too much, 
smaller promises could be used as a heuristic of reliability. Asked how people viewed 
Sberbank and commercial banks after the crash, Svetlana commented: 
 
My impression was that people did not trust such [commercial] banks, they 
trusted only Sberbank, because it was stable. The interest rate there was 
very, very low, but the money would be stable. (Interview no. 1) 
 
In the West, too, investors accept lower interest rates if the risk is known to be low. The 
logic here, however, seems somewhat opposite: That because Sberbank offered less 
favourable conditions, one should expect it to be more reliable and honest. This logic 
must be related to people’s disappointment with the false promises made by the 
                                                   
111  “Naselenie vsë men’še doverjajut Sberbanku i vkladyvajut den’gi v valjutu i zoloto”, Finansovye Izvestija, 
28.03.1995 
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financial pyramids and other financial schemes, and their subsequent distrust in 
advertising.112  
 
Alternative views 
What about those who had been sceptical to the commercial ads all along? To them, the 
crash of MMM came as no surprise, and did not necessitate a change in how they 
perceived commercial ads or business practices. Alla, quoted in Chapter 5, continued to 
see commercial ads as “objects of art”. That they proved not to contain correct 
information, changed her view of neither commercial ads nor commercial banks; and 
she remained deeply sceptical of all Soviet-era institutions, such as Sberbank. 
 
Interviewer: What do you think about Sberbank? 
Alla: I don’t trust Sberbank, because so many of my friends lost their money 
there, during the Pavlov reforms. And they have never got this money back 
(…) 
Interviewer: And commercial banks, are they better or just the same? 
Alla: Those who work in commercial banks are just completely different 
people, a different generation, young people who don’t treat people as if… as 
in Sberbank, where they think that people are worth… nothing. (Interview 
no. 9) 
 
Alla, then, distinguished clearly between Sberbank and commercial banks, but favoured 
the latter. An article in the respected and popular weekly Argumenty i Fakty from July 
1996 presents a different discourse – one also positive to commercial banks, but for 
different reasons. Discussing various savings alternatives – such as stocks, currency, and 
gold – the article has the following to say about rouble deposits: 
 
ROUBLE DEPOSITS in commercial banks. No matter what they say, rouble 
deposits in commercial banks are today the most popular and the most 
attractive. In Sberbank, for instance, you get 42.5% interest and high 
reliability. However, its clients complain that the bank retains the right to 
lower interest rates unilaterally. The profitability of the most reliable banks 
varies from 54% (Promstrojbank) to 81% (Stolicnyj bank sbereženij).113 
 
This discourse had existed before and after the collapse of the financial pyramids, but 
dominated mainly among those who followed the financial markets closely, as it 
                                                   
112 In other countries, not offering good terms is rarely seen as a sign of honesty. In Norway, a survey of 
consumer trust stated: “Banks are among the companies people dislike the most. A major reason is that 
they feel that the banks are greedy – much due to high fees on banking services.” (“Riktig pris på 
banktjenester”, Nettavisen, 21.09.2003, downloaded from: 
 http://pub.tv2.no/nettavisen/nettpaasak/article137608.ece?execute=viewComments, 21.12.2004). 
113  “Kuda vložit’ den’gi, esli oni “lišnie”?”, Argumenty i Fakty, 23.07.1996 
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required knowledge of interest rates and reliability ratings. The Argumenty i Fakty article 
did not distinguish between commercial banks and Sberbank. Indeed, the statement that 
commercial banks are the most popular is correct only if Sberbank is included. However, 
at the time that article was written, things were about to change, as even Sberbank 
started experiencing serious problems in attracting new funds. Given financial analysts’ 
positive evaluation of the prospects of rouble deposits, the question is: Why? 
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7. Dollarisation, 1996–1998 
Dollarisation, obviously, did not start in 1996. As seen in Chapter 1, dollars were 
popular as a means of saving throughout the period under review. However, from the 
second half of 1996, there was a marked increase both in the proportion of dollars of 
actual household saving and in the proportion of the population preferring dollars. 
Sberbank suffered the converse development. Why did the balance between dollars and 
Sberbank shift so markedly in favour of the former? And why did this shift come when 
it did – the second half of 1996? This has been difficult to answer. At the end of the 
previous chapter I mentioned an article from Argumenty i Fakty describing a financial 
analyst’s view on commercial banks. Here is what he had to say on savings in cash:  
 
Up until now, the question about where to place your savings has not 
bothered anyone. The answer was given – in currency. Dollars are dollars 
everywhere always. But the election campaign fever is ending, and with it, 
we have to believe, the rapid devaluation of the rouble. During the first half 
of this year, average monthly inflation has come down to 2.5%, and in June, 
it was only 1.2%. The situation, it appears, is improving. Thus, what kind of 
savings are today the safest and most profitable? 
 
DOLLARS IN THE MATTRESS:114 That won’t bring any interest whatsoever. 
And even worse, the dollar will decline in value by the size of inflation in the 
industrially developed countries, about 2.8% to 3.4% per year. And, as the 
Chairman of the Central Bank of Russia, Sergej Dubinin, declared in a 
speech, the value of the dollar compared to the rouble will increase less than 
average inflation in Russia.115 
 
The logic in this article is that of the economist, and it further underlines the conundrum 
described in Chapter 1: Households increasingly bought dollars when the 
macroeconomic situation stabilised – when there were, in fact, good reasons not to buy 
dollars. And few of my respondents were able to recall a sudden deterioration in 
Sberbank’s position that affected their preferences. Kuzina has pointed to Sberbank’s 
unilateral cut in interest rates in June 1995 – a concern also mentioned in the Argumenty i 
Fakty article, in the section on rouble deposits (cited in Ivašinenko 2002: 65). But how 
would lower interest rates matter if bank savings were still more profitable than dollar 
savings? 
                                                   
114  The Russian expression is “in the sock” – and several of my respondents testified that this could at least 
in some cases be taken literally. 
115  “Kuda vložit’ den’gi, esli oni “lišnie”?”, Argumenty i Fakty, 23.07.1996 
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The decline of Sberbank 
In Chapter 6, we saw how commercial banks came to be associated with fraud and 
dishonesty. This perception came to dominate as certain expectations were 
disappointed. Sberbank was trying to build trust on fragile ground – the Pavlov reform 
was still associated with the bank, although people’s memories seem to have been 
slumbering somewhat after the collapse of the financial pyramids.  
 
A new trust crisis for Sberbank 
Kuzina points out that Sberbank’s unilateral lowering of interest rates hurt trust with 
clients. This is a good starting point. In May 1997, Komsomol’skaja Pravda published 
letters from a depositor who was frustrated by Sberbank’s interest rate policy. 
 
My story is banal (…) Some time ago I – like 75% of our population – gave in 
to the temptation to place my hard-earned savings in a Sberbank account. 
And together with the rest of them, I started getting less and less back – 
they lowered interest one percent, then one a half more, then… 
 
Then they gave me a choice: You can get a measly 1.4% a month – or you 
can collect your money and leave. But that’s not all: A few days ago, 
Sberbank lowered the interest rate yet again. 
 
I am not an economist; I’m just an ordinary depositor. I want to share some 
thoughts with other troubled depositors like myself. Did you know, my dear 
friends, that the central office of our Sberbank has moved into a new 
building on Profsojuznaja Street in Moscow? It is quite a sight: A whole little 
city of glass and concrete, 85,000 square meters, which strikes you with its 
exquisite details and its picturesque fountains. 
 
This fairytale building cost 7 (!) billion roubles. In comparison: To 
compensate all the devalued deposits made by pensioners, the Ministry of 
Finance needed 4.5 billion roubles last year. 
 
The interest rates continues to fall (…) But last year’s revenue was gigantic – 
14 trillion roubles. Sberbank is feasting, and there are no serious 
competitors, in the provinces Sberbank is an absolute monopolist, dictating 
its rules (…) 
 
And they have already come up with a new interest rate on demand deposits 
– which are the most common. And it is… one percent per month. 
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On the other hand, my dear fellow depositors, we have a different source of 
wealth: The best marble offices in the world in the Russian people’s own 
bank.116 
 
The person who wrote this letter seems very well informed about details surrounding 
Sberbank’s project. One could, perhaps, suspect that he had some hidden or personal 
anti-Sberbank agenda. However, the question of Sberbank money spent on luxurious 
buildings was also raised by several of my respondents. And indeed, Sberbank did 
invest a lot in new, modern buildings in 1995 and 1996. The buildings in Moscow were 
only two among more than twenty large projects in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Pskov, 
Tomsk, Orenburg, Nizhny Novgorod and others.117 This attempt to modernise seems in 
fact partly to have aimed at improving trust relations with the public. At the bank’s 
general assembly on 5 May 1995, the building projects were displayed. A newspaper 
article reporting from the general assembly (so favourably disposed towards the bank 
that it seems more like a commercial than a neutral report) underlined that the bank 
employed foreign, European companies of the highest quality. In a country where the 
term “Eurolux” was used to signify high quality – and high price –pointing out this fact 
must have signalled to the audience that the projects were very expensive.118 
Sberbank might have had many motives for upgrading its properties – but it seems 
clear that to many, such use of money did not inspire the trust the bank had hoped for. 
Alla, who had been sceptical of Sberbank ever since the Pavlov reform, and who 
criticised them for retaining a Soviet mentality, was not impressed by the company’s 
attempt at modernising: 
 
At the same time, look at the buildings Sberbank has built. In my city they 
have built three such buildings. Where do they get the money to build these 
enormous things…? Very beautiful, very modern, very expensive buildings. 
And no one got their money back, no one. (Interview no. 9) 
 
                                                   
116 “Sberbank stroit dvorcy, a vkladcikam ne chvataet procentov na chižinu”, Komsoml’skaja Pravda, 
27.05.1997 
117  “Iz nišcich sberkass my prevratilis’ v krupnejšej bank”, Izvestija, 16.05.1995. The information that the 
Sberbank buildings in Nizhny Novgorod were built also in 1995–1996 was obtained in interview no. 17; I 
have been unable to verify it through other sources. 
118  Ibid. An example of the tone of the article is its treatment of whether or not the bank is trustworthy: 
“Briefly put, the main tasks for the bank should be to be reliable, reliable and reliable. In this regard, the 
speech given by the president of the bank, Oleg Jašin, should reassure every potential client.” 
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Whereas people were generally more likely to use a bank if they knew someone who 
worked there, the opposite could be true if the impression given by that employee was 
negative. Nikolaj’s mother worked in Sberbank, and this was his impression: 
 
Nikolaj: The only contact I have with Sberbank is that my mother works 
there. 
Interviewer: But still you don’t trust them? 
Nikolaj: I’ll tell you why I don’t trust them. My mother has shares in 
Sberbank, from the voucher privatisation, and she doesn’t get any 
dividends. She works there, and they promised profits. But now, for her 
dividends they build these enormous buildings, look only here in Nizhny 
Novgorod. There you have it, all her money…(Interview no. 14) 
 
 
 
Sberbank’s main office in Nizhny Novgorod, where Nikolaj’s mother worked. 
Photograph by the author, May 2004. 
 
These buildings served as constant, visual reminders that Sberbank had entered the 
same world of fast money, big cars and crime as the oligarchs who owned the private 
banks. 
 
The government guarantees for Sberbank – but who guarantees for the state? 
Still, there was one important difference between Sberbank and commercial banks: 
Deposits in Sberbank were guaranteed by the state. As mentioned above, many of my 
respondents were unaware of the existence of the guarantees. Still, they might have felt 
that the reliability of Sberbank was intertwined with that of the state. And that image 
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was often less than reassuring. Thus, even those who were aware of the guarantees were 
not reassured by them. 
That the image of the state was important for people’s relationship with Sberbank is 
suggested by the following interview with Pëtr. Asked if he trusted Sberbank, he 
replied: 
 
How can I trust a government that allows four million children to live on the 
streets? I use Sberbank only because I get my pension there.” (Interview no. 
11) 
 
Pëtr had several other accusations to level against the state. Working in the special 
police, he had been ordered to Chechnya in late 1995. He commented:  
That alcoholic [President Yeltsin is meant] and his team… I would not let 
them send me to that damn war. They should have read “A prisoner in the 
Caucasus”119, that’s what they should’ve done, and they would’ve 
understood that we would get stuck there. (Interview no. 11) 
 
Distrust in the government can also be seen in the households’ reluctance to buy 
government bonds (GKOs). After the introduction of the currency corridor, the 
government started issuing bonds promising extremely high returns. When cash 
privatisation failed to generate the expected revenues, this seemed the best way to 
finance the budget. Indeed, the government bonds did succeed in bringing in cash for 
the government, but hardly any of this came from households. The overwhelming 
proportion came from a few well-connected banks. Why did people not respond to the 
calls to buy government bonds? The bonds were supported by generous loans from the 
International Monetary Fund, and investors thought that Russia was “too big – or too 
nuclear – to fail” (Åslund 1999: 23). However, in an article titled “The Government is 
taking Mavrodi’s place”, Komsomol’skaja Pravda warned against government bonds, 
comparing them with MMM and the financial pyramids: 
 
“We are the safest and the most profitable borrowers!” – that’s the central 
point of vice-minister of finance, Andrej Kaz’min, and the head of the 
government department for stocks and bonds, Bella Zlatkis. Their argument 
is the promised 102.74% interest rent that the holders of the four-quarter 
bonds will receive on December 27th. (…) Why the Ministry of Finance is 
playing this game with the population just now seems clear enough. The 
cash privatisation programme, which had so many hopes attached to it, has 
now successfully crashed. The deficit in tax revenue is increasing, 
                                                   
119  “A prisoner in Caucasus” is a novel by Leo Tolstoy. 
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disproving even the darkest forecasts. (…) It is now becoming clear why the 
Central Bank, in cold blood bordering on cynicism, held back their support 
during the latest crisis on the inter-bank market, thereby helping small and 
medium-sized banks on their way to bankruptcy, which, among other 
things, removed competition in extracting money from the population. And 
why the same Central Bank reacted so nervously to the report of the Federal 
Commission for Stocks and Bonds, which said that the actions of the 
Central Bank on the market for short-term government bonds in effect is 
comparable to the organisation of a new financial pyramid.120 
 
Even Sberbank did not have too much faith in its principal owner: The president of 
Sberbank, Oleg Jašin, said that the question of whether or not the state could guarantee 
household deposits depended on state finances, and that knowing the condition of those 
finances, Sberbank was relying on its own resources, and not on state backing.121 
The scepticism to state guarantees was expressed explicitly by my respondent 
Konstantin, a well-educated businessman. 
 
Konstantin: I only save in the mattress. 
Interviewer: And why not in Sberbank? 
Konstantin: First of all, I don’t like the interest rate they offer. 
Interviewer: But in the mattress, you don’t get any interest rate? 
Konstantin: You see, if you have been burned once… If we’d had foreign 
banks, I wouldn’t have hesitated, even if the interest rate were low, because 
the deposits there are insured. Here in Russia, they are also discussing a 
law on deposit insurance. 
Interviewer: And then you will trust the banks? (…) 
Konstantin: But it doesn’t help – today we have Putin, tomorrow someone else. And 
then there is no guarantee. (Interview no. 22) 
 
1996 was the year that President Yeltsin was re-elected. But the re-election was marred 
by scandals that linked the government ever closer to dubious financial structures, 
especially through the loans-for-shares programme, where the major state companies 
were sold at giveaway prices to selected companies who supported the president with 
money for the election campaign. The war in Chechnya was going badly, ending in a 
humiliating defeat in 1996. The economy was still contracting, and if people initially had 
some patience regarding the necessity of painful transition, it was starting to wear thin. 
The one thing that was working, was the macroeconomic stabilisation following the 
introduction of the currency corridor in July 1995. Paradoxically, this stabilisation might 
                                                   
120 “Na smenu Mavrodi prišlo gosudarstvo: Obligacii sberegatel’nogo zajma”, Komsomol’skaja Pravda, 
26.09.1995 
121  “Privatizacija bankov”, Kommersant, 16.05.1995 
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actually have made people less keen to earn interest rates, instead favouring dollars as a 
medium of saving. 
 
Hard currency 
As seen in Chapter 5, the main concern of depositors in the period of high inflation from 
1991 to 1995 was to guard their money against devaluation. They wanted indexation, 
and they were willing to take risks to get it. Economic psychologist Daniel Kahneman 
(2002) has found empirically that people are more prone to take risks when faced with 
the possibility of absolute loss. They are less willing to take risks to make a profit. If 
Kahneman is right, then Russians would naturally be more risk-averse after 1995, as the 
loss from inflation was significantly reduced. In particular, it seems that many Russians 
did not bother about earning two or three percent interest on small amounts, and a 
common answer to the question why they do not have money in the bank is “Why 
should I?” As Olga explains:  
 
I put 2000 roubles in the bank once, not so long before the crisis. In half a 
year, they brought me only about 100 roubles. What’s the point? So, I 
withdrew my money. Now I just have dollars at home, it is much easier.122 
 
The rate of return is not so bad according to Western standards, well above 10% p.a. (as 
interest was added several times a year) or probably just above the inflation rate. But not 
enough, evidently, to bother, or to take the risk. It was easier to have dollars at home.  
 
Dollars – not just money 
The special status of dollars was established before the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union, although people then held dollars for different reasons: Dollars could buy 
foreign goods, sold only in special outlets. When inflation kicked in at the end of the 
Soviet period, people already had some experience in seeing dollars as a stable currency. 
But dollars were to many more than just a currency. Il’ja, a private businessman and taxi 
driver who suffered from expensive gambling habits, told me: 
                                                   
122  Interview No. 13. 2000 roubles at this point was probably roughly equal to 300 USD, and it is likely 
that the deposit took place late 1997, after the new rouble was introduced, changing its value from about 
1/6000 of a dollar to 1/6 of a dollar. Olga could, however, be using the new denomination for the 
previous period. If this was indeed in the autumn of 1997, the inflation rate was about 10?%. 
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Roubles I just spend, I don’t give a damn about them. But dollars are 
dollars. I still have respect for them. I have them in my sock, and I know 
that I can go and change them at any time. The exchange rate will at least 
not get worse. (Interview no. 20) 
 
Dollars were able to serve as a means of precautionary saving, in a way bank deposits 
never had. Grigorij, a 35-year-old businessman, commented: 
 
Of course, it is necessary to buy dollars, to have some amount hidden away 
for a black day. (Interview no. 19) 
 
One effect of the fact that “everyone” had some dollars hidden away, and of the rampant 
inflation in the first half of the 1990s, was the practice of issuing private loans in dollars. 
Most Russians who needed loans did not turn to financial intermediaries – and often 
those who did were turned down. Acquaintances, business associates or employers 
often provided such services instead. It was in such relations the practice of issuing 
loans in dollars developed. 
This could impact the saving decision. For acquisitions of valuable consumer 
durables, such as cars, or even for real estate, it is common in Russia – and in most 
Western countries – not to wait until one has saved enough, but rather to take up a loan. 
This implies that saving takes place only after the acquisition. A consequence of the 
volatile rouble was that people started to give and take loans in currency.123 Many 
consumer durables, if bought from individuals rather than in stores, were bought and 
sold for dollars (Interview no. 8). Even in regular stores, prices were often given in u.e. – 
“agreed units”, which were conveniently equal to the dollar. It was therefore logical to 
make those savings in dollars, according to respondent Oleg: 
 
Loans were given in dollars, and you had to pay back in dollars, no matter 
what the exchange rate was. That is the way it works here. And then it was 
logical to make those savings in dollars. (Interview no. 4) 
 
Of course, from a homo economicus perspective, it would still be rational to make those 
savings in rouble deposits, and buy dollars only in order to pay the loan back. But Oleg, 
evidently, did not share that perspective. 
                                                   
123 I have been unable to find statistics on loans through informal channels. Anecdotal evidence suggests 
that it was quite common to borrow money from acquaintances or from firms to buy stereos, cars and 
even apartments. 
 101
As dollars came to dominate in the economic sphere in Russia it seems plausible that 
many saw dollars as the natural medium for saving, or the natural thing to buy for spare 
money. It is  difficult to investigate this empirically, or to describe the exact causal effect 
of the existence of dollars in the public and private economic sphere – the latter would 
amount to making a counterfactual claim about decision-making in a world where, say, 
prices were indicated more often in roubles and less often in u.e. than was actually the 
case, and where loans were issued more frequently in roubles and less frequently in 
dollars. 
 
Epilogue 
In August 1998 the country woke up to a government default on the government bonds. 
It took a week before the currency market realised what had happened. Then the rouble 
crashed: The price of one dollar skyrocketed from about 6 roubles to about 30 roubles. 
Inflation followed. Banks, which had large shares of their money in bonds, were the first 
to suffer. Commercial banks as well as Sberbank had no chance of honouring their 
obligations. Government guarantees to Sberbank applied only to parts of the deposits; 
and, with the new wave of inflation, depositors lost most of their rouble deposits even if 
they got them back. It turned out that Russia was neither too big nor too nuclear to go 
bust. Again, million of ordinary depositors lost out. However, it could have been worse. 
If Russians had behaved “rationally” in the two years preceding the crisis, if they had 
heeded the advice of analysts, or if they had for a second believed that Russia was too 
nuclear to be allowed to fail – then they would have lost much more. 
And more than five years after the crash, and after a long time of decline for the 
dollar, Vladimir still does not hesitate to describe the two currencies thus: 
 
Hundred roubles… Today they work, tomorrow they don’t. But dollars 
remain dollars. (Interview no. 8) 
 
In Chapter 3, I used Elster’s argument that we cannot deem something to be rational 
only because it succeeded: In complex decision-making situations, it can be rational to be 
irrational “if all the evidence happens to point in the wrong direction” (Elster 1992). The 
corollary must be that we cannot deem something to be irrational only because it is not 
optimal ex ante. The discourses of ordinary Russians that I have followed in Chapters 5, 
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6 and 7 have clearly not conformed to rational decision-making, and have often been 
based on a less than full understanding of the situation. Frequently, Russians made 
choices that were suboptimal from their own point of view, as well as that of broader 
society. The logic of these discourses nevertheless appears to have its own rationality. It 
was that logic that made people anticipate the crash in the summer of 1998 – a crash that 
depended on a host of factors they could not foresee, including the Asian financial crisis 
in 1997 and specifics of Russian political decision-making. And it was the same logic that 
allowed rumours about one of the most solid banks in the country to lead to mass panic 
in June 2004. Perhaps that logic was not rational that time. But what will be rational the 
next time around is something only time will tell. And until then, social scientists as well 
as politicians need to take people’s rationality seriously, if they are to anticipate and 
understand the responses of the Russian population today and in the future. 
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Part III: Conclusions  
 
8. Discourses and Explanation 
Part II has provided answers to the substantive questions posed in Chapter 1: Why were 
commercial financial companies relatively successful from 1992 to 1994? Why did they 
lose to Sberbank between 1994 and 1996? And why did both commercial financial 
companies and Sberbank lose to dollars between 1996 and 1998? We have identified 
some major events that, through their impact on people’s perceptions of trust, identity 
and profitability, marked turning points in the discourses on financial institutions, and 
thus influenced the decision-making processes relating to financial behaviour. 
In this chapter, I sum up the various discourses discussed in Part II, noting what 
insights they provide regarding the interrelationship between discourse, decision-
making and historical events. Although the discourses discussed were overwhelmingly 
dominant both in the media surveyed and in my interviews, there is reason to believe 
that some discourses might be underrepresented in these media, as indicated in Chapter 
4. There might be discourses which I have not described or only touched upon: Some 
people preferred Sberbank all along; some never trusted anybody but themselves and 
invested in their own business; others were faithful to US dollars, Deutsche Mark or 
gold. The discourses that have been described here are the ones I deem most important 
for my purposes, for three reasons. First, they were discourses that changed 
considerably through the period, relating to behaviour that changed. Second, their 
changes relate to events, which makes it possible to think about how they could have 
been different. Finally, they represent different positions that can mutually illuminate 
one another. 
In Part II, I presented discursive phenomena as they appeared and changed 
chronologically. Here I shall attempt to systematise these discourses by discussing basic 
assumptions, basic concepts and entities, and a major storyline which gives a discourse 
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cohesion and continuity, and which can be distinguished from other discourses.124 Most 
of the voices presented in Part III can be seen to form what I call the “emotional 
discourse”, while the contrasting voices represent the “rational discourse”. For most of 
the period, I have further divided the emotional discourse into two sub-categories: 
Optimist and pessimist. 
 
The emotional discourse 
The major assumption of the emotional discourse is that the financial system objectively 
could and morally had an obligation to protect savings against devaluation; if the 
system failed, that was tantamount to fraud. This assumption would often be 
accompanied by the assumption that economic exchange is a zero-sum game – loss 
suffered by one party implies gain for another party – which again could be related to a 
dichotomous view of society: we, the people, against them, the state or the economic elite. 
From the Pavlov reform in 1991 until the crash of the financial pyramids in the 
summer and autumn of 1994, the emotional discourse was characterised by a focus on 
the question of indexation, the rising costs of living, the belief that the government did 
not do what it could to correct the wrongs, and the hope that somebody else would. The 
main entities were thus state financial institutions on the one hand, and a hope for 
something else on the other. The optimists found that something in Sergej Mavrodi and 
Lënja Golubkov of MMM or in another financial company – such as Pavel above in 
Chapter 5. The pessimists did not find anybody to trust – such as Julija. 
The distrust in the state seems to have been brought about or aggravated by an 
attempt to reduce the cognitive dissonance that emerged as a result of losses incurred 
either in the Pavlov reforms, or during the period of hyperinflation. There is not much 
analysis of consequences of different policy alternatives found in this discourse: People 
simply could not reconcile their own anger and frustration with a belief that the 
government was competent and benevolent. Focusing on indexation could solve this. 
The concept was originally introduced in connection with plans about gradual changes 
in relative prices between products – before the Pavlov reform. The first article I have 
                                                   
124  Such analysis is inspired by Hønneland 2003. 
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been able to find dates from 19 March 1990.125 The government wanted to change 
relative prices so that they better reflected the cost of production; however, when the 
goal was to reduce the monetary overhang – and with it, the shortages that had plagued 
the Soviet economy – indexation was clearly unsuited to the task. The whole point was 
to reduce demand relative to supply. Nonetheless, President Gorbachev issued a decree 
on indexation of savings following the Pavlov reforms – with the catch that the added 
money could not be used until 1994. Experts agreed that the law would not actually stop 
savings from devaluing.126  
But the expectation seems to have been created, and was easy to use for opposition 
politicians, as seen by numerous statements by the Supreme Soviet. Lack of knowledge 
of the economics of reform thus seems to have been a factor in people’s accepting this 
discourse;127 but knowledge could be overridden by strong feelings. That clearly seems 
to have been the case with Julija, who demonstrated insight into economics, but claimed 
to have lost her family as a result of the Pavlov reform, and concluded that she would 
never trust the state again. (Interview No. 18, cited in Chapter 5.) This account might 
provide one glimpse into the “black box” provided by the correlations between previous 
experiences in the financial market, education and current views found by Strebkov 
(2001; see also Chapter 2 above). 
After the crash of the financial pyramids, the identity of the entities in the emotional 
discourse changed. Optimists had believed that figures like Mavrodi could guard their 
savings – but he now appeared as the villain. Interaction with commercial financial 
companies had been built on trust, not analysis, and that trust was now gone. However, 
the distinction between Sberbank and other banks was maintained. Sberbank was still 
associated with incompetence, but not necessarily with malfeasance: “The interest rate 
there was very, very low, but the money would be stable” – as Svetlana put it (Interview 
No. 1) – was a typical perception. Pavel was also an optimist – he found Sberbank “more 
or less trustworthy”. Others were still pessimists – like Julija. 
                                                   
125  “Ekonomiceskaja reforma: Sovmin narašcivaet oboroty”, Kommersant, 19.03.1990 
126  “Indeksacija vkladov: Cto oni sdelajut s našimi den’gami? Nu kak cto”, Kommersant, 18.03.1991 
127  Knowledge does not imply “possession of objective truth” – only an understanding of the economic 
problems in the country on the basis of economic models, which in this case was close to how the 
government analysed the situation. 
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However, the pessimists seem to have attracted new followers as irritation and anger 
became directed both at the state in general and at Sberbank in particular. Again, some 
sort of reduction of cognitive dissonance seems to have been at work: Sberbank was 
constructing all these huge buildings, it was making huge profits – and still it did not 
treat its clients better. And how could one trust a state that allowed four million children 
to live on the streets, as Pëtr argued. This meant that entities changed within the 
discourse. Banks were banks, and they were all bad. Instead, a contrast was made 
between the dollar, which would always remain liquid and full of purchasing power, 
and the feeble, domestic rouble. This vocabulary was well developed: The word 
“wooden rouble” (“derevjannyj rubl’”), used derogatorily to denote how unstable the 
rouble was, had at least been employed at least January 1990, and had developed during 
the macroeconomic calamities from 1992 through 1994. Increasingly, the choice seems to 
have been “dollars or roubles” rather than “Sberbank or something else”. 
 
The rational discourse 
The rational discourse made almost directly opposing assumptions. The risks of the 
financial markets were well understood, and financial companies were assumed to be 
working for their own interest. On the other hand, there could well be mutually 
beneficial interactions between households and financial companies – economic 
exchange was seen as a cooperative game rather than a zero-sum game. 
The rational discourse in the first period accordingly focused on interest rates rather 
than indexation, bank ratings rather than the owner or a commercial. If people 
participated in MMM, it was to beat the system. Arguments were constructed logically 
and aimed explicitly at maximising profits. This does not imply that the discourse was in 
fact entirely rational. In the case of MMM, for instance, the important concept to follow 
was whether there were regions to which the pyramid could still spread, although closer 
scrutiny would have shown that, logically, such knowledge would not increase the 
chances of beating the system. But rationality, as understood by Western science, 
constituted the norm for the discourse. 
The contrast to the emotional discourse is also striking in the two ensuing periods. 
While the emotional discourse, distinguishing between Sberbank and commercial 
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financial companies, came to see commercial financial companies as fraudulent, the 
basic entities in the rational story seem simply to have been all the actors in the financial 
market, which were judged according to the risk and profit characteristics, and there is 
hardly any dichotomy between the people and elite. Similarly, the dollar is treated just 
like any other currency. The article about dollars in the mattress in Argumenty i Fakty is 
illustrative: Mimicking more vulgar conceptions in the beginning of the article – “dollars 
are dollars everywhere always” – the article continues: “That won’t bring any interest 
whatsoever. (…) The value of the dollar compared to the rouble will increase less than 
average inflation in Russia.”128 Articles giving advice about saving allocation are the 
main bearers of this discourse in my analysis; but it can be recognised in some official 
rhetoric and in Western analyses as well. And they are reminiscent of the logic behind 
economists’ attempt at explaining financial behaviour – indeed, many of those writing 
were probably economists themselves. 
However, education, even in economics, did not necessarily lead the individual to 
accept the “rational” discourse. This study says little about the relationship between 
sociological variables – age, sex, education etc. – and discourse. This does not imply that 
I do not believe that there are no links between such variables and discourse – and 
establishing such links quantitatively might be a fruitful avenue for further research. 
Similar investigations could be made into the relationship between Ivašinenko’s 
quantitatively based categorisations of Russian financial behaviour and the different 
discourses described here. When such considerations have not figured here, it is partly 
because an important point in this study, in keeping with its methodological 
individualism, has been that an individual’s discourse affects decision-making directly, 
whereas for instance education does not – its effect on decision-making is a result of its 
impact on perceptions and values.129 Indeed, many highly educated Russians did not 
adopt a “rational” discourse. Similarly, lack of education did not prevent Russians from 
picking up a more “rational” discourse. Take, for example, Alla, who seemed to have 
picked up a mathematical way of viewing financial pyramids from her husband, a 
                                                   
128  “Kuda vložit’ den’gi, esli oni “lišnie”?”, Argumenty i Fakty, 23.07.1996 
129  Partly, of course, the qualitative nature of the study would render useless any generalisations in this 
regard on the basis of my small sample of respondents; and the necessary information about the people 
who wrote in newspapers is missing altogether. 
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mathematician. If we do not first understand the link between discourse and behaviour, 
knowledge of sociological variables cannot provide us with an explanation of behaviour. 
It is my hope that this study has made some progress towards such understanding. 
This treatment of the subject might give the impression that whereas the emotional 
discourse was profoundly changed by the dramatic events to which I have drawn 
attention, such non-economic events played less of a role in the “rational” discourse – 
and that discourse might therefore appear more autonomous. However, sociologist Tore 
Sandven (1995, 1999) finds that the dichotomy rational/irrational (and 
intentional/causal) is often not particularly useful. There are instances where an attempt 
to be instrumentally rational can be directly harmful, for instance attempting to control 
one’s preferences, because it might interfere with vital psychological and emotional 
processes. But this does not mean that we are unaware of these processes, or that we 
cannot influence or even stop them. Sandven argues that there are many forms of 
human action, which although not entirely autonomous, are not irrational or “purely 
causal”. We are not “the mindless playthings of hidden forces” (Sandven 1995). 
Moreover, rationality also depends on psychological mechanisms. Why do we consider 
being rational as autonomy in the first place? Although Jon Elster often has insisted on 
the distinction causal/intentional, Sandven’s view fits better with the concept of 
mechanisms, because some of the conditions which trigger a mechanism remain 
unknown, in the interstice between psychology, intentionality and external events. 
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9. Discourse and Counterfactual History  
Is a causal account based on reasons and discourses interesting? Does it teach us 
anything valuable about our societies in the way that explanations based on economic 
and social facts claim to do? British historian Geoffrey Hawthorn has proposed that an 
explanation gains its strength from the counterfactuals it is able to suggest.130 To say that 
a factor is important is to say that, without it, the situation would have been different in 
a way that is interesting to us. If we accept that, which counterfactual worlds have been 
implied by this study? And how can thinking counterfactually illuminate the differences 
between the account presented here and alternative explanations of household financial 
behaviour? 
To answer that question, we need to consider what counterfactuals are and which 
role they play in the writing of history. To Hawthorn, the point of using counterfactuals 
in history and the social sciences is to increase our understanding of what actually is or 
what actually was, by comparing it to what might have been. We consider a causal 
influence important if its absence would have led to a very different world. To say that a 
certain cause produced a certain outcome is interesting insofar as the outcome would 
have been significantly different if the cause were removed. The counterfactual historian 
can change factual causes and entertain speculations about their effects. It is then 
important that the world in which we introduce the counterfactual is our own, and not a 
different universe with different facts and different rules: We must not unwind the past 
or alter the present in ways that require an implausible past. According to this view, the 
central problem of making a counterfactual is to identify when things could have 
become different from what they are. There is a paradox in presenting counterfactual 
alternatives to explanations, because the latter attempt to demonstrate how the world 
became how it actually was. However, looking at counterfactual alternatives implies 
only that the explanations we give were not deterministic. This view depends on the 
premise that history depends on contingencies –  that at least certain things, and thereby 
                                                   
130 Hawthorn 1991: 16. See also Elster 1983 and Sørensen 2004 for discussions about the role of 
counterfactuals in history. 
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all things, were not predetermined to be as they were; that there is a role for chance and 
for personal choice – which is in agreement with the views put forth in this study.131 
 
Could things have been different? 
What counterfactuals suggest themselves depend on the way in which the story is 
presented. My story has focused on individuals in their interaction with the financial 
sector and their perceptions of this sector and of the interaction. The actual narrative 
describing these perceptions is an integral part of explanation; providing a full 
counterfactual would imply providing an entirely different narrative. I shall not embark 
upon such a task. However, we can suggest counterfactuals for how discourse could 
have taken different turns by looking at how events influencing such perceptions could 
have been different. Such events include the introduction and spread of dollars as a unit 
of accounting, the construction of luxurious Sberbank buildings, the crash of the 
financial pyramids, or the Pavlov reforms.  
I shall not look into all possible counterfactual stories; rather I want to draw attention 
to how my account differs from model-based explanation by sketching some 
counterfactuals to a few aspects of what I have called the emotional discourse between 
1991 and 1994 – the discourse distrusting the state and believing financial pyramid 
commercial ads. First, people’s initial attitudes could have been different; they could for 
instance have been less sceptical to the competence of the state; they could have been 
more critical to official or semi-official information and commercial ads. On the first 
count – trust in the state – one could quite easily imagine that a different handling of the 
Pavlov reforms, of the price liberalisation, the communication of the reform programme 
and voucher privatisation could have made for different conceptions of state 
competence and trustworthiness – even if economic outcomes had been similar. 
                                                   
131 Economic historian Deirdre McCloskey has argued for a slightly different view on the role of 
counterfactuals in history. Her point of departure is that social science models are closely intertwined 
with counterfactuals, as they make statements about the relationship between different phenomena that 
may or may not be factual. (See e.g. McCloskey 1994) In principle, we could choose to alter any variable 
in the model, and then derive the consequences – this is indeed what we do when we use models to 
explain. McCloskey therefore allows the counterfactual to change structural phenomena – thereby 
altering the present and unwinding its past. A model that says that people chose not to save in Sberbank 
because real interest rates were negative implies that if real interest rates had been higher, then more 
people would have placed their money in Sberbank. However, such a model remains silent about what 
steps would have needed to be taken to ensure positive real interest rates; how this would have affected 
other parts of the economy; and whether such a scenario is plausible or even possible historically We 
should note that this kind of counterfactual does not explain how the world came to be as it actually is. 
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Considering the respect the Yeltsin government enjoyed immediately following the 1991 
August coup, it seems plausible that the government could have communicated its 
programme in a way which people could comprehend and accept to a greater extent 
than what they did. This draws attention to the role of specific events and the way they 
were talked about in the formation of popular perceptions. 
On the second count – how people judged information in newspapers and on 
television – we would probably have to go further back to find a likely branching point; 
explanation of what commercials are could have been communicated more effectively; 
newspapers could have been more critical towards leading figures behind the financial 
pyramids – recall the interviews with Sergej Mavrodi in several newspapers, where he 
was allowed to present his views without critical questions. More critical media 
coverage, presenting Mavrodi as an oligarch using advanced commercial tools to 
increase sales of his own product, would have made people’s discursive identification 
with Mavrodi less likely. We could also imagine an entirely different relationship 
between the press and the public altogether, but that would probably require a very 
different Soviet past. 
However, if a different relationship would require a different world at the macro-
level, focusing on individual reasons for behaviour might allow us to think 
counterfactually about this relationship. More journalists and editors could have – as 
some did – warned against fraudulent companies in newspapers and on television. More 
people could have – as some did – believed the warnings that were actually issued. 
Although it is implausible that the relationship between the press and the public could 
have been  different from what it was, it is not implausible that some people could have 
come to change their view on the press – because many did. If more people had changed 
their views, outcomes could have been different from what they actually were. To find 
branching points for macro-level change might be difficult; but to find branching points 
for individuals might still be possible. 
Let us return to the economistic explanations reviewed in Chapter 2, and imagine 
counterfactual worlds with positive real interest rates throughout the period and better 
legislation, by identifying branching points where decisions were made that affected 
interest and exchange rates and legislation. Such counterfactuals would also increase our 
understanding of why the world was as it actually was; but they do not directly increase 
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our understanding of why households acted as they actually did, given that world. The 
reason is that in the actual world, real interest and exchange rates and banking 
legislation on household financial behaviour were not the main reasons households had 
for their financial behaviour. Accordingly, explanations of household financial 
behaviour based on variables not entering into the discourses and the reasons of actual 
households, can tell us something not so much about actual financial behaviour itself as 
about the world that made that behaviour possible. 
This view does not imply that such explanations are not interesting in their own right 
or that they are not relevant to the questions posed here. But it does mean that it is 
difficult to say too much about how households would actually have acted in a 
counterfactual world with different macroeconomic policies, because it is difficult to 
know how such changes would have affected the reasons that people actually had. 
Would, for instance, stable, positive real interest rates have had any significance for 
whether people perceived Sberbank and commercial banks as one and the same, or as 
two completely different phenomena? Or for whether they thought that the important 
distinction was that between rouble deposits and dollars, or that between earning profits 
from interest or profits from exchange rate differentials? We cannot even identify 
counterfactuals for such model-based explanation if we do not know why people acted 
as they actually did in the real world. 
This study has held that, when explaining economic phenomena in the past, we 
should not explain the actors of that past as if they were homines economici. We should do 
our best to see them as they actually were. But if this is so in the past, the same must 
apply to the present and the future. When situations are complex and when motivations 
and decision-making procedures cannot be taken for granted, model-based explanation 
is not only inadequate for explaining the past: it might not be very useful in guiding the 
present and predicting the future. Contemporary history therefore has a role to play in 
helping economists heed John Maynard Keynes’ plea that it is better to be “vaguely right 
than precisely wrong”.  
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As safe as Al’fa Bank? 
Let me briefly return to the story of clients who fled Al’fa Bank in June 2004. The crisis of 
trust towards Al’fa came after a month when several smaller banks operating in the grey 
market had experienced problems in the interbank market and with law-enforcement 
agencies. Then Viktor Zubkov, head of the Federal Service for Financial Monitoring, 
issued a statement revealing that an additional 10 banks were on a blacklist of banks that 
could be in trouble. Against this background, rumours about Al’fa Bank – which in fact 
was not on the list – flourished. A leading Russian banker, Aleksandr Grigor’ev, 
dismissed the notion that the events of the spring of 2004 represented a crisis in the 
banking system thus: “The events of May and June 2004 did not constitute a crisis in the 
Russian banking system, there were no and are no macroeconomic reasons for a 
crisis.”132 On this view, a bank crisis is something connected to objective economic 
factors. However, Grigor’ev went on to fault Zubkov’s statement about the blacklist for 
the developments: “It was very unwise to state that there was a black list, which could 
not but evoke the reactions that followed among bankers and depositors.” (ibid.) This 
statement accepts as natural, reasonable and thus in a sense rational the hysteria and the 
rumours that followed Zubkov’s statements. 
To explain how a mere rumour almost led to the liquidation of one of the most solid 
banks in Russia (the bank was saved by its shareholders), we could propose the 
following explanation and counterfactual consideration: If Zubkov had not made the 
comments about the existence of a blacklist, there might not have been fertile soil for 
planting rumours. And even as Zubkov had made his comments, Al’fa Bank might have 
gone through the disturbances in the financial market unscathed if rumours had not 
been planted about that specific bank (it has been suggested that enemies of the bank 
deliberately did so to hurt the bank). To Grigor’ev, the comments and the rumour 
constituted a full good explanation, probably because to him, there was no need to 
explain why comments about a blacklist would lead to rumours, or why the existence of 
rumours would lead to panic. Sharing the experiences and the perceptions of Al’fa 
Bank’s customers, Grigor’ev had no need for a further analysis of why rumours 
flourished or why they led to panic. 
                                                   
132  ”Bankovskoe delo postepenno civilizuetsja”, Ekspert, 18–24 October, 2004 
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However, to an outsider, the blacklist and the rumours are a bit like the shots in 
Sarajevo. Without them, there might not have been a war, but they still do not quite 
explain why there was. The discourses described in this study show how people came to 
see banks as dishonest; rumours asserting that a particular bank was in legal trouble or 
could not support its deposits fit in with this discourse, and could easily be accepted as 
true. Furthermore, we have seen how the state was not trusted in matters financial. 
Government officials who denied that Al’fa Bank was on any blacklist could therefore 
not be trusted; they might have had their own motives for saying so – just as, by the 
way, those who put the rumours out in the first place allegedly had. Without a discourse 
expecting fraud both in business and in government, the events of May and June 2004 
could hardly have had such drastic effects. A study of discourse thus connects past and 
present events in a way that can make behaviour intelligible. 
Discourse is about concepts, and conceptual history is usually about the long run. 
This is logical, since concepts are relatively stable; if they were not, we could not use 
them for communication. Most of them thus belong to what Ferdinand Braudel (1972) 
would call conjunctures, whereas our deepest held and least questioned beliefs perhaps 
could be considered as belonging to the realm of the longue durée. On the other hand, the 
events that affect discourse are mere evennements. When we deal with individuals, the 
different modes of historical time come together: Braudel’s longue durée, conjonctures and 
evennements exist only within them at any particular point in time. An explanation of the 
crisis in Al’fa Bank in terms of the arguments brought forth in this study would thus 
connect beliefs and previous experiences about what the state is, what a bank is, and 
what bank bankruptcy implies, with the specific events in the spring of 2004. How many 
experiences would need to be recounted would depend on when the combination of 
past experiences and current events would make behaviour intelligible. An explanation 
should be able to convey to us how, when, and under which circumstances Russians are 
willing to consider a bank to be as safe as the bank. 
It is my hope that this study can contribute not only to making intelligible aspects of 
financial behaviour in early post-Soviet Russia, but also to providing insight into more 
general patterns of social and economic interaction in the post-communist world. 
 115
Appendix – List of Respondents 
 
No. 1 – Svetlana 
Age: 30 years old 
Marital status: Unmarried 
Education: Music academy 
Occupation: Musician 
 
No. 4 – Pavel 
Age: 60 years old 
Marital status: Divorced, one son 
Education: Vocational training 
Occupation: Worked at a Soviet plant until 1991, after that 
he has alternated between petty trade and working as a taxi 
driver. 
 
No. 5 – Stanislav 
Age: 36 years old 
Marital status: Married, two children 
Education: Army academy, bachelor’s degree in economics 
Occupation: Served as an officer until 1993, has worked in 
private business since, is now the head of an internet café. 
 
No. 8 – Vladimir 
Age: 35 years old 
Marital status: Unmarried 
Education: Secondary school 
Occupation: Bus driver/taxi driver/chauffeur 
 
No. 9 – Alla 
Age: 42 years old 
Marital status: Married, three children 
Education: Vocational training: Fashion institute 
Occupation: Fashion industry/florist/housewife 
 
No. 10 – Vjaceslav 
Age: 44 years old 
Marital status: Unmarried 
Education: Bachelor’s degree in history 
Occupation: Journalist 
 
No. 11 – Pëtr 
Age: 62 years old 
Marital status: Divorced, two children 
Education: Police academy 
Occupation: Worked as police officer until retiring in 1995. 
 
No. 13 – Ol’ga 
Age: 49 years old 
Marital status: Married, two children 
Education: Secondary school 
Occupation: Works as a shopkeeper. 
 
No. 14 – Nikolaj 
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Age: 33 years old 
Marital status: Unmarried 
Education: Secondary school 
Occupation: Bus driver. 
 
No. 17 –Aleksandr 
Age: 38 years old 
Marital status: Married, one child 
Education: Secondary school 
Other: Grew up in Baku; worked there in a video store, in a 
restaurant, and in a casino. Moved to Russia in 1994. Was 
unemployed for a while, then started a truck company. 
 
No. 18 – Julija 
Age: 39 years old 
Marital status: Divorced, two children 
Education: Polytechnic/economics 
Occupation: Manager of a fashion retailer. 
 
No. 19 – Grigorij 
Age: 35 years old 
Marital status: Unknown 
Education: Army academy/economics 
Occupation: Worked as an officer until 1995, since then for 
a private cement dealer. 
 
No. 20 – Il’ja 
Age: 47 years old 
Marital status: Unknown 
Education: Vocational courses 
Occupation: Worked as a mechanic in Soviet times, then got 
involved in various business enterprises, driving taxi in-
between. 
 
No. 21 –Evgenija 
Age: 52 years old 
Marital status: Married, no children 
Education: Vocational courses 
Occupation: Worked in a Soviet car plant until 1995, since 
then in shops. 
 
No. 22 – Konstantin 
Age: 45 years old 
Marital status: Divorced, two children 
Education: Polytechnic 
Occupation: Worked as a television mechanic in the Soviet 
era, has worked in private business since 1995. 
 
No. 24 – Boris 
Age: 57 years old 
Marital status: Unknown 
Education: Polytechnic 
Occupation: Worked as an engineer in a Soviet car plant, 
started a private engineering company in the early 1990s. 
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